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Considerable interest has emerged recently within U.S. policy scholarship toward
deliberative democracy and its potential viability as a form of alternative democratic
governance in resolving persistent policy dilemmas. Despite these claims, the deliberative
scholarship is an empirically understudied field. Instead, deliberative theory is usually
normatively articulated as an alternative and preferable form of governance. Secondly
and to a lesser extent, deliberative scholars assert that deliberative governance can work
and does exist. In these cases, often extensive deliberative claims are made but not
carefully tested according to explicitly identified deliberative criteria and measures.
This dissertation contributes to the systematic testing of deliberative theory that
has only recently begun. Theoretically, this dissertation fits within the gulf between ideal
and non-ideal deliberative scholarship. This dissertation draws from multiple sources,
such as interviews, direct observation, meeting minutes, and secondary sources, to
systematically evaluate and then comparatively assesses the evidence in four untested
exemplar deliberative cases that took place within seemingly intractable policy issues.
These cases are Oregon health care reform (OHCR) surrounding the Health Services
Commission (HSC), watershed restoration and management in Oregon surrounding the
Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board (OWEB), and the New Community Meetings in
Lane County and the greater Eugene-Springfield metro area surrounding the issues of
"gay rights" and sustainable development (NCMI/II). These cases exhibit significant
variation along explanatory and outcomes variables.
Overall, the findings in this dissertation suggest that at times ideal deliberative
scholars establish criteria and measures that are impractical or even unnecessary for
robust deliberation. The evidence in these cases suggests that non-ideal deliberative
standards appear capable of yielding deliberative outcomes that are perceived by
participant stakeholders in adequate terms.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND METHODOLOGY
I. Introduction
Recent and considerable scholarly interest has emerged toward deliberative
democracy and its potential viability as a form of alternative democratic governance in
resolving persistent policy dilemmas such as those involving crisis, contentiousness, and
complexity (Innes and Booher, 1999).1 Deliberative theory is also widely discussed and
celebrated by numerous scholars as a supplement to more conventional forms of electoral
democracy (Habermas, 1987, 1996; Gutman and Thompson 1996, 2004; Cohen 1996,
1997; Bonham, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Benhabib 1996, 2002; and Chambers 2003).
Despite these claims, deliberative scholarship is a relatively understudied field.
The lack of empirical development is acknowledged by critics and deliberativists
themselves (Fung and Wright 2003; Rosenberg, 2007; Sanders, 1997; and Pincione,
2006). Numerous deliberative scholars and critics claim that the deliberative literature
lacks rigor. According to Jane Mansbridge, "The observation and theory ofdeliberation
are also in their infancy. At the moment, we know relatively little about what makes for
1 Recent U.S. theory and policy scholarship has taken the classical western notion of a grass roots
democracy and evolved the basic framework. More currently, deliberative democracy has evolved most
notably with authors such as Habermas (1971) or Lindblom (1990), and continued with Dryzek (1990), and
currently is explicated by authors such as Fischer and Forester (1993), Fung (2003), Dorf and Sabel (1998),
as well as many others.
2good deliberation in a democratic assembly" (Mansbridge in Fung and Wright 2003,
178).
In Shawn Rosenberg's recent deliberative work, Can the People Govern?,
Rosenberg states that "despite the interest in deliberation, relatively little systematic
research has been done.. .In fact, only recently has research ofthis kind begun"
(Rosenberg 2007, 3). In only roughly the last 10 years has any significant effort begun to
systematically identify and empirically test deliberative scholarship. As a result, this
means the extant deliberative scholarship does not explain or even attempt to address
many empirical questions. 2
Instead, deliberative theory is usually articulated as an alternative form of
governance by drawing on normative appeals that seek to persuade stakeholders,
policymakers, or theorists to seek deliberation (Habermas, 1984; Dryzek, 1990; Pincione,
2006).3 Secondly and to a lesser extent, deliberative scholars assert that deliberative
governance can work and does exist. Deliberative "proofof life" is usually substantiated
through extensive case studies across numerous issue areas such as community level
organizing in development, environmentalism, and public health (Sirianni & Friedland,
2001).
2 Fung and Wright support the lack ofcareful empirical study in the following passage: "most work in
political science and sociology has not been helpful in bridging the gulfbetween proponents and critics of
participatory collaboration. As has been often noted but seldom addressed, [political science] focuses on
formal avenues ofparticipation and influence - voting and interest groups - usually in centralized venues
while social movements scholars focus squarely on informal methods such as protest and disruption.
Participatory collaboration lies between these two domains, and so has largely escaped the analytic gaze of
social scientists" (Fung and Wright 2003,285).
3 Deliberative normative argumentation generally asserts that genuine deliberation can better overcome
problems ofpluralist or instrumental politics along concerns ofcitizen inclusion and increased sense of
efficacy and legitimacy (Fisher & Forrester, 1993). See the work of Habermas (1984) or Dryzek (1990) for
a very cogent critique ofpluralist thought.
3The largely untested state of deliberative theory arguably results from a lack of
basic consensus regarding deliberative criteria and measurement.4 Numerous deliberative
scholars present implicit and explicit defmitions ofdeliberative democracy that vary
widely from one another even when they share they same basic criteria (Elster, 1998).
Partially because of this disagreement, when exemplar deliberative "proofoflife" claims
are made and presented in various scholarly studies, evaluative criteria generally remain
undefmed and explicitly tested (Elster, 1998; Mansbridge in Fung and Wright 2003, Fung
and Wright, 2003; Rosenberg, 2007). These and other deliberative scholars often lament
the fact that few studies have rigorously tested along explicit and generally accepted
criteria even in cases where exemplar deliberative claims are made.
A focus on normative questions and a theoretical lack of consensus along basic
deliberative criteria means the extant deliberative scholarship does not tell us much
empirically. Deliberative theory cannot explain many important questions such as why
policy issues such as state level environmentalism as opposed to health care reform
consistently exhibit success along deliberative criteria. Or, more generally, why or when
will stakeholders seek out deliberation as opposed to exit or manipulation? When might
be expect deliberation to work? How do policymakers know when deliberation exists or
is "good enough?"
Instead, deliberative studies often make exemplar deliberative claims without
explicit, shared, or minimal evaluative deliberative criteria and careful application within
4 For example, in their article entitled "Consensus building and Complex Adaptive Systems: A framework
for evaluating Collaborative Planning," Innes and Booher state that "neither planning professionals nor the
academic community has a clear idea ofwhat they should expect from consensus building" (Innes and
Booher, 1999).
4the cases examined. Importantly, this has led to a distinct gap in the deliberative literature
between ideal (theoretical) and non-ideal (policy based) deliberative scholarship. Ideal
deliberative scholarship leaves little practical ability to implement and measure
deliberative forums while non-ideal deliberative po1icymakers lack the appropriate
theoretical standards to continue to improve deliberative standards and results. This lack
ofpractica1 application tells policy-makers and practitioners little about how to
implement and measure deliberative institutional standards and procedures. Finally, the
lack ofempirical development also engenders critics ofdeliberation to question the
practical viability ofdeliberative theory (Sanders 1997; Pincione, 2006). 5
These are valid critiques that deliberativists themselves readily acknowledge.
Accordingly, the central concern oftms project is to continue efforts that are just
beginning to address the lack ofempirical rigor and subsequent questions about the
practical implementation and viability ofdeliberation itself (Rosenberg, 2007). Does
deliberative democracy actually lead to better outcomes? Ifso, what outcomes are better
and under what conditions? This dissertation undertakes a systematic analysis of
extensive deliberative claims within four cases (in three chapters) with the goal of
moving toward answering these aforementioned questions. These cases include Oregon
health care reform (OBCR) surrounding the Health Services Commission (HSC),
watershed restoration and management in Oregon surrounding the Oregon Watershed
Enhancement Board (OWEB), and the New Community Meetings in Lane County and
5 The most vociferous critics (often social choice theorists) argue that deliberation is pitched at a high level
ofabstraction. That is, deliberation's idealized normative claims are largely untested in any "real" political
arena. This leads critics to then assert that the viability ofdemocratic theory as a viable or even desirable
alternative form ofgovernance remains largely questionable.
----- ----------------
5
the greater Eugene-Springfield metro area surrounding the issues of "gay rights" and
sustainable development, respectively (NCMI/II).
By explicitly hypothesizing, justifying, then setting and testing standards for
deliberation, this project ultimately seeks to begin to reconcile ideal and non-ideal
deliberative scholarship and ultimately argues for a better appreciation ofthe conditions
that are more likely to facilitate adequate non-ideal deliberative institutions and behavior.
Accordingly, in this chapter I will begin by briefly outlining and then reviewing the
extant relevant deliberative literature. First, I will briefly outline normative deliberative
claims and "proofoflife" case studies. Next, I will show the state of current
disagreement amongst deliberative scholars. Then I will present two basic and shared
central deliberative criteria and their thresholds that I will use to assess the empirical
evidence in each case study. In the last section of this chapter I will discuss methodology.
In this section I will identify my method of analysis, justity the cases for selection, and
then discuss data collection methods.
II. Normative Deliberative Claims: Why Deliberation?
Recent attention to deliberative theory has emerged partially as a response to the
"aggregate" view of democracy advanced by rational choice theorists and the
conservative attack on the affirmative state.6 In this "rational" view ofdemocracy, the
individual is conceived as rational in a limited sense. That is, the individual is postulated
6 Fung and Wright 2003,3.
6to have a set of preferences that are ordered according to his/her desirability.? In this
model ofpolitical behavior, autonomy and equality are best understood as existing under
conditions where every individual enjoys equal access and is equally capable ofpolitical
influence. Therefore, when sufficiently interested or affected, an individual can and will
influence the political arena at a level proportionate to the extent an individual's
preferences are affected.
In this light then, governmental institutions are best designed to allow and even
encourage this free and equal pursuit of interest, as the aggregation ofthese interests
equate to the public good or at least a notion offair governmental process and decisions.
"Losers," that is, individuals that do not see governmental choice reflect their individual
preferences, still accept the outcomes and give legitimacy and compliance due to a
perceived fairness about the "rules of the game," where no one group receives unfair
governmental treatment and all are allowed to freely enter and compete equally. While
the losers might have lost an election, they will abide by the result in the hopes that they
can win the next (Rosenberg 2007, chapter 1).8
In these orthodox political models, conceptions of "democracy" largely consist of
organizing and legitimizing the state as largely limited to and defined in narrow terms
such as free, fair, regular and competitive elections that chose representative leadership
7 "Taking into consideration constraints and opportunities present, he/she is then assumed to make choices
that will lead to the satisfaction of these preferences" (Rosenberg 2007, 5). Each individual agent is a self-
directing political actor who makes decision and acts in the political arena to best maximize their individual
interest (Rosenberg 2007, 5).
8 Critics suggest this works under ideal conditions but are unlikely in most real political arenas. Minority
groups have little hope ofever winning an election, and forced compliance to governance in this manner
may become quite expensive and ineffective that ultimately undermines and reinforces social cleavages,
eroding legitimacy for the disadvantaged or otherwise excluded, less powerful social groups or interests.
7(Fung and Wright 2003, 3) as a way oforganizing the state. The resulting notion ofthe
proper role ofthe state is then largely encompassed by theories such as interest group
liberalism (Lowi, 1979).
According to de1iberativists, these increasingly removed or unavailable
participatory mechanisms do not facilitate active public stakeholder involvement or
consensus based politics. As routinized political parties and interest groups substitute for
participatory democracy, society is increasingly administered at a level remote from the
input ofpublic citizens. This yields a less understood and therefore legitimate state. Most
importantly however, theories of interest group liberalism seem incapable ofgenerating
and implementing public policies that "solve" larger and long term public policy
problems and instead generate a sub-optimal political process and output (Rosenberg,
2007).9
As an alternative, deliberative theory normatively presents itself as a more
rational, legitimate, directly democratic, practical, and sustainable response to the
shortcomings ofdemocratic governance inherent in elite, statist, or orthodox pluralist
theory that do not adequately cope with problems like social and political fragmentation,
shared power, and conflicting values (Rosenberg, 2007). Political participation and for
that matter appropriate governance is not necessarily most effectively based in se1f-
interested, instrumental calculus associated with social choice theory (Arrow, 1951).
9 By solve I mean securing state level policy decisions that secure a productive, sustainable economy and
citizenry through broad based citizen stakeholder participation and understanding, or at a minimum
satisfaction with major state policy decisions (Fung & Wright, 2003).
8When deliberativists begin to make these normative assertions they first offer a
different view of individuals, then a different understanding ofbasic political values, and
at times normatively assert how to best realize deliberative values in the design of
political institutions. The discussion that follows will briefly outline these respective
normative assertions.
Individualism- Deliberativists assert ideas ofparticipatory deliberation which are
premised on a very different understanding ofpolitical equality than the "aggregate view
ofdemocracy advanced by rational choice theorists" (Rosenberg 2007, 4). Behind these
assertions lies an optimistic view ofpotential human behavior. Deliberative theory begins
with and is normatively driven by the notion that individuals are not only capable ofbut
in fact actively make judgments or act according to a larger sense offaimess and justice
that is not necessarily driven by a individualistic instrumental calculus. In the deliberative
view, an individual is not only a rational actor making choices that act to satisfy personal
interests, he or she is "also an ethical and moral agent who reflects and collaborates"
(Rosenberg 2007, 7). Contemporary deliberativists insist that a fully developed, healthy
democracy revolves around the transformation rather than simply the aggregation of
individual preferences as in an orthodox pluralist political model.
This recognition of an increased capacity or broader basis 0 f preference
identification and formation also leads deliberative theory to a different normative
conception ofpolitical equality. Equality and autonomy require each other. "Equality is a
necessary precondition for autonomy" and equality itself requires autonomy (Rosenberg,
92007, 7).10 Only equals are able to fully engage in truly independent reasoning that is
genuinely open and cooperative. Also, without equal autonomy, reflection and taking
another's other position becomes difficult and less likely, thereby reducing equality in
deliberative interaction. Positions remain static and therefore replicate existing hierarchy
(Rosenberg 2007, 7-8). Deliberativists stress that this relationship between equality and
autonomy stress cooperative processes that promote standards such as equal participation
and influence within a policy process. In tum this engenders stakeholders to behave in a
manner which subsume neither the selfnor the notion ofthe public good defined beyond
immediate and narrow individual gain (Rosenberg 2007, 7-9).
Institutions- Deliberative democracy is normatively presented as "a partial
remedy for social and political deterioration of established democracies and as a measure
ofpreventative governance for emerging ones" (Rosenberg 2007,2). Deliberativists insist
that non-instrumental behavior is readily possible when the desired reflection and
orientation to "the other" is realized under not isolation but through actual interaction
with the beliefs, values, and judgments ofother people that hold these positions
(Rosenberg, 2007). Therefore, deliberative governance seeks to engender a more robust
and healthy civic capacity and engagement.
To facilitate an actively engaged citizenry, deliberativists espouse a positive role
for the state apparatus. That is, deliberativists believe the state is a viable, affirmative
institution and remains an essential tool for democracy. In response to the attack on the
10 In this case, equality is important in relationship to power among political actors. That is, the more
similar social actors are in terms ofcondition (resources, education, influence) the more likely they are to
engage in genuine deliberation due to the absence of inability ofany actorls to manipulate, coerce or
exclude. Autonomy refers to the capacity ofa rational individual to make informed, un-coerced decisions.
10
affirmative state, deliberative scholars call for reformed state institutions, not necessarily
less government. Deliberativists maintain that institutional reforms serve as a viable
mechanism to effectively shift tractable human behavior and motivations outside of the
realm ofmere self-interest by re-designing social and especially governmental
institutions to rebuild social capitol and to re-invigorate civic virtue (Manin, 1987;
Fishkin, 1991). Deliberative reform, with its potential for a more humane and just
society, can be facilitated with value driven, deliberative notions of community
discussion and consensus (Habermas, 1984).
However, in contemporary society, this capacity to collectively solve problems is
suppressed or weakened by the way in which major domains ofsocial life, such as the
market, the state, and organizations are removed from direct citizen participation or
continue to be guided by notions of instrumental rationality. 11 The transformative, non-
instrumental capacity of individuals is facilitated and replicable when deliberativists
recognize the collaborative and social dimensions ofvalue and preference formation.
Accordingly deliberativists often espouse extensive participation in governance as
paramount.
Furthermore, numerous deliberativists normatively insist the effects of
participatory deliberation rather than isolated political action enhances our marketplace of
ideas. Appropriate participatory deliberation results in political decisions that are more
11 Not unlike the Jeffersonian notion ofcivic republicanism, these contemporary deliberative theorists
assert that democratic public life only thrives where institutions enable citizens to debate matters ofpublic
importance. Habermas and Dryzek attempt to describe "ideal speech situations" that many other
deliberative theorists have also suggested and developed, where actors are equally endowed with the
capacities ofdiscourse, recognize each other's basic social equality and in which their speech is completely
undistorted by ideology or power (Dryzek 1990, Habermas, 1984)
11
logical (Gutman & Thompson, 1996), rational (Benhabib, 2002), just, considerate of
others (Cohen 1997), self-critical (Dryzek, 2000), and oriented toward the common good
(Cohen, 1997; Benhabib 2002). Ultimately, however, a deliberative policy process must
be interactive if it is to be more likely in bridging differences and produce policy
decisions that are ''both perceived as more legitimate and in fact more consensual,
rational, and just" (Rosenberg 2007, 2).
Deliberative Governance Criteria- Although the "rationality project" has brought
increasing efficiency in administration and decision-making, governance decisions are
becoming increasingly removed from lay participation and thus, satisfaction and a sense
oflegitimacy are being eroded.12 Democratic institutions like elections or referenda alone
are not considered adequate according to ideal deliberative standards. Deliberativists
agree that institutions must, when possible, generate full and equal participation in a joint,
cooperative process between citizens in order to realize the best political decisions
(Rosenberg 2007, 7-8).
As a member ofthe more recent critiques ofpositivism, deliberative post-
positivist frames argue that positivist theory, like interest group liberalism, encourages
instrumental behavior and as a result is undemocratic. 13 To engender an alternative form
of political behavior (meaning citizens that are fully engaged with Jeffersonian civic
virtue) that is required to make fully rational and just decisions, some collective notion of
12 These deliberative theorists might include, among others, Habermas, 1987; Gutman and Thompson,
1996,2004; Cohen, 1996, 1997; Bonham, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Benhabib, 1996; and Chambers, 2003).
13 Anglo-American deliberative theory began its most recent resurgence and development in the 1990s with
foundations in critical theory or critical legal studies (Welsh, 2000; Rosenberg, 2007).
12
decision-making that facilitates extensive citizen participation is usually an important
principle for building successful deliberative institutions (Rosenberg, 2007).
However, Anglo-American conceptions ofdeliberative governance often strive to
enlighten the political community (or generate better political processes and decisions) by
getting us closer to a shared understanding of"truth." By constantly probing into
alternative hypotheses, a political community (in the spirit ofthe science) moves closer in
the direction ofa cumulative body ofevidence or ''truth.'' That is, moral and empirical
progress is possible. Therefore, we can and should seek out continual discussion,
revision, and refinement ofour moral or scientific beliefs through practical reasoning,
leading in tum toward more correct and virtuous behavior. By engaging a similar process,
deliberative governance enables society to reach cumulative shared understanding or
moral truth as well.
While deliberative governance is arguably still aligned with the tradition ofthe
philosophy ofscience-specifically to the extent that deliberativists often advocate a type
of criteria to structure political discourse and decision via persuasion and argumentation
(e.g. argumentation and evidence as the proper way to conduct and evaluate public
discourse and decision-making)-deliberative theorists from various schools or frames
(such as Continental European alternatives) also at times partially or completely attempt
to escape orthodox positivist notions ofdiscourse and decision-making that assert a
"right" way to think and communicate, or that value certain forms of expertise or groups
that communicate using this expertise over others (Habermas 1987; Stone 2001;
Rosenberg, 2007).
13
However, both Anglo-American and Continental European deliberativists often
tend toward refuting de facto assertions about correct or incorrect assumptions about
political behavior (e.g. instrumental rationality) or epistemological frames (e.g. economic
rationality) in order to enhance the capacity of citizens and government to not only allow
for greater inclusion and legitimacy but also to better probe and utilize multiple forms of
expertise. Ultimately, the reasoning goes, refuting assertions about correct political
behavior will continue to produce better political process and outputs, thereby reducing
political exclusion and manipulation ofmultiple real or potential stakeholders. 14
In sum, the normative deliberative literature presents persuasive, moral arguments
that propose alternative assumptions about individuals, the role of institutions, and
alternative standards of appropriate governance predicated on ideas like some measure of
equality. 15 To the extent that deliberative scholarship suggests practical policy oriented
14 This is a development expanded from Habermasian thought and includes Mansbridge, Young,
Aronowitz, Bickford, Sanders, and others. To the extent these authors demand any speech related
evaluative criteria making that rely on the better argument, they use the term "argumentation" to mean
something approximating Habermasian "communicative action" or arguing that participants should ascribe
to the norm of"reasonableness" or an effort to understand one another. How this is to be measured is
unclear.
15 It is important to note that at times and increasingly deliberative scholars do propose partial but usually
only theoretical reforms rather than necessarily make a purely normative case for deliberative governance.
At times, institutional reforms are proposed to shift group preferences toward deliberation seeking. For
example, Fisher and Forrester, Dorfand Sabel, and Lindblom insist that institutional reform, whether it is
ideally making institutions completely open and reflexive (Lindblom, 1990), or having these same values
pragmatically bounded with specific institutional suggestions (Dorfand Sabel, 1998 & Fisher & Forrester,
1993), ensures that most ifnot all groups see the process as generating "better solutions," which in tum
leads to increased levels ofmore genuine participation as it is perceived as more inclusive and fair, and
therefore ultimately more legitimate. Or, Dryzek, Mansbridge, and Cohen believe that groups must
perceive they have a stake in the process to seek deliberative strategies. As institutions are properly
reformed, less powerful groups perceive real access and genuine opportunity to have more influence or
power in the decision-making while more powerful groups ostensibly are persuaded by the normative
framework provided by deliberative theory for enhancing the overall good ofthe decision-making
community and seeing beyond their short term interests. This in turn will increase the likelihood that all
these groups will seek out more deliberative strategies of interaction.
14
theoretical reforms-rather than necessarily making a purely normative case for
deliberative govemance-deliberativists have not usually attempted to operationalize or
test their theoretical propositions. Under these circumstances we cannot actually know
anything or make any evaluative claims about the accuracy of these ideas. Accordingly,
the largely normative stance ofdeliberative theory engenders vociferous critiques of
social choice theorists who insist that deliberation is too unrealistic, unstructured, and
h . 16C aotlc.
16 The largely normative, untested nature ofdeliberative theory makes it a popular target and arguably leads
to numerous other theoretical critiques as well. Rational choice theorists (among others) argue a neglect
among deliberativists in recognizing real incentives and behavior patterns among political actors that
arguably contradict the ideals of deliberative theory, such as immense material differences, fixed
preferences, rational public ignorance, and elite posturing that suggest that deliberation will either not
escape the instrumental political environment or will lead deliberative actors to engage in suboptimal
decision-process and decision-outcomes, where deliberative behavior will only create a political realm with
exploitable deliberative "suckers" where any rational instrumental actors also cohabitate. Rational choice
theorists also point to rational public ignorance, elite posturing, and the claim is made that mostly citizens
will not invest time in careful deliberation. Therefore, theories ofdeliberation are utopian (Pincione 2006,
14). Small "1" liberal or difference democrats (as Dryzek refers to them) - or those conceiving ofjust
governance in terms ofindividual rights - worry that deliberative processes lack of clear standards for
discussion and decision making give competitive advantage to morally objectionable positions. For
example, deliberative decisions are ideally made through consensus whenever possible to help ensure that
the broadest and therefore most valid reading of the public good is reflected in subsequent policy decisions
(Cohen & Rogers, 1983; Jane Mansbridge, 1990). However, is consensus appropriate when a majority
position emerges concerning a minority group that is not morally defensible? There is also the issue of
deliberative theory and its potential for exacerbating existing power imbalances when asserting that
persuasion and argument can substitute for epistemological authority, by"offering reasonable, morally
justifiable arguments openly to all," or that "deliberation can be judged by the quality of the participation-
as gauged by the degree to which participants' opinions and proposals are informed" (Fung and Wright,
27). Lynn Sanders and others raise concerns that argument and persuasion is or at least often can be a form
ofpolitical competition results in political exclusion as this suggests a superior language of decision-
making that many elite or status quo groups have disproportionate capacity to engage in. The valuing of
argument and persuasion likely ensure that existing power arrangements are perpetuated ifnot exacerbated
(Dryzek, 2000). Accordingly, this project rejects the deliberative theorists that define consensus as
convergence.
---_.. ------------------
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III. Exemplar Deliberative Case Studies
To the extent that careful empirical work has been undertaken, it has generally
been limited to attempting to prove that deliberation does exist and can work. The
deliberative literature focuses on attempting to prove the existence ofactual real
deliberation often through informal observation ofsingle cases where citizens
participated in some form ofpolitical or policy deliberation according to often unclear or
even non-deliberative evaluative criteria (Forester, 1999; Fung & Wright, 2003;
Rosenberg, 2007).
Numerous case study examples are cited both nationally and globally, across
multiple issue areas, and range across vertical layers ofgovernment. These cases have
generated both direct and representative democratic authority which devolves substantial
administrative and fiscal development power to individual villages, communities, and
diverse stakeholder interests. These so called "exemplar" or evidentiary deliberative case
studies include everything from local deliberative U.S. case studies such as neighborhood
governance councils in Chicago that address the fears and hopes ofmany inner-city
Chicago residents by re-structuring urban bureaucracy by devolving substantial power
over policing and public schools to local residents; to the U.S. based ecosystem
management projects that have proliferated since the 1990s; civic environmentalism in
Sierra Nevada country ofCalifomia between environmentalists and timber harvesting
interests in Quincy; or federal habitat conservation planning under the U.S. Endangered
Species Act which empowers stakeholders to develop governance arrangements that will
satisfy the goals ofboth human development and the protection ofendangered species; to
--------------- _._ .._----
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Panchayat reforms in West Bengal and Kera1a India (Fung & Wright 2003,5).
Unfortunately, the deliberative claims in these cases are not clearly defmed and
then explicitly tested (Fung and Wright, 2003). Shawn Rosenberg reiterates that what
little systematic research has been done in deliberative studies has been generally limited
to "a number ofcase studies were conducted that involved more or less informal
observations ofsingle cases where citizens participated in some form ofpolitical or
public policy deliberation" (Rosenberg 2007,3). This type ofstatement been supported
by other deliberative scholars as well (Mansbridge, 1980; Button and Matteson, 1999).
Furthermore, to the extent that empirical "proofoflife" case studies do exist,
deliberativists such as Fung and Wright caution that the lack of adequate systematic
research means that specific deliberative propositions can neither be confirmed nor
falsified:
A large caveat needs to be entered on the kinds of inference that can be supported
by these cases. In selecting their cases [in Deepening Democracy], the editors
sought to find illuminating illustrations of empowered participatory governance,
not to test a theory about it. In effect, they have sampled on the dependent
variable. Given the immature state oftheory and data in this area, this judgment
made sense. Its downside however, is that we lack the variation needed for testing
hypotheses. (Fung and Wright, 243)
Even when evaluative criteria are stated or can be inferred in exemplar
deliberative single case studies, these claims may focus on outcomes or apply non-
deliberative evaluative criteria (Sirianni and Friedland 2001; Pinkerson, 1992).17 For
example,
17 For example, deliberativists such as Sirianni and Friedland (2001) point to actual outcomes that leave the
less powerful or poor better ofas proof that deliberation is being sought out by some ifnot most or all
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Why then might we expect these deliberative democratic institutions to produce
effective outcomes? First, these experiments convene and empower individuals,
close to the points of action, who possess intimate knowledge about relevant
situations, Second, in many problem contexts, these individuals, whether they are
citizen or officials at the street level, may also know how best improve the
situation. Third, the deliberative process that regulates these groups decision~
making is likely to generate superior solutions compared to hierarchical or less
reflective aggregation procedures (such as voting) because all participants have
opportunities to offer useful information and to consider alternative solutions
more deeply... (Fung and Wright 2003, 25)
Additionally, deliberativists like Fung and Wright cite increased legitimacy, a
shortened feedback loop, and enhanced learning capacity as support for the usage of
outcomes as measuring the deliberation process itself As a result, deliberative empirical
fmdings are not capable ofdisconfmning ideal deliberative theoretical assertions.
IV. Deliberative Disagreement
A widespread lack of theoretical consensus is common in deliberative theory.
They disagree about "values, status, aims, and scope ofdeliberation, and their
disagreements yield different views ofdemocracy" (Gutman and Thompson 2004,21).
This lack of consistency problematizes and further explains the frequent lack of
deliberative empirical analysis (Fung and Wright, 2003).
This means that one deliberativist's deliberation may be another's instrumental
behavior more rightly associated with interest group liberalism (Fung and Wright 2003,
187). Deliberative criteria are usually either undefined or widely divergent in
interested and affected groups in a policy area. Fung and Wright state that "choices will be fair if groups
adopt reasonable proposals rather than those that gamer the greatest self-interested support or political
influence" (Fung and Wright 2003, 18).
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interpretation at times. Are participant stakeholder supposed to change their minds during
or after participatory forums and should stakeholders only worry about the common good
(most deliberativists), or should they retain their original positions but come to respect
the opinions (while not agree with) of other positions (Jane Mansbridge, 1980)? "We do
not even know exactly which transformations and deliberations should occur or are
'better' and why" (Mansbridge in Fung and Wright 2003, 187). Gutman and Thompson
state "the disagreement among deliberative democrats who seek consensus and those who
accept pluralism is more intractable than the disputes we have so far considered"
(Gutman and Thompson 2004,26).
Deliberativists also disagree about whether deliberation has only "instrumental
value" or "expressive value." That is, do we gauge deliberation by outcomes, or by
whether "good" policy outcomes were reached? Or, do we measure it by whether it
generates mutual satisfaction and respect among citizens? As mentioned, Fung and
Wright (2003) as well as Sirianni and Friedland (2001) assert that outcome measures are
important to gauging whether deliberation has occurred. For example, Fung and Wright
state that "choices will be fair if groups adopt reasonable proposals rather than those that
garner the greatest self-interested support or political influence" (Fung and Wright 2003,
18). However, later in chapter 6 Jane Mansbridge insists that we must judge separately
''the quality of the deliberation... the quality of the decision procedure... and the quality of
the outcome" (Mansbridge in Fung and Wright 2003, 180).
Another related disagreement among deliberativists concerns whether deliberative
theory should be predicated on procedural or substantive grounds. That is, pure
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proceduralism holds that "the principles should apply only to the process... and not
prescribe the substance of the laws, but only the substance by which the laws are made
and the conditions necessary for the procedures to work fairly" (Gutman and Thompson
2004,24). Substantive deliberativists insist that procedures (majority rule) can produce
unjust outcomes (discrimination against minorities).18 The assertion ofbasic rights and
standards that demand all citizens are treated as free and equal citizens presuppose and
facilitate any minimum guarantee ofdeliberative procedures. This contrast is sometimes
thought to be reflected in the tension between Habermas and Rawls, where Habermas is
said to favor democratic deliberation over rights and Rawls would favor rights over
deliberation (Gutman and Thompson 2004,26). In practice however, both perspectives
recognize the need for democratic principles articulated within and by a deliberative
process (Gutman and Thompson 2004,26).
Finally, at times scholars agree certain criteria (e.g. procedural and substantive
standards) are important for deliberation in principle but remain vague about defming and
bounding these concepts and establishing appropriate thresholds or measures. While
deliberativists ideally ascribe to extensive participation (especially by traditionally
marginalized populations or by those most affected by the decision at hand) when
practical and ethical constraints are introduced they begin to gravitate toward either
representative or participatory criteria for participation (Gutman and Thompson 2004,
18 Deliberative disagreement on substantive and procedural criteria can also lead to different assertions
about the proper role ofdeliberation. Should deliberation occur in government or in civil society? The
answer to this question is partially driven by substantive or procedural concerns. After all, ifminimum
constitutional standards are required for minimum deliberative guarantees and an informal civil institution
cannot ensure these minimums then a governmental role might be more a more appropriate forum for
deliberative institutions.
20
30). Deliberative lack of cohesion is made worse though theoretical vagueness and
resulting difficulty in testability and ultimately undermines its own direct democratic
intentions with such underdevelopment. For example,
Since the empirical study ofaltemative institutional designs is too immature to reveal
whether these features are necessary [state centered devolution and centralization] to
deliberative arrangements, we offer them as observations and hypothesis about design
features that contribute to institutions that advance, stabilize, and deepen democratic
development (Fung and Wright 2003, 20).
Again, as a result, answers to important deliberative questions remain equally
absent and confused. While Elster (1998) and other deliberative scholars assert there is
some basic agreement among scholars on a core set ofdeliberative criteria, there still
remains substantial disagreement over a) the actual meaning ofmany of the identified
deliberative criteria, and b) to what extent or in what combinations these criteria should
be present in order to meet deliberative thresholds, i.e. to know when deliberation
emerges to the extent that agreement exists over the meaning of each criteria.
V. Shared Deliberative Criteria
While varying at times in exactly how to best accomplish this, deliberative
theorists nonetheless see deliberation as a crucial democratic tool toward finding
legitimate and viable solutions to policy issues that have proven resistant to statist,
pluralist, or elite based frameworks (Fischer and Forrester 1993; Welsh, 2000).
However, the deliberative literature does clearly establish the need for the
following as basic criteria of deliberation: power imbalances must be within certain
thresholds; groups must seriously encourage, listen to, and respect all valid perspectives;
------------ ._.. --_._-
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and institutions should be designed to meet the participation requirement or genuine
inclusion of as many interested and affected actors as possible, especially the previously
less powerful. The absence ofor reduced presence ofanyone these factors, according to
deliberative theory, illustrates that the process is not fully deliberative. To the extent that
these thresholds are exceeded, more robust deliberation is expected.
Deliberative theorists such as Dryzek and Habermas, while each hailing from
American and Continental schools respectively (Rosenberg, 2007), share central
commonalities that reflect the core theoretical agreement that exists within deliberative
theory. These and other notable deliberativists maintain that facilitating genuine and
robust deliberation requires that citizens be brought together publicly to discuss public
policy in a setting that emphasizes equal influence and participation as well as mutual
respect. Deliberative scholars are universally hopeful for and in fact optimistic toward a
revival ofthe public sphere and see the affirmative state as central to achieving this
vision.
Ideally, this new deliberative political community would transcend a system of
manipulation, exclusion, or coercion, and is based on the equal rights and obligations of
legally vested citizens, again, in a manner not unlike Jeffersonian civic republicanism. A
discursive theory ofdemocracy requires a political community which can collectively
define its political will and implement it as policy, and it requires an activist public
sphere, where matters of common interest and political issues can be discussed, and the
force ofpublic opinion can influence the decision-making process at a minimum (Dryzek
1990, Fisher & Forrester, 1993).
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This usually necessitates an acknowledgement ofresolving criteria ofrelative
parity and respect as central to any claims about standards ofdeliberation or deliberative
claims. Claims 0 f relative parity or respect usually begin then, at a minimum, with some
measure ofperceived stakeholder legitimacy. In order to make grand claims of
widespread satisfaction and appeal, however, deliberativists often suggest decision-
making models that seek inclusion and consensus or as close to consensus as possible. In
this case, Cohen and others do not mean that genuine deliberation leads to convergence
(Elster 1998, 197-98). Consensus instead refers with satisfaction with the process and
acceptance of the decision, whether all stakeholders agree with the substance ofthe
agreement or not. This idea ofconsensus turns on the perceived adequacy of the
deliberative process (as even an ideal deliberative procedure will not produce consensus)
and helps ensure some measure ofrelative parity.
However, consensus requires some measure of perceived legitimacy. Legitimacy
necessitates that all stakeholders must perceive they are being treated with respect,
meaning "open-mindedness and a willingness to listen" (Fung and Wright 2003, 178) and
that their voices have some measure of influence within participatory forums. If these
conditions are not met then stakeholders are less likely to seek out deliberative forums
and engage in deliberative behavior.
This means that assertions about serving the public good or achieving public
consent cannot rest merely on the satisfaction of the dominant interests in a participatory
process or decision, nor can the will of the majority necessarily be enough to argue that
the public good had been ensured, if the traditionally marginalized poor or minority
--- ---- -----
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populations have not been included somehow (Cohen and Rogers 1987; Jane Mansbridge
1991). Ifproperly included, "even people who disagree may then accept the results of a
deliberative procedure as legitimate" (Cohen in Elster 1998, 197-198). Therefore, the
process must be as extensively inclusive as possible and must strive to produce consensus
decisions. 19
The existence ofcriteria for making participatory decisions is inevitable.
However, in order to claim legitimacy in the decision-making process, deliberativists
rightly expend considerable effort in coping with issues ofparity in participatory
decision-making. Cohen and Rogers (1983) assert that access to basic material resources
is a precondition for genuinely free and unconstrained deliberation. The existence of
serious material inequalities is likely to erode free and equal public deliberation by
translating into drastically unequal capacities for political action. Legitimate collective
action is not the product of the will of a dominant interest/s or the sum of individual self-
interested behavior that may result in some sort or majority preference, but a "property of
intersubjective discourse" (Dryzek, 1990).
Following Habermas, critical theorists are concerned with the tendency for power
or force and subsequent resulting domination by a small group ofstakeholders onto
others. Critical theorists ideally seek to achieve equality within a deliberative forum and
within broader society, to the extent possible.2o The exception to this is the force ofthe
19 This is the notion ofconsensus that deliberativists such as Cohen and others postulate and that I will
utilize.
20 Deliberativists like Cohen and Rogers would urge the elimination ofgross material inequities by
recommending things like free public education and state-financed child care, for example (Cohen and
Rogers in Fung and Wright 2003, chapter 10).
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better argument, itself a controversial assertion among deliberativists (Habermas, 1984).
A truly deliberative forum, therefore, must adopt the principle that it must be constantly
at work to mitigating the capacity ofgroup or actor domination or potential domination
through an imbalance ofpower. Accordingly, even a process that appears deliberative or
a decision that is based in consensus is suspect until the relationship between subjects
along formal and informal dimensions are assessed.
Critical legal theorists place emphasis on the state as an instrument of facilitation
and enforcement ofminimum standards (centralization) to ensure deliberative measures
are undertaken and to reduce local cooptation and also voluntarily devolves state
authority for more appropriate and legitimate affected community decisions. Critical
legal theorists assert the proper type and scope of collective action by generally locating
power as close to the issue area itself and in this process governance moves closer to the
affected and interested actors themselves and away from centralized authority at the
hands of a removed state agent. The focus is on the immediacy ofthe connection between
discursive forums and their agreements and the actual implementation ofresulting
deliberative decisions. This makes discussions about what should be done immediately
linked to what is currently being done (Dorfand Sabel 1998; Sabel 1994, 138; Welsh
2000).
This means political or policy decisions are removed from a centralized and
remote governing unit. These units ofgovernance are situated locally and given the full
extent of authority possible. Deliberative theory attempts to produce dialogue that is
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traditionally facilitated through an administrative state agency (voluntary top down
devolution), deliberative theorists increasingly argue for dialogue that does not allow for
anyone frame to be considered dominant, such as so called "expert" knowledge, or other
positivist frames. To ensure this and other forms of domination are constrained, the
central governing agent retains an important but modified role relative to the familiar
centralized statist role ofa federal governing structure, for example (Dorf and Sabel,
1998).
That means locally empowered governmental units are to be granted adequate
capacity to preempt and mitigate local elite co-optation ofdeliberative decision-making,
extra-constitutional behavior, and are to mitigate severe violations ofbasic self-imposed
goals or best practice standards. This is to be accomplished through the setting of
minimum standards that directly seek to cope with inequity and help facilitate respect.
These minimum standards should include things like rigorous requirements for
full community inclusion and participation, for example (Cohen & Rogers in Olin
Wright, 1995; Dorf and Sabel 1998). After all, the relationship between theories of
deliberative democracy and theories ofliberal democracy or basic centralization
standards. While these may assume various forms in the existing deliberative scholarship
most deliberativists declare deliberation to be compatible with traditional liberalism, such
as Dorfand Sabel (1998) or other critical deliberative scholars and deliberative legal
theorists. Critical deliberativists insist deliberative theory that assume and enforce
minimum legal and constitutional principles actually enhances the legitimacy oflaws and
------------------ -------
26
policies.21 In a deliberative arrangement with basic minimum standards, organized
interests and private groups would continue to exist, but are ideally moved away from
seeking only to influence policy for purely instrumental gain.
However, while uncommon among Anglo-American theorists, some
deliberativists such as Continental European critical theorists like Jiirgen Habermas, go
further, and question the attempt by traditional liberal philosophers to establish the
priority ofrights or justice over democracy as another form ofepistemological control
through the attempt to force others to ascribe to a western notion of individual rights over
community self-determination, for example. According to Pincione, this is often
implicitly established in Americentric, small "1" liberalist notions ofdeliberative justice
and rights (Pincione, 2006). The legitimacy of political decisions (and perceptions about
power and respect) primarily depends on the satisfaction ofdeliberative principles (such
as rights, justice, consent, inclusion, and collective will).
In sum, while scholars may disagree over exactly what each ofthese criteria
entails regarding deliberation seeking and emergence, the deliberative literature does
clearly establish the need for the following as basic criteria ofdeliberation: power
imbalances must be within certain thresholds; groups must seriously encourage, listen to,
and respect all valid perspectives; and that institutions must be designed to meet the
participation requirement or genuine inclusion ofas many interested and affected actors
as possible, especially the previously less powerful. The absence ofor reduced presence
of anyone these factors, according to deliberative theory, illustrates that the process is
21 Also notably Amy Gutman, Dennis Thompson, and Carlos Ninos.
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not fully deliberative. In the next section, I will defme basic deliberative terms and
establish the central shared theoretical deliberative criteria, their measures, and the
minimum thresholds I will use to assess the evidence in each empirical case.
VI. Theoretical Deliberative Variables
Before proceeding to test deliberation it is important to establish a working
conceptual defmition ofdeliberation itself. According to deliberativists, what exactly is
deliberation? Deliberative scholars would agree, at a minimum, that deliberation can be
understood as a decision-making process where all relevant stakeholders are allowed
and encouraged to discuss and influence public policy through mutually respectful
d · l 22la ogue.
What specific theoretical criteria and actual institutional standards are suggested
by this defmition? The core assumption behind deliberative theory rests on making
decisions that are arrived at by interested and involved stakeholders such as local citizens
or other relevant political actors.23 Implied in the notion of incorporation is the idea that
22 Deliberative scholars agree, at the very minimmn, to the criteria contained in this definition of
deliberation (Rosenberg, 2007). This type of definition also implies certain additional minimmn standards
such as making decisions through interested and involved groups such as local citizens and political actors
and some minimmn level ofparity to facilitate genuine participation and influence among multiple
stakeholders. To the extent these indicators are not present, we do not expect to find full deliberation
occurring.
23 Determining where one stakeholder or group ends and another begins is crucial to dealing with
measurement issues surrounding deliberation. At the most basic definitional level, a group can be
considered a recognizable collection of individuals who seek to act in a coherent fashion in pursuit of a
political goaL A group can be measured either subjectively (that is, what group do you consider yourself a
member of or where would you place a given group), or by establishing generally understood, explicit
measures. For our purposes, a group is a political faction or grouping of individuals within a political
organization, such as a political party, a trade union, or other group with some kind of political purpose
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deliberation respects and is actually strengthened by diverse opinions that bring different
types of expertise to bear upon an issue. This means that deliberation seeks consensus but
does not attempt to generate sameness. This defmition ofdeliberation necessitates that
decisions do not usually select on goals or ends, only on an agreed upon, shared process
ofinteraction without primacy being given to one group, type ofknowledge, or a
particular policy outcome. Additionally, this defmition ofdeliberation implies some
measure of equality and respect.
In this section I will draw from the extant deliberative literature to identifY central
and shared theoretical deliberative criteria and their measures in the next section in order
to more systematically predict and measure deliberation against the evidence in each of
the examined cases. These criteria will then be expressed respectively as independent and
dependent variables. First I will identifY the independent variables parity and respect and
their associated minimum thresholds and measures. If sufficiently present, these variables
cause deliberation to occur. To the extent that these minimum standards are exceeded,
more robust deliberation is expected. Next, I will present the dependent variables, which
are referred to as stakeholder perceptions ofparity and respect. I will then present and
discuss the minimum thresholds and measures ofthese dependent variables. Ifminimum
perceived parity and respect thresholds are met then deliberation is occurring. To the
(e.g. a power bloc, or a voting bloc). The individuals within a faction are united in one common goal or set
ofcommon goals for the broader organization; although not all goal/s are always shared by its members
(hence the subjective measure to account for in group view divergence). There is the problem of
overlapping membership or shared goals by numerous groups, making group identification messy and
imprecise at times. In fact, from an ideal deliberative perspective, the actualization of deliberation might be
an end to any definitional utility behind the term itself as groups may no longer see each other as distinct
units with very narrow goals or ends but united behind a transformative concern for a deliberative process
itself. However, in orthodox political environments of interest group politics, and or contentious and
polarized environments which deliberation is initially presented as most needed as a governance strategy,
identifYing different groups is often quite obvious.
29
extent that these perceived thresholds are exceeded then more robust deliberation is
occurring. The following formula illustrates the deliberative conceptual model I will first
discuss and then employ against the evidence in each case:
D AP+AR= 0 (PR+PP)24
Deliberative Independent Variables: Parity and Respect- The aforementioned
definition of deliberation implies and deliberativists often explicitly address the issue of
relative parity and mutual respect are central to most if not all deliberativists. First,
perhaps no general deliberative principle is considered more important to deliberation
by deliberativists than the concept ofpower. Joshua Cohen (1989) was the first theorist to
specify criteria by which one might judge the democratic legitimacy of deliberation and
his first criterion of deliberation was that deliberation is to be free, reinterpreted as the
Habermasian ideal of "freedom from power" (Macedo 1999,224).
What is power? Power, according to Jane Mansbridge, from a deliberative
standpoint, is understood as "the threat of sanction or use of force and in practice should
ideally be absent in a deliberation, though in reality this is impossible" (Mansbridge in
Fung and Wright, page 183, Deepening Democracy or Mansbridge in Macedo 1999, page
224, Deliberative Politics). 25 Mansbridge and other deliberativists do not demand that
24 Adequate Parity + Adequate Respect are independent variables. If sufficient at minimum thresholds then
deliberation is thought to be occurring. Perceived Adequate Parity + Perceived Respect are dependent
variables and therefore serve as measures ofdeliberation. Again to the extent that these minimum adequacy
measures are exceeded, more robust deliberation (or higher values in the above formula) is expected.
25 Power is more like the capacity to influence, exercise control, or bring about change. However,
deliberativists are concerned with the exercise of power to alter participation, discourse, and to influence
decisions and their larger perceived legitimacy due to an ability to coerce rather than by merit or consent.
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deliberation be fully free from power (as this is impossible), nor do they demand equal
influence or even equal participation (Mansbridge in Deliberative Politics 1999, 224-
225) as some may care or be more affected than others and some ideas may somehow be
more viable than others.
While disagreement exists as to the actual boundaries ofpower and the level of
parity necessary for deliberation to occur, deliberativists agree that without either some
sort ofexisting minimum background parity or institutional conditions are needed before
and during relevant stakeholder interaction to effectively generate at least momentary
conditions ofrelative parity. Ifnot, it is likely that more powerful actors will simply
dominate those with less power.
Subsequently, it is also more unlikely that less powerful groups will perceive or
seek out deliberative forums as legitimate, ultimately making true deliberation unlikely.
After all, according to Fung and Wright (2003, introduction), real deliberative output is
only possible through a genuinely collaborative processes that is inclusive, fair, and free
from domination. Ultimately, a full expression ofdeliberation is not possible in ideal
terms without relative parity. In other word, the relationship that is suggested here is that
the more extreme the discrepancies in the potential or actual use ofpower among groups
in a given issue area, the less likely genuine deliberation will occur or be sought OUt.26
To establish measures ofpower and minimum thresholds to evaluate deliberative
claims, institutional deliberativists often assert that issues ofrelative parity include
26 Power is a central concern ofdeliberativists. The basic proposition of relative parity can be drawn from
the deliberative literature and yields the following basic hypothesis: a group that has relative equality of
power with other groups will be more likely to seek deliberation over exit or manipulation (Fung & Wright
2003, 23; Cohen & Rogers 1987, 248).
------- - ---
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specific requirements such as devolution and centralization (Dorf and Sabel, 1998; Fung
and Wright, 2003). In practice, deliberative theorists insist that full inclusion often
requires some localism or what legal deliberativists call devolution at a minimum.27 In
attempting to institutionalize deliberation, deliberativists like Fung and Wright or Dorf
and Sabel (1998) assert the importance ofvoluntarily devolving state authority to
ameliorate power inequities among local groups in a given issue area. Adequate
devolution is hypothesized as facilitating greater deliberation among all involved local
groups.
Specifically, this devolution means the creation ofa local governance council
that has the power or means to set, redefine, and then accomplish its goals.28 That is, a
central state authority that voluntarily devolves substantial authority to local decision
bodies yet retains some minimum oversight to better protect and utilize local knowledge
are institutional factors that cause deliberation, therefore if any of these indicators are
27 "Effective government is first and foremost local government. ..The freedom ofmaneuver accorded local
jurisdictions in directly deliberative polyarchy and the obligations ofmutual regard that are its precondition
both favor exploratory problem solving and become the more effective for it. Above all, an experimentalist
regime gives locales substantial latitude in defining problems for themselves... Instead ofarguing the
relevant matters at long range through the institutions ofrepresentative democracy, local jurisdictions in
directly deliberative polyarchy can in such cases initially act on their own best understanding of ends and
means" (Dorfand Sabel in Democratic Experimentalism, 322-323).
28 This means a governance unit is not a fixed geographical or functional unit. It must be able to delegate
and or federate to other units ofgovernment, for example. To do this effectively, they must be able to
combine expertise in their respective areas of specialization with the ability to collaborate closely with
citizens or other interested or affected parties who have a stake in the decision activity (Dorf and Sabel
1998,316-317).
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absent then claims ofdeliberation emergence are reduced (Dorf& Sabel, 1998; Fisher &
29Forrester, 1993).
Deliberativists also insist that while devolution is crucial to generating effective
deliberation there must also simultaneously be accompanying centralization standards.
Appropriate centralization standards are also postulated as leading to greater deliberation
among relevant stakeholders. 3o Centralization generally consists of setting ofbasic
minimum standards and assistance in facilitating local priorities (Dorf& Sabel, 1998).31
Minimum governance standards must be required and practiced to ensure that
deliberation is most effectively working toward the public good and is ensuring that local
cooptation or some other forms ofmanipulation or exclusion is not taking place.
29 Inclusion requires that shared, community relevant, and legitimate decisions are incorporated and largely
arrived at locally; they are not made entirely from distant areas and from vertical layers ofgovernment by a
few groups.
30 "Iflocal knowledge and simultaneous engineering are indispensable to government under diverse and
volatile conditions, there is no reason to assume, and many to doubt, that they are sufficient" (Dorf and
Sabel 1998,315).
31 Facilitating the necessary minimum features ofa deliberative environment demand centralizing
standards that must "address both the Madisonian concerns about the self-aggrandizing tendency of
government and the equally Madisonian concern about the menace ofoligarchy in the closed communities
of small republics" (Dorf and Sabel 1998,284). This means generating practical governance standards that
"show respect for individual rights that, in the American constitutional tradition, provides crucial protection
against both the tyranny of the majority and the tyranny of entrenched interests" (Dorf and Sabel 1998,
284). More specifically, on pages 316-317 of"Democratic Experimentalism," Dorf and Sabel articulate an
ideal set of centralized, institutional minimum standards that consist of: inclusion standards that seek
incorporate experts as well as interested participants and especially seeks to actively solicit feedback from
those actors affected in a given issue area. Additionally, power must be devolved within an institutional
apparatus that is partially independent from a central agent. Next, whenever possible, this institution should
be largely open in its sharing of information as well as inclusive in its decision-making whenever possible
meaning the decision body shares power with and encourages interaction with multiple stakeholders.
Finally, the decision-making apparatus is evaluated through locally pre-established goals as well as by a
central agent that generates accountability though shared best practice standards and other relevant
information that exist in the policy area.
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For example, are there basic minimum or best practice standards codified in
governing documents that are also implemented by a central authority such as decision
and inclusion standards at meetings? Are there inclusion standards and are overtures
made towards inclusion ofpreviously less powerful groups in meetings? Do participants
agree with these assessments? Ifnot, then centralization is also less likely to be occurring
along deliberative guidelines (Dorf & Sabel, 1998; Fisher & Forrester, 1993).
What are the objective minimum conditions for relative parity then? Cohen states
that the criterion ofequality requires that participants are somehow "substantively equal
in that the existing distribution ofpower and resources does not shape their chances to
contribute to the deliberation" (Cohen 1989, 23). In other words, while relative parity
before and outside deliberative forums is usually impossible at a minimum, this
necessitates the creation ofa deliberative forum, and its rules and practices must control
some ofthe pre-existing and durable differences in power at least regarding their ability
to participate and have their positions incorporated, in order to facilitate conditions for
genuine deliberation (Fung and Wright 2003,266).32 To accomplish this, deliberativists
should explicitly attend to issues ofgroup dynamics and try to develop ways to undercut
the dominance ofhigher-status individuals (Sanders, 1997).
How can institutions accomplish this level ofequality? What conditions are
required, assuming that relative parity does not exist outside of these institutional spaces?
Deliberative institutions require perceptions of legitimacy, fairness, and substantive
32 According to Anne Phillips in Democracy and Difference, "Robust democracy becomes possible only
when economic inequalities are substantially reduced" (144, Benhabib). Many deliberativists realize this
ideal condition is unrealistic and have come to rely on institutional mechanisms to approximate this
standard.
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equality by the most marginalized groups and can be measured by inclusive efforts and
results. For example, "equity and fairness stems from the inclusion ofdisadvantaged
individuals - residents and workers - who are often excluded from public decisions."
(Fung and Wright 2003, 17 and 26) In Joshua Cohen's classic statement, inclusion is
defmed in slightly more specific terms. "Deliberative legitimacy is to be found in all
those subject to a decision participating about its content" (Cohen in Dryzek 2008, 484).
In sum then, alleviating relative parity specifically involves focusing on resolving
concerns about control and domination in a policy area and begins when deliberative
institutions first possess minimum levels ofinstitutional authority and assert or operate
under minimum basic standards in order to establish relative equality and to be perceived
as legitimate by the relevant actors (Fung and Wright 2003,36-37, and Thomas in Fung
and Wright, 150).
Specifically, at a minimum, all major stakeholders and affected groups must have
a) formal access, b) a real stake or influence in the deliberative process to ensure that no
stakeholders can dominate the decision process, and the HSC must c) be open to and
actively solicit and acquire unstructured feedback, especially from the most marginalized
and affected populations. 33 Ifthe interactive process, decisions, or stakeholder
33 What are ideal deliberative participatory standards? To claim genuine deliberation, deliberativists often
require participation by all groups including the most marginalized groups if they are affected, or by all
individuals affected. In Deepening Democracy, Fung and Wright assert that "For deliberative democracy to
succeed in real-world settings, it must engage individuals with little experience and few skills of
participation" (Fung and Wright 2003, 32). Or, "Deliberative legitimacy is to be found in all those subject
to a decision participating about its content" (Joshua Cohen, 1989). Now, given that extensive participation
of all interested and affected stakeholders is unlikely, how can non-ideal policymakers be certain that a
given participatory forum acts sufficiently as a representative institution in meeting deliberative
requirements that stipulate granting substantive policy input to all relevant stakeholders? What do we mean
by representative and how can we measure whether an institution meets this standard? Standards of
representation are contestable in the deliberative literature. However, institutional deliberativists like
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participation is dictated by one or more stakeholders we do not expect to fmd fun
deliberation. These independent institutional variables are expressed as indicators or
minimum standards for robust institutional deliberation. To the extent any ofthese
indicators are not present, deliberativists expect to fmd reduced deliberation occurring.
To the extent that these minimum indicators are exceeded, we expect to fmd more robust
deliberation occurring. These minimum independent institutional variables are illustrated
in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Indicators of(Xs) Relative Parity
Xs Indicators of Xs
Power Decisions are not dictated by any stakeholders; no stakeholders excluded
Devolution State voluntarily grants authority to local unitls, substantial authority is given
Centralization Written or implemented minimum standards: formal access, formal influence of
relevant stakeholder interests, open to and actively solicit feedback from all
relevant stakeholders
Dependent Variables: Perceived Adequacy along Respect and Parity Criteria-
The previous discussion postulates institutional independent variables that predict
deliberation and suggests minimum thresholds for the theoretical deliberative
independent variables parity. However, how do we know deliberation when we see it? A
Archon Fung believe that deliberative representativeness is not possible without real access. At a minimum,
often the most readily attainable and most common basic indicator ofrepresentativeness is institutions that
incorporate voluntary self-selection. Ideally, an institution will actively attempt to identify and solicit all
stakeholders and interested members of the general public (Fung in Rosenberg 2007, 163). Alternatively,
participants may be chosen that demographically mirror the general or affected population. Third,
institutions need to take steps to aggressively indentify and actively solicit feedback from all affected or
interested stakeholders to ensure better facilitate robust deliberative participation. For example, Fung
suggests structural incentives for low status and low income citizens to participate (Fung in Rosenberg
2007, 162).
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review of the extant deliberative literature suggests criteria and thresholds for
deliberation that serve as dependent variables. Policymakers, deliberative participatory
stakeholders, and to a lesser extent non-ideal deliberative theorists postulate that
satisfactory stakeholder perceptions are a strong indicator ofdeliberation (Gutman and
Thompson, 2004). Do stakeholders report (at minimum) adequate conditions ofre1ative
parity and respect, both considered essential deliberative criteria for any real measure of
deliberation? Accordingly, perceived adequacy along both respect and parity criteria and
thresholds will each be used as an indicator of or dependent variable for deliberation.
Perceived respect is considered crucial by deliberativists for and as a measure of
genuine deliberation (Fung and Wright, 2003). If a given stakeholder perceives they are
not being treated with respect they are less likely to seek out deliberative forums and
engage in deliberative behavior. What is respect? Respect is considered an essential
measure ofdeliberation and is a process defined as the practice of civility, an economy or
limitation ofmoral disagreement which should ultimately lead to helping recognize the
merits oftheir opponent's claims (Macedo 1999, 10).34 Another necessary but not
sufficient prerequisite, deliberation requires some degree ofmutual respect, a major
component ofGutman and Thompson's reciprocity, and requires listening (Barber, 1984)
and putting yourself in another's place, or empathy (Benhabib, 1991).35 It also requires
34 "Informally and in theory so far, we currently judge good deliberation on the basis, among other things,
of the degree of mutual respect" (Mansbridge in Fung and Wright 2003, 178).
35 Gutman and Thompson (1996, 2004) define reciprocity as part of a process to find mutually acceptable
ways to resolve moral disagreement. Ideally it consists of"acting fairly, following the rules in the spirit
that one expects others to adopt, as opposed to acting in one's self-interest, say taking advantage ofa legal
loophole or lucky break" (1996, 2). Under non-ideal conditions, "Citizens who reason reciprocally can
recognize that a position is worthy ofmoral respect even when they think it is morally wrong" (1996, page
-- ------------------
---------------- ----------
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recognizing the differences between you and others that make it impossible for you to
fully put yourself in their place (Young, 1997).
What are the objective minimum conditions for respect? According to deliberative
theorists, respect means that participants must all a) feel included, b) genuinely heard,
and c) that their perspective is taken seriously and into account by all group members in
order to seek out and engage in deliberative behavior (Macedo in Deliberative Politics,
1999).36 To the extent that these conditions are not met, at a minimum, deliberativists do
not expect full deliberation to be occurring. To the extent that these minimum indicators
are exceeded, we expect to find more robust deliberation occurring. This is illustrated in
Table 2 below:
Table 2: Indicators ofPerceived Respect
YI Indicators ofRespect
Respect Relevant stakeholders are included, heard,
taken seriously, and incorporated
Next, do involved stakeholders (or other relevant stakeholders that can be
measured, especially the least affluent) perceive minimum conditions ofrelative parity
are met (a-c) and are in fact adequate?3? To the extent that relevant stakeholders perceive
3). Some might call this accommodation or an economy ofmoral disagreement and in practice this means
interaction with others by appealing to morally and mutually recognizable reasons.
36 A synthesis of the deliberative literature yields a basic respect hypothesis: a group that reports respectful
treatment by other groups will seek deliberation over exit or manipulation (Mansbridge in Fung & Wright,
2003).
37 For a review of the discussion on parity see the previous section. fu addition however, these conditions
are not exhaustive or necessarily universally agreed upon by deliberativists in these terms. However, a
synthesis of the recent deliberative literature such as Walsh in Rosenberg, 2007 or more specific and
-------------~--- ~~--
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fair treatment and real influence, deliberation becomes more likely. If these conditions
are not met and deliberation follows, then the proposition that relative parity or respect
must exist along deliberative institutional measures does not hold.
To the extent that a deliberative forum does not meet these standards deliberative
theory would predict reduced deliberation seeking and behavior. To the extent that these
minimum indicators are exceeded, we expect to find more robust deliberation occurring.
Relative parity and mutual respect, as dependent variables, are illustrated in Table 3
below.
Table 3: Perceived Adequacy: Parity and Respect
Dependent Dependent Variable Indicators
Variables
(Yl) Parity Stakeholders view the process as open, are given a stake, and are not
dominated by any other stakeholders
(Y2) Respect Stakeholders report feeling included, heard, taken seriously, and incorporated
VII. Method of Analysis
Before proceeding further it is important to indentify and discuss a few specific
methodological points. This study is a cross case analysis and consists of multicase
designs utilizing a mixed methodological approach (Miles and Huberman 1994, chapter
7). According to Miles and Huberman, a cross case analysis serves two important
purposes: to increase genera1izahi1ity or to "ensure that events and processes in one well-
applied deliberative literature Dorfand Sabel (1998) suggest these minimum conditions for meeting a
threshold of"relative parity" that have been consistently confirmed in case study interviews as well.
--- ~---
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described setting are not wholly idiosyncratic" (Miles and Huberman 1994, 172).
Additionally, the aim ofa cross case analysis is to "understand how processes and
outcomes across many cases are qualified by local conditions, and thus to develop more
sophisticated descriptions and powerful explanations" (Miles 1994, 172). A cross case
analysis then, "must have a theory ofsocial explanation that both preserves uniqueness
and entails comparison" (Miles 1994, 172).
This project seeks to accomplish both of the goals ofcross case analysis (the
particular and universal) by utilizing a mixed method approach that draws from case
oriented strategies and variable oriented strategies, both ofwhich are a methodological
subset of cross case analysis (Miles 1994, 173-176). While I test each case by
preconceived theoretical deliberative variables (parity and respect), I will first examine
each case according to these explanatory variables separately. In each case chapter
section and conclusion I will present and then assess the particular empirical findings and
relate each case separately to the deliberative literature. In the concluding comparison
chapter I will compare aggregate variable scores across case, identifying and then
assessing themes that cut across case.
VIll. Case Selection
The cases chosen for this study are as follows: the Oregon health care reforms
beginning in the late 80s and early 90s (OHCR), viz. the prioritization process and the
Health Services Commission (created by SB27 in 1989); the Oregon Watershed
Enhancement Board (originally created as GWEB in 1987 then OWEB in 1999); and the
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New Community Meetings I and II between fundamentalist Christians and "gay rights"
activists in Lane County (1994-1996) as well as the New Community Meeting II which
concerned issues ofgrowth & sustainable development in Central Lane County (1997-
1998).
In order to test deliberative assertions regarding parity and respect I sought out
cases where deliberative claims have been made but have not been carefully evaluated
according to explicitly identified deliberative criteria and measures. Accordingly, all four
deliberative cases I have selected for study have all been referred to as exemplar
deliberative cases. These cases represent an opportunity to explicitly test along
deliberative criteria both comparatively across cases and over time within cases along the
aforementioned ideal and perceived deliberative criteria and threshoIds 0 f parity and
respect.
I sought to control as many fixed explanatory as possible in order to allow for a
controlled comparative assessment of my case set. For example, existing state innovation
and diffusion literature as well as the deliberative scholarship itself assert that geography,
political culture, and historical time as well - as other explanatory variables - are all
important factors that influence policy innovation and deliberation respectively. This
scholarship considers these factors (and others) important to predicting the viability ofas
well as the shape of innovation and diffusion (e.g. deliberative) reform (Walker, 1969,
1973; Berry and Berry, 1999; Rogers 1995).
As a result I selected cases where these explanatory variables remained as close to
constant as possible. Oregon's recent history is rich with claims ofdeliberative
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governance reform (Clucas, 2005). That is, selecting these cases allowed me to roughly
control multiple important, explanatory factors such as geography, political culture, and
historical time. By holding constant these fixed explanatory variables I am able to focus
on the role ofportable institutional variables. Restated, policymakers cannot readily
replicate or alter successful deliberative explanatory variables like political culture,
geography, or larger historical circumstances. Isolating or holding these important but
fixed explanatory variables constant is crucial to assess the role of these replicable
institutional factors in deliberative governance.
With a few exceptions in non-ideal.deliberative studies, a discussion of the role of
issue area in influencing deliberative governance reform is largely absent from extant
deliberative literature (Rosenberg 2007; Beirle & Cayford, 2002). As a result, the distinct
issue areas served as a contributing factor for case selection. That is, OHCR surrounds
the debate over state-wide health care reform in Oregon, OWEB is concerned with
environmental issues, NCMI is based on a local community and its internal disagreement
over gay marriage, NCM II is concerned with balancing growth and sustainability issues
primarily in Eugene and to a lesser extent the immediate surrounding area.
The primary justification for selecting NCMI and II (excepting perhaps extensive
deliberative claims) was the fortuitous existence of two cases that were nearly identical
along numerous explanatory variables excepting issue area and deliberative outcomes.
The accidental good fortune ofsuch a comparison in NCMI and II within Oregon (which
also allowed a controlled comparison with OHCR and OWEB) justified NCM selection
in order to assess the role of issue area itself in deliberation.
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Additionally, preliminary research was conducted to confirm that these cases
exhibit significant deliberative variation on the dependent variables perceived parity and
respect. In Designing Social Inquiry King, Keohane, and Verba state that variation in the
dependent variable is often overlooked by social scientists but is crucial to test and assess
the influence ofthe "explanatory variables" in a study and to better account for the
variation across the selected cases (1994, 109). That is, these cases were selected that
exhibited variation along the dependent variables parity and respect in order to "obtain an
unbiased estimate ofthe impact ofthe explanatory variables" (King 1994, 109). Finally, I
selected cases that are local or within Oregon. Selecting local or statewide cases
considerably facilitated data collection and direct observation.
IX. Data Collection
To assess the theoretical deliberative assertions regarding theoretical deliberative
measures ofparity and respect, I gathered primary and secondary data from a wide
variety ofsources in each case. I actively recruited and interviewed key figures and
diverse representative stakeholder participants in each case. However, my interview
sampling procedure was not random That is, at a minimum, in each case I was able to
identify a complete list of either board members (HSC and OWEB) or a list ofcore
participants in NCMI and II. I originally attempted to contact as many members ofeach
list as possible. For a number ofreasons, I was unable to secure an interview with many
ofthe individuals on these lists. These limitations included the private listing of contact
information, relocation, or repeated failure to return my request for an interview.
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Despite these limitations, I secured semi-structured interviews with all major
divergent identifiable stakeholder interests in each issue area. However, this was not a
random process. To ensure all major identifiable stakeholder perspectives were recruited
I asked interview respondents to identify all relevant stakeholder interests and to suggest
representatives and contact information for each stakeholder group. This led to and
helped me locate and recruit interviews with individuals that were stakeholders but were
not always identified as either board members or core participants in both HSC and
OWER
I also used the referral process in NCMI and II when I was having difficulty
locating core participants. However, in an effort to avoid the "circle of friends" or
snowball interview sample bias I recruited at least one participant from all major
identifiable stakeholder positions Additionally, I also successfully recruited participants
in each case that either publicly self-identified or were identified in interviews as
somehow unhappy with the participatory forums in each case in order to secure a more
representative sample along the dependent variables - perceived parity and respect - in
order to "capture the tails." This represented part of my efforts to avoid selection bias or
interviewing only a limited set of stakeholder perspectives. As a result, this yielded 28
extensive semi-structured interviews with key participant decision-makers and
stakeholder representatives in each participatory forum.
These interviews were used to verify the accuracy ofreports and statements from
other sources regarding the empirical reality of the participatory events themselves. These
interviews were then utilized to assess ideal and perceived deliberative claims along
----------------- -----
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parity and respect issues and to identify and to assess the interview respondent's own
subjective deliberative criteria. I did not share my own personal opinion unless explicitly
asked (this clearly occurred in one instance). However, at times I asked unscripted
follow-up questions. Accordingly I would characterize these interviews as more than
entirely scripted "objective" question and answer sessions.
However, I did have a general question set and I usually asked each question on
that list. However, as I progressed through my interviews in each issue area, if! received
the same response to a given question after several interviews I would generally not ask
more than one follow-up question to further clarify these responses. Also, if a question
that appeared later in the interview was answered in an earlier question, I would still ask
every question on the list but would state the respondent could add to their earlier
response if the respondent felt they had anything to add to this question. 38 This yielded a
relatively even mixture offadditional information and no further elaboration. This
strategy was adopted to minimize further data saturation at the expense ofgathering new
information or clarifying unclear or inconsistent responses. That is, follow-up questions
were limited under this set of circumstances in order to spend the limited time allocated
for each interview asking follow-up questions that were not yielding matching responses.
The ordering of my questions moved from the specific to the general in order to
facilitate confidence and comfort in the interview process. This meant I would begin each
interview by asking the respondent to talk about their involvement in the participatory
38 In my last interviews with policy elites that I had difficulty securing an interview oflimited duration (e.g.
Kitzhaber most notably) I dropped the respect questions due to time constraints and in order to focus on
questions that were not yielding consistent responses and to allow follow-up questions about Kitzhaber's
initial involvement with OHCR that were not a part of the public record.
45
forums through their organizational capacity, for example. I would then move to more
general questions about their perceptions regarding the participatory forums along ideal
respect and parity measures. Finally, I would ask them to identify their own assumptions
about deliberation. How did each participant define deliberation? How well did the
meetings ascribe to their standards? Also, when asking questions about power and
respect, I would ask them to clarify the criteria used to make their evaluations if interview
assumptions remained unclear.
My overall approach to the interview process was often scripted but was also at
times interactive. This does not meet strict positivist standards ofscientific objectivity.
However, according to Miles and Huberman (1994) my interview process does meet
criteria ofscientific validity as these interviews involved observation, replication, and
falsifiability. I decided to largely employ interviews as a supplemental tool ofanalysis
rather than more rigorously consistent methods such as survey instruments partially
because ofthe rich contextual narrative that could more accurately capture events in these
cases than either archival research or survey administration alone.
Additionally, I was initially unsure of my conceptualization, prioritization, and
testability of ideal deliberative hypotheses initially employed in this project. As a result,
in the initial interviews I used the initial interview process (as well as data from other
sources examined) to help initially assess the scope and testability ofthe ideal
deliberative hypothesis and then discard and refine untestable or unclear deliberative
propositions. For example, initially I had considered testing hypotheses involving
increased alternatives and polarization as leading to reduced deliberation. However,
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interviews suggested that these concepts were difficult to accurately assess and at times
were not clearly distinguishable from other measures (such as polarization and respect)
across all selected cases.
Restated, utilizing a partially open-ended, iterative interview process I was able to
fmd instances ofpoor questions or particularly unclear measures. Due to the initially
extensive scope ofthis project this was a fortuitous process. This allowed me to drop and
refme hypotheses due to important limitations in testability and data acquisition
availability in all cases examined rather than attempting to pursue the original project in
its entirety or by paring the project by making random choices due to limitations in scope
and expediency. 39
In each case I also gathered and examined archival data in the form 0 f newspaper
articles, meeting minutes, publicly accessible information on state run websites, and
policy reports drafted by state agencies (e.g. The Secretary of State, OWEB and HSC) for
legislative and gubernatorial officials (for OWEB and HSC), legislative bills and statutes
(OHCR and OWEB), as well as previous scholarly studies.
In OHCR, I acquired the entire Health Services Commission's statewide public
meeting minutes from 1989-1990. These meetings immediately preceded the formation
ofthe original HSC list and were used by the HSC to incorporate public values into the
prioritization scheme. I also drew from the previous extensive study by Mary Pinkerson
(1992) and the reports and secondary information provided by previous scholars,
journalists, and policymakers.
39 Specifically, alternatives and polarization measures were left out and devolution and centralization
measures were placed within ideal deliberative parity measures as an explanatory variable.
--~-----_. -----
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In OWEB, I acquired a year's worth of meeting minutes in OWEB (2007). I also
directly observed 3 days of Oregon Watershed Board public meetings in Salem, Oregon
in May of2007. These meetings were audio recorded. Also, a survey was administered
via email to a random sample of 10 local watershed councils in the spring of2009.
Additionally, extensive public records and general information on OWEB is kept and
maintained by OWEB online. This allowed convenient public access. Finally, I also drew
from the work ofprevious studies involving local watershed councils as well as the
reports and secondary information on OWEB provided by previous scholars, journalists,
and policymakers.
In NCMI and II, extensive internal archival documentation carefully outlined the
NCM model and its specific implementation was provided over several meetings with
Gayle Landt. I was also able to secure the meeting minutes from NCMII (1997-1998).
My study ofNCMII also included the research ofOregon Survey Research Laboratory
and Patricia Gwartney's longitudinal content analysis ofNCMII which measured and
tracked changes in outside respect over time. In both NCMI and II, I also drew from the
previous secondary research and reports provided by previous scholars, journalists, and
policymakers.
The following four cases are broken down into three chapters. These cases consist
ofthe Oregon Health Service Commission, the Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board,
and New Community Meeting I and II. Since both NCMI and II roughly vary only by
issue area, I will discuss NCMI and II in one chapter in order to compare and discuss
each case by variable simultaneously and to avoid a replication ofevidence. Each chapter
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contains four major sections: an introduction, an examination of ideal and perceived
power within and outside each participatory forum, then an examination of ideal and
perceived respect inside and outside each participatory forum, and a finally a chapter
conclusion.
I begin each empirical chapter with an introduction, where I introduce the issue
area as well as the factors which led to an adoption of deliberative governance reform and
the justification of each case along exemplar deliberative claims. In sections two and
three I present and assess evidence along ideal and perceived parity and respect. In
section four I summarize and assess the major chapter findings and their relevance to the
deliberative literature according to theoretical propositions regarding criteria and
thresholds along ideal parity and respect.
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CHAPTER II
CASE STUDY 1. EVALUATING EXEMPLAR DELIBERATIVE CLAIMS
SURROUNDING OREGON HEALTH CARE REFORM
I. Introduction
1. Background
Oregon's health care experimentation in the late 1980s and early 1990s represents
the nation's most far-reaching health care reform attempt to date (Fisher and Forrester
1993, 105; Pinkerson 1992, 22). OHCR has generated extreme national and even
international interest.40 Scholars, journalists, and Oregon policymakers often make
extensive deliberative claims concerning Oregon's health reform process.41 Despite the
40 In Civic Innovation, Sirianni and Friedland mention that "Representatives ofhealth ministries from
countries with universal coverage, ranging from Canada and Australia to Germany and England, were
visiting Oregon to learn how to address similar cost pressures besetting their own systems" (Sirianni and
Friedland 2001, 153 and 162).
41 Most claims surrounding the Oregon Health Care Reforms generally concern three major criteria:
innovation, deliberation itself, and outcomes as a measurement ofdeliberation. Innovative claims are based
in describing a reform process was very different than previous health care reform attempts and was far
reaching despite the complexity presented in health care as an issue area and the expected resistance
encountered among health care interests in preserving their substantial livelihood potentially threatened by
significant change in the status quo. According to extant deliberative process claims, the HSC generated a
more satisfactory, legitimate, as well as fair and just process of decision-making through an explicit, open,
and inclusive decision-making process where the public is aware of and has real authority over the
allocation of their tax dollars and state decisions over public health care provision. Outcome based claims
generally assert that a more directly democratic decision-making process actually generates objectively and
normatively better outcomes, that is more expertise is brought to bear upon the problem of health care
provision amidst a scarcity ofhealth care dollars and decision outcomes more closely and efficiently drive
and are linked to health care decisions. In this chapter, deliberative process claims will be evaluated.
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durable failure among other national and state level health policy reforms (and ultimately
within the Oregon case as well) Oregon's drastic health care policy innovation initially
generated extensive success. That is, the Oregon reforms were responsive to individual
and collective interests (through prioritization), controlled costs, and provided universal
access at the same time (Jennings in Fischer and Forrester 1993, 101 )42
The deliberate attempt to create universal state-wide health care through the
explicit and public rationing ofhealth expenditures and service provision in Oregon
formally began with the Oregon Basic Health Services Act. The object ofthese
legislative bills was a formal statewide attempt to settle the disagreements about priorities
in health care insurance under conditions ofdifficult choices that public budget
constraints invariably impose (Prioritization ofHealth Services, 1991). OBHSA consisted
of three pieces oflegis1ation. First, Senate Bill 935 which requires all employers to offer
health insurance to their workers by 1994 which was later dismantled. Second, Senate
Bill 534 established a risk pool for the coverage of persons who are uninsurable because
ofpre-existing conditions.
Finally, Senate Bill 27 whose purpose was to "permit expansion ofMedicaid to
all Oregonians up to 100 percent of the federal poverty level, and to do so by covering
only those services judged to be ofsufficient importance or priority" (SB27). Oregon
42 The Oregon reforms were particularly innovative. Oregon health care reform (OReR) institutionalized
an extensive and explicit state level policy making process. This process utilized an explicitly
institutionalized deliberative prioritization or rationing scheme. This prioritization of care included all
relevant stakeholders and ultimately led to improved outcomes measures. These innovative reforms also
generated widespread state level support among the state legislature, policymakers, the health care industry,
and even strong support among most of the general public.
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chose to provide limited coverage to every poor person, as measured by the federal
poverty standard (Morrow, 2003). SB 27 was adapted to the federal Medicaid system. It
designated that everyone who falls below the federal poverty level is eligible for health
care through the Medicaid program. In terms of adjusted coverage, this meant 160,000
additional eligible individuals (Morrow, 2003).
In many ways, the extensive interest in and deliberative claims surrounding the
Oregon Health Plan originate with and surround SB27. Passed in 1989, SB 27 is the
legislative centerpiece of this case study as this bill represented health reform legislation
which directly led to the creation of the HSC, the central deliberative mechanism of the
OHCR process. Through SB27, the Oregon legislature intended and in fact demanded
that the HSC encourage public involvement in the prioritization of health service
provision. SB27 mandated that the HSC "actively solicit public involvement in a
community meeting process to build a consensus on the values to be used to guide health
resource allocation decisions" (Oregon Basic Health Services Act, Senate Bill 27;
Jennings in Fischer and Forrester 1993, 108). These three pieces oflegislation were the
centerpiece ofthe Oregon Health Care Reforms and are represented in Figure 1 below:
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Figure 1: Oregon Basic Health Services Act
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2. Why the Oregon Case? Untested Deliberative Claims
Oregon health care refonn is referred to as a successful exercise in deliberative
governance experimentation. Numerous policy researchers and political scientists such as
Fischer and Forrester (1993), Friedland and Sirianni (2001), Mary Pinkerson (1992),
various lobbyists, elected representatives, and state level policymakers most closely
involved in the refonn process, such as those serving on or closely involved in the Heath
Services Commission (HSC report 1991)-among many others-all treat the Oregon
health reform process via the HSC and its initial list prioritization as an exemplar of
local populist andprogressive deliberative experimentation that reflects a successful
deliberative process. Specifically, the citizen participation in policy making via the actual
rationing process of health care services embodied within the Health Services
Commission (HSC) is most commonly referred to in substantiating the deliberative
claims that surround the Oregon Health Care Reforms (OHCR) discussion.
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For example, Mary Pinkerson extensively researched the Oregon health care
reform-including the HSC-and believes that the Oregon case shows us real
deliberation and consequently deliberative potential in policy-making, as she writes in
"Oregon's Health Plan: An Experiment in Governance":
[Oregon] exemplifies the public as expert and demonstrated that civic minded
people are capable of talking about rationing and are willing to consider not only
what is in their interest, but what is the common good.. .indicating a movement
toward greater accountability, community involvement and awareness of the
common good... competing interest groups need not paralyze the area of health
care legislation, as has largely been the case on the national level. Beyond health
care, it suggests that people can be empowered to reach past narrow self interest
and work together to solve common problems. (Pinkerson 1992, 321)
Ellen Pinney was the director of Oregon Health Action Campaign in 1988 and
was closely involved in the Oregon reform process and an active participant in the Health
Services Commission meetings. Pinney believes the HSC meetings were as deliberative
as any she has ever seen across the state. Pinney articulates to this day that "those were
the best public hearings (within the HSC) I have ever participated in. Never, ever, have
we seen public hearings like that in Oregon at any other time" (Interview with Ellen
Pinney, November 2007).43
Due to the vague, and broad, largely unexamined deliberative claims surrounding
this case, the Oregon health care reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s provide an
43 Deliberative claims are extensive and are made by numerous other scholars, policymakers, and
journalists, among others. For example, Bruce Jennings, in Fisher and Forrester's "Argumentative Tum,"
states that the Oregon Health care reform case "provides an interesting case study of the prospects and
possibilities of counsel and consensus .. .it appears that the Oregon experiment has been unusually
successful in bracketing the normal, politics-as-usual approach to Medicaid funding and in creating a novel
kind of self-consciousness about how decisions should be understood and made. The rhetoric of openness
and accountability won the day, and this policy experiment has been thematized as a communal and civic
process (Jennings in Fisher & Forrester, 105 and 112).
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opportunity for more careful examination of a case with strong deliberative claims. A
more careful understanding of the features of the Oregon case may shed some light into
designing deliberative forums that increasingly attempt to push policy analysis and
decision-making process toward, as Bruce Jennings states, a deliberative tum in policy
studies (Jennings in Fisher & Forrester, 1993).
II. Evidence: An Accounting of Power
1. Power within the HSC
Findings: Deliberativists claim the HSC was able to achieve relative parity
between groups within the HSC meetings and during the HSC prioritization process.
These claims assert the HSC itselfwas able to avoid being unduly influenced by any
particular stakeholder (such as the insurance industry ofhospital associations). In
support, the HSC granted the public a real stake in the decision-making process and
aggressively pursued formal and informal measures to take public preferences into
account. However, extensive efforts by the HSC to solicit participation and achieve
relative parity failed according to ideal deliberative criteria and even the HSC's own
goals. The evidence examined does not readily indicate that relative parity was generated
by or within the HSC nor practiced among the various groups involved at any point in the
prioritization process. Importantly however, this evidence also suggests that a large gap
in relative parity does not necessarily mean genuine deliberation will not be sought and
cannot occur. The nature of participation coupled with participant satisfaction with the
efforts to ameliorate this lack or parity expressed by representatives of the medically poor
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suggest the HSC itself may have reached acceptable deliberative thresholds. Evidence
such as interview data and meeting minutes will be examined to confirm that genuine
deliberation was actively sought out (despite the lack of stakeholder parity).
A. Institutionalized HSC Access and Influence
What was the role of institutional design in facilitating deliberative participation
among the various actors associated with health care reform? According to deliberative
theory, appropriate institutional levels of devolution and centralization are necessary to
facilitate deliberative response among interested and affected actors. The HSC design,
creation, and HSC process itself are examined in this section.
OHCR reforms conform to devolution along theoretical orthodox deliberative
standards. The HSC did and continues to have real autonomy and authority over health
care decisions in the state. Power was voluntarily devolved from the state level by the
legislature by SB27 and given to the HSC in substantively autonomous terms the SB27.
In generating a prioritized list, the initial requisite deliberative institutional step involved
devolution, or creating the HSC and giving this body authority.44
Specifically, the HSC was given the task of constructing a prioritized list ofhealth
services to the legislature and then recommending how many of those services should be
funded over the next two years. After an independent accounting firm projected the cost
44 Devolving state authority to the HSC is central to deliberative theorists like Dorf and Sabel (Democratic
Experimentalism, 1998), po1icymakers, HSC meeting participants, as well as secondary sources, which at a
minimum implicitly suggest and at times overtly demand that the devolving of authority as central toward
lending legitimacy to deliberative claims and broadened participation. These and other ideal deliberative
(e.g. centralization, parity, or respect) standards can be reviewed in the previous methodology section.
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of all the services on the list the legislature decides the amount of money to allocate to
the Medicaid program. The Health Service Commission itself was given final authority to
determine the constitution of this list and its order through SB27 (Prioritization ofHealth
Services, 1992). Once the legislature accepts the prioritized list, a line is drawn on the
prioritized list of services; services above the line will be covered by Medicaid, services
below it will not (Prioritization ofHealth Services, 1991). Most importantly, while the
legislature ultimately decides the amount ofmoney to allocate to the program, once the
legislature accepts the list and the appropriation is made, "legislators are not permitted to
rearrange the order of services, they can only decide how far down the list to fund"
(Jennings in Fisher and Forrester 1993, 108).
The HSC never dealt with or controlled what the overall state budget should be or
how health care resources should be traded off against other state treasury demands.
Nonetheless, this devolution nonetheless grants substantial autonomous leverage and
power to the HSC according to ideal deliberative standards. Deliberativists assert that this
type of devolution results in insulated authority which shifts the locus ofpower and
argument from the advocacy arena of the legislature. "Medical expertise and value driven
public input and deliberation that is incorporated into assessing the relative worth of
health care services is no longer subject to and driven by a political process oflegislative
lobbying, bargaining, and compromise" (Jennings in Fisher and Forrester 1993, 108).45
45 For example, if a lobbying group favors a service that the HSC has ranked low on the list, it cannot
attempt to get that service moved higher by the legislature. It can only try to get the line drawn below that
service. This is more difficult to achieve politically (Pinkerson, 1992; Fischer and Forrester, 1993).
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The HSC often conformed to centralization standards articulated by Dorf and
Sabel in structure and often in practice. The HSC was empowered with significant
authority to generate the prioritized list, this devolution was also mandated to occur under
a minimum but specific set of centralized deliberative standards.
Senate Bill 27 required Oregon to expand health care coverage (Medicaid) to
cover all those below the federal poverty level. To do this, SB27 mandates a prioritized
service list. The HSC was also to come up with a method of and actual ranking of
medical services. This ranking was to be accomplished according to "notions of fairness
and equity as determined by public values and the best medical science and information
available" (Oregon Basic Health Services Act, Senate Bill 27; Coffman, Darren. Personal
Interview. 14 March 2008).46
An empowered yet bounded HSC was mandated to independently draw on and
determine which services to rank and how to rank a list of health services ranked by
priority from most to least important. The HSC was mandated to undertake a specific
process to accomplish this. To ameliorate real or perceived power imbalances in creating
community forums, extensive participatory goals were set. To accomplish this, numerous
community forums were mandated. These forums were open and transparent. These
46 The key policy entrepreneur, former Senate Leader and Governor Dr. John Kitzhaber, and other key
actors such as the grassroots bioethics work, community meetings, and health care parliaments catalyzed by
the previous work of Oregon Health Decisions all worked together and acted to reframe the issue from one
of an uncaring government to one of fair and ethical, explicit allocation of existing state resources with the
ultimate goal of the plan being universal coverage. This meant insuring an additional 450,000 Oregonians.
(Sirianni and Friedland 2001,156-157). The OHP was also driven by the goal of the greatest good for the
greatest number. "Among the emerging goals of Oregon Health Decisions (OHD would later contribute
substantially to the process of setting health care priorities in Oregon) was a concern with discovering a
public good which goes beyond the aggregation of self-interest" (Pinkerson 1992, 55).
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forums generated and took into account extensive public participation and were perceived
as legitimate by the public and the major involved stakeholders (Prioritization ofHealth
Services, 1991)
To accomplish this ranking scheme, the HSC process would begin by establishing
a general set of values driven by the public (as mandated by SB27).47 Prioritizing of
services was then to proceed by further ranking services within a general cost
effectiveness ranking scheme. This led to the development ofan elaborate formula for
comparatively evaluating costs and benefits of specific services with an explicit intention
of discontinuing services that did poorly on this formula. Importantly, in addition to the
use of objective facts, such as cost and longevity, the ranking methodology was generally
based on a formula which also included subjective factors such as quality oflife or well-
being, which were used to help inform how many of those services should be funded.
This was accomplished using the best available medical cost benefit information
(Prioritization of Health Services, 1991; Coffman, Darren. Phone Interview. 14 March
08).
47 To begin with, each Commissioner gave a relative weight to each of the seventeen categories determined
by the commission from zero to 100 to the attributes of: value to society, value to and individual at risk of
needing the service, and essential to a basic health care package. The values were to be drawn from the
community meetings. From these meetings, 13 health related values were generated but not ranked. From
these 13 values, the commission grouped them into three equal attributes used to rank categories of health
services. These were quality oflife, ability to function, and effectiveness of treatment. In addition to
weighing the attributes, each commissioner was to assign scores from 1 to 10 (10 being the best) to each of
the 17 health service categories determined by the commission. Each of these categories was ranked three
times according to values of individual at risk of needing the service, value to society, and whether the
service was essential to a basic care package. Before a fma1 ranking was determined, the commissioner
reviewed his or her scoring to see if there were major discrepancies between his or her numbers and the
numbers of other commissioners. This allowed commission members to change their scoring or argue for
higher or lower scores. The staff then summed the weighted scores (11 scores- one per commissioner) and
averaged the result (Pinkerson, 1992; Prioritization of Health Services, 1991).
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This process was the beginning of what the health care industry now commonly
refers to as evidence based medicine. At the time, evidence-based medicine was "in its
infancy" according to current HSC Director Darren Coffman (Coffman, Darren. Phone
Interview. 14 March 08) and former HSC Commissioner Ellen Lowe (Lowe, Ellen.
Phone Interview. 16 November 07). There were no established methods for ranking
services. Determining what information would be gathered, and how the information
would be used in prioritization entailed considerable original research gathering and
analysis using an innovative evaluation process. This resulted in a long, laborious, and
carefully considered process (Prioritization of Health Services, 1991; Interviews with
former HSC Commissioners; HSC Director Coffman, Darren. Phone Interview. 14 March
08).
OHCR legislation created the HSC as a state appointed and governor approved
board to ensure adequate representation. Specifically, the legislature required that the
HSC itself be entirely volunteer and representative ofhealth care providers and
consumers.
48 The HSC intentionally selected representative that had experience with
48 According to HSC Executive Director Darren Coffman, this helped assuage anxiety that "some might
have thought if these folks were getting paid for it they might be unduly influenced" (Coffman, 14 March
2008). The commission was required to be structured with multiple medical experts and representatives of
the public and individuals from diverse backgrounds and experience to better represent the medically poor.
The HSC numbers 11 and was to consist of five state licensed doctors with clinical expertise in several
general areas to better understand the needs of multiple life stages and groups (geriatrics and public health)
as well as a public nurse, a social services worker, and four consumers of health care. In an interview with
former HSC member Yayoe Kuramitsu reiterates the importance of setting standards for representativeness
and diversity of the board: "We each contributed to the list based on our knowledge and experience, so
together that really helped. Doctors are very disease focused, you know my medical social work
background in running programs were more detail oriented. We think about ancillary services and who
fixes the wheel chair and how does that person get transportation to the doctor, while doctors might just
look at what happens when they come to their office. Each one of use, the nurse had a different perspective,
I had a different perspective, but because of what we did we could offer a macro and a micro perspective
and I think the physicians did the same thing, (and again we also) had lots of help from the community"
(Kuramitsu 8 November 2007).
60
poor uninsured populations. In fact, all HSC Commissioners had experience working
directly with the poor. The HSC included representatives that could directly speak for the
medically indigent. The HSC members included a public nurse, a social services worker,
and four consumers ofhealth care. Together this gave the lay public real voting rights and
represented a majority of the eleven Commissioners.
Ellen Lowe, a long-time HSC Commission member and original Health Services
Commissioner, supports this when she says "there was not a one ofus that had not
worked with the populations that we were asked to provide a benefit plan to serve... We
all had had very direct contact in both our personal lives and work experience with the
Oregonians we were asked to represent" (Lowe, Ellen. Phone Interview. 16 November
07).
To ensure proper deliberation and incorporation ofpublic values, SB27 and the
legislature set a number of explicit and public goals or deliberative standards in which the
HSC was to operate in populating and ordering the prioritized list. SB27 contained
mandates that defined the basic goals of HSC list constitution and prioritization, such as
universal care and service prioritization. While "the legislation did not direct the
Commission as to the method to use in setting priorities" (Pinkerson 1992, 169), it was
well known that the prioritization process was to be driven roughly by notions like the
principle of the greatest good for the greatest number.
Pinkerson states that "Kitzhaber is convinced, for example, that government ought
to be focused on the common good rather than the needs of individuals" (Pinkerson 1992,
39). Later, Pinkerson speaks to the direction of OHCR when discussing Oregon Health
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Decisions and the organization's concern with the public good: "Among the emerging
goals of OHD was a concern with discovering a pubic good which goes beyond the
aggregation of self-interest" (Pinkerson 1992, 55).
The notion of the public good was actively brought to bear on the composition of
and the decision process utilized within the HSC. Former Commissioner Ellen Lowe
states that "we are going to prioritize services that did the most good for the most number
of people" (Lowe, Ellen. Phone Interview. 16 November 07).
Kitzhaber was only interested in Commissioners who shared this vision and the
process oflist prioritization laid out in SB27. One former HSC Commissioner recalls that
"I remember Kitzhaber saying to me, you know, I can't have anybody on this committee
who is not interested in my vision. He said you know, he wasn't looking for people to try
to say this is not right, you know, dissenters, and I think we all agreed" (Interview 15).
SB27 mandated and the HSC also explicitly established specific deliberative
participatory standards and goals. The Oregon legislature intended and in fact demanded
(through SB27) that the HSC encourage public involvement in the prioritization of health
service provision. SB27 mandated that the HSC "actively solicit public involvement in a
community meeting process to build a consensus on the values to be used to guide health
resource allocation decisions" (Prioritization ofHealth Services 1991, appendix E, page
7). According to HSC documents, the primary and explicit institutionalized goals ofthe
47 HSC meetings conducted by OHD on behalfof the HSC were: 1) to ensure broad
attendance by a cross section of the Oregon public to elicit values pertaining to why
Oregonians find health care important; 2) to attempt to ensure that the demographic
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characteristics of community meeting participants are representative of county
characteristics; and 3) to ensure that the target population ofSB 27, those Oregonians
who are below the federal poverty level, participate in those meetings (Prioritization of
Health Services Report 1991, 26).
The HSC was explicitly required to solicit and incorporate a wide range of the
larger potential participatory community and especially those affected by these potential
health reforms. These standards of openness and actual lay participation were quite high,
especially relative to previous, similar statewide efforts to generate inclusive, egalitarian,
and broadly participatory meetings in this and other statewide policy issues (according to
phone and personal interviews with Yayoe Kuramitsu, Ellen Pinney, and Joy Marshall).
Additionally, throughout this process there was extensive federal oversight. To
ensure national health care basic minimum standards in administering the OHP using
federal Medicaid dollars, the OHCR health care delivery was and continues to be tightly
regulated through federal Medicaid oversight. For example, the Federal Americans with
Disabilities Act and its federal interpretation requires certain types of coverage for
disabled citizens whether the HSC and the public agree to prioritize these services or not
in order to receive federal Medicaid dollars (Pinkerson 1992, chapter 9).
One ofthe goals of centralized benchmarking is to help advance polarized groups
past blockages in local decision-making. However, state and federal agencies are also
constitutionally bound to ensure that, in the Madisonian spirit, minorities are not unfairly
disadvantaged. That is, forced to policy made without their consent simply because they
lack sufficient political clout to be fully incorporated by majoritarian political will. In
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OHCR, the creation ofand the specific requirements of the ADA exist to translate this
ideal into a specific context, which is to address the unfortunate historical tendency to
discriminate against Americans with disabilities.49
Once the state legislature had set the funding level for Oregon's prioritized list,
implementation required obtaining federal waivers from the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) of the Department ofHealth and Human Services. In a letter
written by Louis Sullivan, the Secretary ofthe Department of Health and Human
Services, the Bush administration decided on August 3, 1992, to deny approval of the
Oregon waivers. This denial was to stand until violations ofthe ADA were resolved.
Specifically, HHS took issue most directly with using quality oflife judgments in the
prioritization process itself The HHS also directly cited "exclusion ofliver transplants
for patients with histories of alcoholism and the denial oflife support for premature
babies" (Pinkerson 1992, 312).
B. Actual Participation
Existing sources claim the HSC granted real public stake in the decision process,
offering formal and informal measures that actively sought out and then took public
preferences into account. According to deliberative theorists access is an important first
49 Whether politically motivated and appropriate or not, and while certainly frustrating for HSC and
members of the health care community of those affected by federal refusal to grant exemptions to the HSC
list at times who may feel such oversight contextually inappropriate, this kind of centralization does
conform to the Dorf and Sabel's commitment to centralized oversight to protect minorities and to prevent
local cooptation by illustrating the willingness of a central agent to set limitations on local experimentation
if and when local governance units are not in compliance with perceived basic minimum standards or more
specifically (in this case) constitutional or federal law that was in place to attempt to protect minority
populations from an unfettered standard of "the greatest good for the greatest number."
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step in institutionalizing a legitimate deliberative forum that helps to incentivize broad
based participation. However, for these claims to be accurate, ideal deliberativists like
Cohen (1989) and the HSC itself (Prioritization of Health Services, 1991) consider actual
participation levels as a baseline measure of deliberative success. 50 Accordingly, large
attendance numbers and representative population diversity at community forums are
considered important to build claims of public legitimacy and satisfaction.
The HSC social values subcommittee held numerous meetings in virtually every
county. However, the composition of these meetings was not representative of the
multiple interests and stakeholders concerning poor uninsured Oregonians. Those most
likely to be directly impacted by the health reforms under consideration were largely
absent from the deliberative meetings. This is one ofthe most damaging aspects ofthe
deliberative claims made in the literature surrounding the HSC. Deliberative
participatory standards require eliciting-at a minimum-interest and participation by the
most affected and marginalized groups.
In the winter of 1990, Oregon Health Decisions financed and conducted 47
community meetings involving 1048 participants on behalf of the HSC. In addition, 12
public hearings were held and hearings managed to generate 1500 total participants
(Pinkerson 1992, 179-180). The number of participants ranged from 3 to 120, with an
average of 20. Ideally, the meeting participants were intended to represent, as close as
50 The deliberative literature and the HSe itself set minimum deliberative participatory goals that explicitly
called for meeting participation proportional to the county population levels in which the meeting was
taking place (HSe Prioritization Report 1991, Appendix E).
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possible, the actual county demographic characteristics in which the meetings were being
held (Prioritization of Health Services Report, 1991).
As it turned out, the participants were a self-selected group, many with a prior
interest or background in health care. "OHD encountered considerable difficulty in
bringing people out to public settings they were not used to attending." (Pinkerson 1992,
336) The explicitly stated goals of achieving attendance among a broad cross section of
the Oregon public, especially the medically poor and in numbers representative to the
county demographics were not achieved despite extensive efforts to do so.
Nonetheless, the HSC worked hard to meet these goals to include all affected
potential and real participants. The HSC undertook numerous specific steps to fulfill the
HSC mandate to generate extensive participation. Formal efforts to reach these goals
included but were not limited to: public hearings, community meetings, HSC and
subcommittee meetings, health care provider meetings, a telephone survey of health
values, and expertise input to proposed list prioritization methodology and outputs. The
HSC and its staff included representatives of the poor and implemented their suggestions
as centralized standards within community meetings for generating higher levels of
deliberation.
Working with the HSC, Oregon Fair Share (a now defunct non-profit advocacy
group for the poor) provided door-to-door canvassing to encourage attendance, supplied
the media with public service announcements, and posted flyers. Meeting announcements
were also included with Medicaid card mailings. Nearly all the meetings were held as
specific locally organized community meetings, though a few were held within the
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context as the meetings of other organizations, e.g. the Annual Meeting of the Oregon
Records Association (Prioritization ofHealth Services, 1991).
Participatory Demographics- Meeting participant demographic data supports the
lack of extensive participation among potentially affected, often politically marginalized
populations. Annual household income (over 50% earned more than $35,000), education
level (70% college educated), percent insured (90%), percent involved in health care
(69%), and percent on Medicaid (4.4%), illustrate the inordinate participation of those
interests least likely to be affected by HSC prioritization. Conversely, the statewide
annual household income was approximately $27,000.20.7% ofthe population was
college educated, and while many more were and remain underinsured, more than 14% of
Oregonians lacked any health coverage. 51 Of particular concern is the fact that the groups
most affected were present at a disproportionately lower rate when it is arguable that to
conform to deliberative standards of inclusion they arguable should have been present at
a disproportionab1y high rate. The following table illustrates some the differences in
representation:
51 http://www.ers.usda.gov/stateFacts/OR.HTM#PIE;
http://olmis.emp.state.or.us/olmisj/OlmisZine?zineid=OOO00005
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/index.jsp
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/d18258 reform 2005 or.pdf
-------------
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Table 4: Representation Comparison: Community Meetings & Statewide Figures
Meeting Representation 1990 Community Meeting 1990 Statewide Difference
Average Average
Annual Household $33,850 (est.) $27,000 $6850
Income
% College Educated 70% 21% 49%
% Insured 90.6% 84% 6.6%
% Health Care 69% 9% 60%
Professionals
Physicians and especially other health care professionals that participated were
disproportionally represented. This group was by far the most active and widely
represented interest in the community meetings organized by Oregon Health Decisions
and in the Health Services Commission's prioritization process. In fact, of the 47
community meetings conducted by OHD on behalfof the HSC to gather feedback on
public values, on average 69% of the meeting participants were either physicians or
health care professionals (Prioritization ofHealth Services Report 1991,28-29).
According to Oregon Employment Department data, health care professionals
represented only 9% of Oregon's tota11abor force in 1990.52
Dr. Pinkerson supports the considerable role ofhealth care professional in the
community meeting process (1992).53 In formulating HSC decisions and influencing the
formation of the HSC, the considerable impact and disproportionate participation of
physicians as entrepreneurs on the politics of health care is widely understood in existing
52 http://www.gua1ityinfo.org/olmisj/CES?areacode=410IOOOOOOO&action=summary&submit=Continue
http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag65.htm#about
53 "Following the example of these leaders in 'civic medicine,' physicians used their considerable
power...The Oregon Medical Association supported the legislation" (Pinkerson 1992, chapter 3).
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literature and supported extensively by interview subjects. The following section assesses
the deliberative cost to the disproportionate role ofphysicians and the health industry.
C. Perceived Adequacy
Ideal deliberative participatory standards were clearly violated by skewed
attendance and participatory input from health care workers and physicians in particular.
However, did skewed attendance affect how the HSC meeting participants perceived the
creation, implementation, and process of the HSC? Did stakeholders feel they could
access and influence the prioritization process? Non-health care related HSC meeting
participants recognized that judging participation consisted of and should be measured by
more than simply attending meetings and voicing their opinions on basic prioritization
values.
Interview subjects perceived that power was not equal within the community
meetings or within the HSC (despite considerable efforts to address power concerns as
evidenced by institutional design). Additionally, even though extensive participation by
the medically poor remained elusive, interview subjects nonetheless stated that the
relative balance of power among participants and decision-makers within the constraints
of the community meetings was (to summarize) either as good as they had seen or as
good as could realistically be expected. 54
In response to the HSC meetings, when OHAC and other groups requested that
unusual but important steps should be taken to really make sure that poor
underrepresented people might participate Ellen Pinney states "I give credit to Paige
54 This is substantiated through interviews with Ellen Pinney, Joy Marshall, Ellen Lowe, Paul Kirk, Yayoe
Kuramitsu.
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Metzler (HSC staff helped organize and recruit community participation), as I don't think
there was anything we asked her to do that she did not do" (Pinney, Ellen. Phone
Interview. 16 November 07). Former Commission member Ellen Lowe recalls the efforts
of the HSC to incorporate all perspectives:
I think the HSC worked really hard at not utilizing the legalistic, administrative rule
framework when we went out to meet with people. We tried to make it less formal.
We would do things like being there to answer questions and available with
information both in the afternoon and in the evenings other than just interact with
them in the structure of the meetings (Lowe, Ellen. Phone Interview. 16 November
2007).
Another former Commissioner recalls efforts to elicit participation through access and
transparency:
Every weekend we had public hearings, and we went around the state. I was up in
Portland 1-2 times a week, and it went on for 6 years [Kuramitsu's HSC term]. Our
whole focus was on the meeting process, nothing ever took place behind closed
doors ...we had a lot of good publicity, we were on television, we were on the radio,
and the media (Kuramitsu, Yayoe. Personal Interview. 5 December 2007).
Additionally, despite the inordinate influence and participation of physicians and
other health care professionals, direct representatives of the uninsured, HSC members,
and other po1icymakers also perceive of the role ofphysicians as invaluable as far as
pushing OHCR innovation and providing the necessary medical expertise and heavy
lifting necessary to undertake the act of ranking and rationing services. Within the HSC,
direct representatives of the poor also reported feeling that physicians behaved in
deliberative terms.
---------_._._----_._-----
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In fact, physicians donated literally thousands of hours of pro bono medical
expertise and this included extensively sharing opinions and expertise in the community
meetings organized by Oregon Health Decisions and in the Health Services
Commission's prioritization process (Pinkerson, 1992). The following statement by
Darren Coffman statement reiterates the crucial role of health care professiona1s-
especially physicians-and captures the widely recognized sentiment of those involved in
OHCR.
[Health care professionals, HSC members, health care advocates] They
volunteered thousands and thousands of hours to the process, Commission
members who are volunteers, not getting paid, the meetings that they sat through
in developing the prioritized list in the early 1990s, that was up to 20 hours a
week, have active physician practices and then even beyond then their were other
health care providers that we would bring in and request info of them, [He]
advocates that would go out and try to get input from those potentially affected by
the reforms (Coffman, Darren. Phone Interview. 14 March 2008).
All interview subjects reported that power was equitably distributed in terms of
opportunity to participate and add input into the HSC decision process. HSC members
were respectful and open to all members of the Commission over time and regardless of
the particular issue under discussion. Ellen Lowe, one of the original HSC
Commissioners and voting lay representatives on the HSC certainly perceived equality of
power among the HSC members and within its decision-making process:
I can only remember a couple times when we did not have unanimous votes. I call
it sort of the nod test. But we used to take the time after the community meetings
or listened to testimony or received information from a lot of folks to spend time
talking about it. I often thought that maybe one of the things with a great deal of
skill, and with the help of the governor's office I know, in choosing those of us
that served on the Commission, that were not going to be demagogues. So we
listened to one another (Lowe, Ellen. Phone Interview. 16 November 2007).
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The initial HSC standards and subsequent changes were generally perceived quite
favorably. Anonymous questionnaires administered by Oregon Health Decisions at these
community meetings (OHD conducted 47 of the initial community meetings at the
request of the HSC) that incorporated responses that specifically mentioned the meeting
standards and actual process lend additional support to the perception of the quality of the
meeting process. For example, overall ''participants ofthe community meetings generally
felt that the meetings were conducted well," despite some suggestions about using the
same facilitators for consistency and several participants reporting they were "put offby
the health care scenarios worksheet" (HSC Prioritization Report 1991, 27).
Despite actual participatory shortcomings, representatives of the poor that were
present at the HSC meetings acknowledge the difficulty in recruitment despite the
genuine efforts of the HSC. Joy Marshall reiterates the need but the extreme and
inevitable difficulty in recruiting a full range ofparticipants in the real world (especially
outside the HSC) of severe inequity:
It is so hard to do but you have to have true consumers, average people and poor
people have a real say. To do that you have to find those people. They don't have
free time and they are totally intimidated when they are sitting at the table with
experts. But to really have genuine input from the spokesperson you need real
commitment on the part of the bureaucrats. There is a huge cultural gap, the
intimidation factor, and they have to be really committed to respecting and
valuing that input and making a real effort to go get it. And I doubt that happens
very often. It is just really token or non-existent.
I cannot criticize them [HSC] for the whole culture that keeps people in
poverty and uneducated. I think that they had some good values and efforts and it
could have been better I guess. But it is easy to be a Monday morning quarterback
I think it was a great idea and what they did (Marshall, Joy. Phone Interview. 15
November 2008).
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While the community meetings were generally held in high regard, importantly,
the "community solidarity" rhetoric at the meetings in some ways lacked appeal for
people perceiving themselves as marginal to the community in terms of real influence or
comfort with the meetings or solicitation of feedback. For example, "distrustful of the
commitment to the benefits under SB 27 on the part of the legislature, the Oregon Human
Rights Coalition finally opposed OHP. As welfare recipients, they were dissatisfied with
the funding level at 587" (Pinkerson 1992,226).
Additionally, while there was testimony by Medicaid recipients and consumer
advocates at the public hearings, The Oregon Health Action Campaign (including
member organizations such as Oregon Fair Share, and Oregon Human Rights Coalition)
chose to put its energy into outreach for the public hearings rather than the community
meetings, because it was more comfortable with the traditional advocacy format. The
public hearings were more relevant to a population that wanted most of all to lobby for its
own preferences regarding changes in services affecting themselves as individuals.55
Conclusion- What ultimately made many groups skeptical was not the meeting
process but that Oregon's prioritization process did not truly represent a community
consensus. This is evidenced by the fact that not everyone was affected by the reform.
That is, decisions were made by those largely unaffected by the outcomes andfor those
largely absent. Accordingly, it is difficult to claim community consensus and legitimacy
based in shared interests. In Setting Health Care Priorities, Dr. Dougherty claims that the
Oregon Plan will place the non-poor majority in a conflict of interest: their sense of
55 Interview with Dana Brown by Mary Pinkerson, August 27, 1991.
73
decency pulling them one way, their financial interests another. Dougherty believes that
achieving just results through rationing in a public process will be likely only if the
interests of the middle class are tied to the welfare of the poor through a plan that creates
shared coverage (Dougherty, 1991).
Since the legislature and members of the HSC were not directly affected by the
plan, some groups found it difficult to believe the concerns of these groups had the same
access expressed as consideration in decision-making. Ellen Pinney, OHAC's director,
was involved in every phase ofthe Oregon Plan, yet the group ended up adopting a
neutral position to Oregon's prioritization. So did the Ecumenical Council of Oregon, a
coalition of Christian churches (Pinkerson, 1992).
Numerous groups ultimately chose to oppose OHCR for these and other reasons.
These groups included: the ACLU, AIDS councils, the Children's Defense Fund, the
National Association of Children's Hospitals, American Academy of Pediatrics, the
National Association of Community Health Centers, the U. S Catholic Conference,
Families USA, the American Association ofRetired Person, the Oregon Catholic
Conference, and other groups. Participation by the most affected (the medically poor) in
any part of the OHCR was minima1.56 However, substantive participation often revolved
around policy outcomes and not the deliberative process within the HSC meetings.
56 Skeptics might argue those most directly affected by the HSC's decisions may not have turned out at
meetings due to a perceived feeling of lip service in the meeting process. That is, in reality the uninsured
poor felt that in the end HSC process would be dominated by the affluent. The most powerful stakeholders
would participate and attempt to influence policy according to their interests rather than by what was best
for or what directly affected populations most preferred. As a result, less powerful though directly affected
stakeholders may have chosen exit or avoidance of the HSC process rather than engaging in a futile attempt
to voice their preferences or participate deliberative terms.
74
The evidence examined suggests that the HSC met minimum theoretical,
institutional deliberative relative parity standards. Meeting minutes, HSC documents,
interview subjects, and secondary sources all substantiate ideal and satisfactory claims
that a) the HSC was open to and actively soughtfeedbackfrom all identifiable
stakeholders (especially the medically poor, and b) the HSC granted real public stake in
the decision process, offering formal & informal measures that took public preferences
into account. Furthermore, involved groups (or other relevant groups that can be
measured, especially the least affluent stakeholder representatives) felt that these
minimum conditions of relative parity were met. This is illustrated in Table 5.57
Table 5: Relative Parity within the HSC
Minimum Ideal Access Actively Solicit Public Stake
Deliberative
Conditions
IV: Institutional Yes: HSC Meetings Yes: HSC actively sought Yes: HSC granted the
Structure and were public; all HSC public participation, esp. lay public 4 of 11 votes
Behavior infonnation and from poor: surveys, publicdecisions were meetings, visiting soup
transparent kitchens, etc.
DV: Perceived Yes: OFS and OHAC Yes: OFS and OHAC claim Yes: OFS and OHC
Adequacy claim HSC was open these meetings are the most claim the substantive
and tried harder to extensive, best statewide stake given to public
balance parity than they attempts to involve the was the best they have
had ever seen public they have seen seen and could expect.
57 These findings suggest that for deliberative processes to work, actual attendance appears rather
unimportant. What matters is that those designing the process actively set and implement efforts to solicit
all interested and relevant stakeholders. This finding will be discussed more in the conclusion of this
chapter and in the comparative chapter that follows the empirical chapters (OHCR, OWEB, and NCMI).
75
2. Power and Influence outside the HSC
Findings: The role of powerful interests and their influence outside the HSC
meetings was a serious concern. The composition ofthe HSC and prioritization
framework was accomplished in a closed political process and its prioritizing framework
or prioritizing principles were arguably pre-ordained. In support, numerous questions
about ideal deliberative standards that surround representation, influence and legitimacy
were raised by interview subjects before the creation of and outside the HSC itself. HSC
participant stakeholders reported concerns that the HSC was unduly influenced by a
narrow group of outside stakeholders in a closed process. Participant stakeholders
expressed concern that real decisions were made before and even outside ofHSC forums
without adequate public and stakeholder input. The initial process involving HSC
inception, framing, and composition is presented; then the perceived concerns regarding
this process are presented and evaluated in the following section.
A. HSC Inception, Framing, & Composition
Inception & Framing- The central role of former Governor John Kitzhaber as a
health care leader and entrepreneur in Oregon health care reform during the OHCR ofthe
late 1980s and early 90s and continuing today is not easily overstated. The crucial role of
Kitzhaber in OHCR is widely recognized in existing health care studies and deliberative
scholarship, in interviews with the HSC Commissioners, staffmembers and HSC
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participants, as well as by the media and the general public (Pinkerson, 1992; Interviews
with Coffman, Kuramitsu; Lowe; Pinney; Marshall).
For example, I asked current Darren Coffman what made Oregon such a unique
and far-reaching experiment in health care possible. Coffman spoke about the central role
Kitzhaber's vision and effort in launching OHCR and creating the HSC. For example,
I think a key to it was having a champion of the cause, and clearly that champion
was John Kitzhaber. And the fact that he had such a grounded background in HC
and at the same time was very influential in the legislature was key and his
charisma if you will and being able to bring all the stakeholders, parties involved
to the table and in coming up with the original legislation. Also the OR pioneering
spirit, doing something that had never been done before. That did not necessarily
give us any grief or cause us pause, trying to plow forward (Coffman, Darren.
Phone Interview. 14 March 2008).
Kitzhaber was largely responsible for framing the goals and basic institutional
framework. According to secondary sources such as media reports and scholars such as
Mary Pinkerson, Kitzhaber was instrumental in drafting the bill, passing the reform
package, and in the initial creation of the HSC along with its central premise of rationing
roughly along conceptions of the greatest good for the greatest number (Pinkerson, 1992).
This happened despite initial opposition from fellow Democrats such as Bill McCoy,
chairman ofthe Senate Human Resources Committee. McCoy had already shown he
strongly opposed to rationing or priority setting. Later, members of the lay public,
representatives of the poor, and numerous federal politicians would join him.
While Kitzhaber's central role in OHCR is readily recognized, the nature of his
role in successful implementation in OHCR is less clearly understood. A phone interview
with Kitzhaber conducted in the spring of2008 illuminated Kitzhaber's role through an
------------------ -------
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insider account of OHCR and its ability to overcome the inertia of conflict over health
care funding and delivery. That is, Kitzhaber's unique assessment helps to explain how
OHCR was able to avoid the conflict and paralysis endemic to other serious health reform
attempts where small but powerful vested interests often seek to maintain the health care
status quo.
Kitzhaber partially attributes the initial success of OHCR due to the relatively
closed nature of the initial OHCR process. Normally a Medicaid reform bill would have
gone through McCoy's committee. However, due to McCoy's resistance, Kitzhaber, who
was then President of the Senate, appointed a separate committee, the Committee on
Health Insurance and Bio-ethics to move the legislation. To chair the committee,
Kitzhaber selected his friend Robert Shoemaker, counsel for the Multnomah Medical
Society. Shoemaker had just been elected to the Senate. "Together they handpicked the
other members of the HSC." (Pinkerson 1992, 132) Governor Neil Goldschmidt then
"followed the recommendations of the Friends of27 and Kitzhaber's office when he
made the appointments in August (to HSC), 1989" (Pinkerson 1992, 171 & 321-322).
While acknowledging the practical steps or necessities of implementation,
Kitzhaber nonetheless also drew some criticism from the various stakeholders in the
reform process and also raises some ideal deliberative concerns (centralized standards
already discussed). Examples include Kitzhaber's role (and the role of other health care
elites) in the closed initial meetings between the major health care elites or stakeholders,
the closed process of defining the guiding principles of health reform, and the closed
HSC selection process.
------------ ----------
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I asked Kitzhaber the following question: "in your own particular experience in
the refonn process that began in the late 80s and early 90s, did the most influential
stakeholders disagree about what they wanted from health care refonn and if so how did
you manage this?" In his response, Kitzhaber indicated the necessity and the ultimately
the deliberative viability ofpreemptively sitting down behind closed doors with the most
powerful health care players in Oregon. These stakeholders were, as Kitzhaber described
them, the "most likely to not only have their interests directly affected but also most able
to influence the refonn process itself." This was done in order to gather the necessary
momentum and support to engage in substantive health care reform (Kitzhaber, John.
Phone Interview 4 June 2008).
To be clear, there most certainly were enonnous potential losses and gains at
stake in the refonn process. The drastic changes proposed and subsequent potential
revenue loss associated with the OHCR rightly concerned physicians. To ameliorate their
concerns, Kitzhaber personally approached physicians and other health care interests to
help guide the refonn process (Pinkerson, 1992). Doctors and hospitals received pre-HSC
assurances from Kitzhaber and actual exemption from civil and criminal liability as well
as professional and licensure sanction for refusing to treat patients whose illnesses are
uncovered by the rationing experiment (Pinkerson 1992, chapter 5).
In order to facilitate agreement among the state's most important health care
interests before the fonnation of the HSC, Kitzhaberbrought together a coalition of some
of the primary interests in statewide health care. This was done to help forge a basic
agreement on a set of principles in order to gather support and move ahead with the
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health reforms and the creation of the HSC. Kitzhaber confirms this as evidenced from
our phone interview:
The main people at the table were Kaiser, BC, the hospitals, the Hospital
Association, the Medical Association, AFL-CIO, and OR HAC which focuses on
the medically needy, the low income folks. I think that was the main coalition.
The AFL being the consumer groups. And we started out by agreeing on a set of 8
or 9 principles, and I could get you a copy but I am sure they are out there
somewhere. And basically the agreement was within the constraint of those
principles; you can argue your own economic self-interest (Kitzhaber, John.
Phone Interview. 4 June 2008).
This preemptive work with the major powerful interests in Oregon health care
proved to be a smart, politically crucial step.58 The philosophy behind this approach
involves working with the most powerful interests currently vested in the status quo to
facilitate their "buy in." This stakeholder buy in facilitates overcoming the largest
political roadblocks to reform. This strategy is explained early in the interview by
Kitzhaber. According to Kitzhaber, to make real headway in health care reform (or other
complex and contentious issue for that matter) is to
Make the politics and economics of the transition explicit. Don't pretend they are
not there. Get them on the table...my point is that the only way you put the
politics together to make this happen is first of all you have to get broad
agreement and buy in on what the system ought to look like, one that actually
produces health etc. And then you have to basically get the, look at all the
stakeholders that are going to be affected who can jam up the political process and
get their issue on the table. Shift the conversation from where we want to go to
how do we get there (Kitzhaber, John. Phone Interview. 4 June 2008)?
58 For example, contrast OHCR with the attempts in the mid 1990s by the Clintons at the federal level that
did not preemptively sit own with the major players and therefore later encountered numerous roadblocks
from national health care elites, such as the now infamous "Harry and Louise" ads run by the health
insurance industry.
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Kitzhaber allowed the most powerful interests to fashion a platform that would
not threaten their livelihood yet would also meet the original goals of the legislative
proposals. While this recognition proved invaluable it was also controversial to multiple
stakeholders and does not meet ideal deliberative standards. To engage in a public
process of rationing care with the goal expand coverage to universally cover the
medically poor, this political maneuver may have proved to be practical, even essential.
Moving the Oregon Plan forward without significant ifnot paralyzing opposition and
creating conditions for HSC deliberation and implementation of its decisions arguably
necessitated this step.
HSC Composition- The composition of the HSC was not a public or participatory
process and was not intended to be. The task of the governor was to name the
Commissioner members. These lay members were Governor appointed and Senate
approved. During the drafting of SB 27, four of eleven representatives were to be chosen
from the lay public. The other seven members were health professionals.59 These lay
members, as a minority and of diverse backgrounds, alone wielded less formal power
(minority vote) and were arguably less unified in their preferences than the medical
professionals on the Commission in that they shared more diverse experiences and
training as well as less medical expertise.
The nominations were not discussed in a public or participatory process. The
public was not given any formal access or vote in the HSC composition. Governor at the
59 For a listing of the original 11 members of the HSC see HSC prioritization report to the governor and the
legislature"1991 Prioritization of Health Services."
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time, Neil Goldschmidt followed the recommendations ofKitzhaber's office and the
Friends of27 when he made the appointments in August 1989 (Pinkerson 1992, 171).
The legislative package imposed term limits in order to mitigate the potential stagnation
of the committee or interest group influence over time. This was accomplished by
requiring the Commissioners to serve staggered four-year terms, and they were mandated
to review the prioritization process every two years (Pinkerson, 1992). This is confirmed
in an interview with one former HSC Commissioner:
OR Health Association named me a candidate and Senator Kitzhaber came to my
office and interviewed me.. .I remember Kitzhaber saying to me, you know, I
can't have anybody on this committee who is not interested in my vision. He said
he wasn't looking for people to try to say this is not right, you know, dissenters.
(Interview 15)
In sum, the initial meetings among elite stakeholders and process used to create
and populate the HSC according to guiding philosophical principles as well as the HSC
rationing process itself were largely closed to the public. While perhaps necessary along
feasibility issues, whether the HSC was properly composed in the end and whether it
made deliberative decisions or not, all this was driven by a handful of powerful
stakeholders. These examples do not conform to theoretical deliberative standards.
B. Perceived Adequacy
OHP generated broad public support in the legislature and most of the state - even
ifit was controversial outside of Oregon (Sirianni and Friedland 2001, 153).
Additionally, the plan was perhaps as close to a consensus as possible considering the
complex issues and interests at stake in such drastic innovation. Most interested and
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affected individuals and groups favorably received the plan and virtually all major
stakeholder groups or their representatives in Oregon understood and appreciated the
explicit intent of the plan to ration care publicly.
However, the outside political environment clearly influenced HSC participant
perceptions of the legitimacy of the HSC itself. These perceptions may have influenced
participation among traditionally marginalized stakeholders such as the medically poor.
Numerous stakeholders were not entirely happy with OHCR, the prioritization process, or
even the HSC. The most significant vociferous exceptions were ecumenical organizations
and the disability community (Pinkerson, 1992).
The poor and uninsured lay public and their representatives were aware that the
HSC meetings were taking place within a larger, instrumental pluralist political process.
Perceived exclusion and uncertainty surrounding HSC formation, composition, and
establishing the guiding principles of list prioritization may help explain why uninsured
and poor representatives were not present. Some stakeholder group representatives point
to this exclusion as support for maintaining a skeptical and reduced sense of efficacy.
That is, relevant stakeholders suspected they possessed little ability to substantially
influence OHP outcomes due to the larger political arena in which this issue was taking
place.
Specifically, these deliberative concerns center on exclusion in populating the
HSC, in framing the OHCR guiding philosophy or purpose, and in meeting behind closed
doors with the health insurance industry. The support for this position includes
Marshall's criticism of Kitzhaber's closed health care discussions at Willamette
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University, Pinney's critique of the "privileged position" or influence of the insurance
industry or other health industry lobbyists, and Marshall and Pinney's assessment of how
the OHC process was narrowly framed to cut out important issues and policy
possibilities. These are serious external concerns that appear to have influenced
perceptions about the efficacy of participation inside the HSC.
A closed process can and did raise questions of inclusion and access in the eyes of
those excluded. Stakeholders raised concerns over exclusion, such as those raised by
Oregon Health Action Campaign's former director Ellen Pinney. For example, before
SB27 had been passed,
Kitzhaber convened a group ofbioethicists/thinkers to think about how we would
prioritize it [health care]. This was after the OHD meeting. But this group was
assembled at Willamette University absolutely offlimits to the public and nobody
knew exactly what they were doing. And the Senate Committee on bioethics,
chaired by Senator Bob Shoemaker as I recall, were having a hearing on SB27,
and it referred to this process the public was ostracized from (Pinney, Ellen.
Phone Interview. 15 November 2007).
Some participants believed the process surrounding the HSC marginalized them.
For example, Dana Brown, past director ofthe Human Rights Coalition, attributed their
board's decision in part to finally oppose the OHP was partially related to discussions
board members had with Oregon Fair Share.6o According to Joy Marshall, a spokesman
for OFS, the group was disappointed in the legislator's commitment to public
participation in the public process. She said the group had great difficulty making contact
60 OFS is a citizen action group which opposed Senate Bill 27. Oregon Fair Share advocates elimination of
private insurance in favor ofa single payer system run by the government (Pinkerson, 1992).
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with Senators Kitzhaber and Shoemaker, and noted they sometimes left the room when
the group was testifying at public hearings (Pinkerson, 1992).
Additionally, OHAC expressed "skepticism among OHAC members that the poor
would be treated fairly in any system which signaled them out from the general
population" (Pinkerson 1992, 264-65). This is reiterated by Ellen Pinney when she states
that what was presented did not become reality (the package became a package only for
Medicaid enrollees). Joy Marshall ofFair Share echoes this concern. "Unless everyone is
on the same boat, as long as you have poor people and regular people health care, poor
people get the short end of the stick" (Marshall, Joy. Phone Interview. 15 November
2007).
Dr. Richard Conviser, formerly ofHealth Policy Research and Analysis in West
Linn, Oregon, argues in "Universal Health Care Coverage, Rationing, and HIV Care"
believes that the actual policy decisions and implementation are evidence that the HSC
was controlled by a narrow group of external stakeholders. Conviser states that the
OHCR has benefited private health insurers, their policyholders, and the previously
uninsured (Conviser, 1995). Despite the emerging lack of funds over time for more and
more expensive services (e.g. late stage AIDS treatments), Conviser asserts the HSC list
and legislative funding seems more and more to be geared towards survival and not the
original mission of the plan (universal coverage).
While health providers and active minority groups (AIDS and disabled advocates)
lobby successfully to maintain and even expand HSC prioritized expensive treatments
that yield little improvement in health, the less involved poor have increasingly gone
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underinsure. For example, when this section was written, new adult claims were currently
being refused.61 Coupled with actual exclusion in the framing and composition of the
HSC, participants have expressed some concern over the motivations and priorities to the
medically indigent due to deliberative process concerns and actual outputs and their
decreased level of coverage and care for the medically poor.
Speculative but real concerns were also raised by Joy Marshall, then a member of
Oregon Fair Share. "It [meeting decisions] probably came down to the head ofthe
hospital and Kitzhaber and maybe three other people who made a lot of the final
decisions" (Marshall, Joy. Phone Interview. 15 November 2007). This type of statement,
whether accurate or not, is linked to stakeholder's sense of exclusion and uncertainty
exacerbated by events such as the initial exclusion from the framing ofthe health reform
agenda and the lack ofvoice in the composition of the HSC.
Closed discussions and decision-making does not conform to ideal deliberative
theory. Also, it is not clear that this closed discussion was necessary or helpful
considering the actual reservations raised in this case about this initial exclusion in
interviews with Joy Marshall and Ellen Pinney. Whether practical or even necessary, this
confuses deliberative claims such as claims of equal power or lack ofundue influence by
any stakeholder groups. This lack of transparency before and outside ofthe HSC makes it
unclear whether and to what extent the process surrounding the HSC or the HSC itself
was immune to perceived manipulation and control by a narrow set of stakeholders.
61 Per legislative mandate, on July I, 2004 the OHP was no longer accepting new adult applicants. This
information was acquired through a phone conversation via a telephone number listed at
http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/Healthplan
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Conclusion- Especially in the initial OHCR, there was significant alarm and
questions concerning exclusion, bias and a lack of information outside of the HSC or
HSC sponsored meetings around inception, framing, and composition.62 Many anxieties
were partially alleviated by those who eventually came to participate in the HSC process.
However, these concerns may explain some of the continued problems generating turnout
among traditionally marginalized groups.
Overall, however, the perceived adequacy within the HSC by participants within
the meeting process was relatively high (compared to their ideal standards and previous
deliberative experience). Nonetheless, without an ideal outside deliberative environment
it is impossible to know for sure why the medically poor chose to remain largely absent.
This may have served to confirm these potential participant worries about their influence
over and therefore the legitimacy of the HSC and its prioritization process for the non-
participants. Skeptics may insist that the lack ofthese initial extensive open deliberative
steps could have served to generate perceptions of exclusion or among non-participants
deliberative concerns as statements like this these suggest. 63
62 For example, when asked "how deliberative was the HSC?" Joy Marshall echoed the concerns ofEllen
Pinney as to 1) the closed nature of the HSC composition and 2) suggests how a different process could
make it more legitimate. For example, Marshall states "you hold a certain number of slots on the board and
a lot of them are real people" (Marshall, Joy. Phone Interview. 15 November 2007).
63 Deliberative critics like Lynn Sanders (1997) would argue that a closed, preordained decision-making
process -in this case prioritization conceptualized by elites and driven by a fIxed value of the "common
good" - serves to exclude other marginalized interests or health perspectives and reinforces the status quo.
Sanders and others would argue this type ofpolitical process that precludes a deliberative forum should
raise serious concerns over issues of relative parity. Or, deliberativists like Fung and Wright would also
argue this type ofpolitical process fails to meet relevant stakeholder's standards of perceived adequacy
- -----.------
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A closed andfixed framework driven by elites is a valid critique and should be
acknowledged. The process outside of the HSC led participant stakeholders (e.g.
representatives of the medically poor) to question the HSC itself. The deliberative
concerns raised by the exclusive and closed process that preceded the HSC could be
easily mitigated in order to build public trust. Future deliberative institutional endeavors
ofthis sort would be wise to involve the public and medically poor stakeholders in the
process from the beginning. That is, the HSC case suggests that, to the extent possible,
the same ideal and perceived deliberative standards - as accomplished in the HSC's
internal deliberative process - should be replicated in the process of conceiving, framing,
and populating the HSC. This would increase perceived legitimacy and potentially
enhance participation. Increased legitimacy (along thresholds of perceived deliberative
adequacy) is more likely to the extent that these stakeholders are allowed to take part and
have real and up front input in conceiving, populating, and establishing the guiding
purpose of the HSC. 64 Furthermore, the proposition that traditionally marginalized
along criteria of relative parity. In tum, failing to meet thresholds of relative parity makes genuine
deliberation less attractive (Fung and Wright 2003,23).
64 While complete transparency at all points in the policy process is often considered necessary to make any
genuine deliberative claims (Habennas, 1992; Cohen and Arato; Fraser 1992; Young, 1996; Gutman and
Thompson, 1996; Benhabib, 2002; Rosenberg, 2007), policymakers and even some deliberative theorists
themselves are beginning to realize the this has not been clearly established in this case and may be
unnecessary or at least unrealistic to build deliberative legitimacy. In fact, research in this case suggests
that in highly contentious and complex issues, a closed discussion among the relevant stakeholders may be
quite important in the initial stages ofbuilding a deliberative forum (Elster 1998; Macedo, 1999; Williams
2000; Mansbridge, 2003). Successful policymakers such as Kitzhaber and interview subjects in other
deliberative forums maintain that while transparency is important and needs to be built into a deliberative
process as soon as possible, stakeholders in a controversial issue are initially need a closed forum to state
issues that may be necessary to voice in order to establish stakeholder "buy in" but may vilify, be
misunderstood, or misrepresented by the general public or the media. To satisfy thresholds ofperceived
deliberative adequacy, inclusion of all major relevant stakeholders or discourses is appropriate (this did not
happen in the OHCR) but should initially be conducted initially under conditions ofprivacy in order to
reach enough understanding and agreement that a deliberative, public forum is a viable option.
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stakeholders (in this case the medically poor) will not participate no matter what steps are
taken could be fully tested. Table 6 illustrates these perceived and theoretical deliberative
institutional shortcomings.
Table 6: Relative Parity outside the HSC
Minimum Access Actively Solicit Public Stake
Ideal
Deliberative
Conditions
IV: Institutional No: meetings were not No: neither the public a No: lay public had no
Structure and always public; information broad rep. sample of formal influence in
I Behavior
and decisions were limited stakeholders were informed process
to a small, powerful or invited to participate in
stakeholders brought OHCR prioritization
together by Kitzhaber meetings in Salem
DV: Perceived No: OFS and OHAC reps. No: OFS and OHAC reps. No: OFS and OHAC
Adequacy felt exclusion shows a few felt excluded from was not informed or
stakeholders received important meetings about allowed in initial
unfair access and influence OHCR prioritization in OHCR prioritization
inOHCR Salem meetings in Salem
III. An Accounting of Respect
1. Respect and Perceived Adequacy within the HSC
Findings: Interviews with fonner HSC Commissioners, HSC participants - such
as representatives of the medically poor - and examined meeting minutes demonstrate
that all stakeholders reported high levels of respect by and within the Health Service
Commission. Interview subjects did not mention any feelings of disrespect by other
meeting participants in the HSC meetings when explicitly asked. Additionally, meeting
minutes did not indicate any direct concerns with issues of deliberative respect within the
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HSC by and among meeting participants. When examples of respect within the HSC were
mentioned by interview subjects, responses were positive.
A. HSC Meeting Structure and Process: Perceived Adequacy?
Interview subjects were repeatedly asked specific and open ended follow up
questions that attempted to elicit responses concerning respect issues. For example,
subjects were usually asked a minimum ofthree respect questions that included the
following: I) "Do you think all relevant interests within the various communities felt
included and taken seriously in the community meeting process AND in the prioritization
process that took place inside the HSC as well? 2) Was there a tension in the meetings in
terms ofmaking the participants feel their perspective was not shut out despite the need
for some real limitations (how many could speak, what about, how long, etc)? Then, at
minimum, a final open ended follow up question was asked: 3) were there any problems
with respect issues that you were aware of?" Interview subjects did not report any major
problems (systemic, intentional, pragmatic) concerning respect questions during the
bl ' . 65pu IC meetmgs.
When respect concerns were specifically mentioned by interview subjects, these
discussions were positive. Interview subjects praised the work of the legislature to
engage in and structure deliberative opportunity via the HSC. Respondents often
mentioned the HSC's willingness to listen and incorporate public values, testimony, and
65 In the last few interviews with policy elites such as Darren Coffman and John Kitzhaber some respect
questions were dropped due to consistent positive responses concerning respect and in order to focus on
other interview questions that were yielding less consistent responses. This is discussed in the previous
methods collection discussion.
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hard work to provide the necessary resources and structures to solicit a broad range of
community feedback. Respect among participants was not specifically asked in
interviews. While rarely mentioned specifically by interview subjects, when respect
among participants was mentioned the conversation usually concerned the general
consensus (with some strong exceptions) about prioritization as a valid priority as helping
generate agreement which in tum facilitated more respect.
In structuring and conducting the HSC meetings Commissioners felt they were
always willing to listen and demonstrated a commitment to solicit feedback above and
beyond what was required of them. HSC members would often stay hours over the
scheduled meeting time to give everyone a chance to have their say and seemed
genuinely concerned and willing to listen as long as participant discussion was relevant to
the health care reform. When asked if all members of the participatory community felt
respected, Paul Kirk states
Well I hope so. I think we tried to conduct the meetings in a respectful way. We
did not rush them. We spent a lot of time listening to people's point of view...we
tried to conduct it in a respectful, relatively unhurried manner. We recognized that
one of our roles was to sit and listen (Kirk, Paul. Phone Interview. 7 December
2007).
Beyond the assertion of the need to ration care and the explicit charge to produce
a list that would benefit the greatest good for the fewest dollars the Commissioners never
challenged the manner of expression or the validity of views expressed in meetings.
Some of the HSC members such as Paul Kirk or Ellen Lowe reported deliberately
structuring the meetings and soliciting prioritization feedback in multiple formats (such
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as a telephone survey as well as meeting testimony and focus groups) to accommodate
inclusion and respect as fully as possible.
The HSC went about attempting to facilitate respectful inclusion in a number of
ways. For example, Ellen Lowe states that the HSC worked hard and undertook
numerous steps to make meetings more comfortable by avoiding the legalistic,
administrative framework at meetings. Meetings were less formal. Commissioners
scheduled time to simply be available to answer questions or provide information one on
one. The HSC also structured times in meetings that provide opportunities for exchange
and that allowed the HSC to listen "rather than our being there to pontificate" (Lowe,
Ellen. Phone Interview. 16 November 2007).
The HSC also conducted meetings in numerous formats and provided resources to
facilitate feedback and tried to increase participation by providing child care and food.
The meetings were actively advertised to make the community not only feel aware but
also that their concerns were important. Meetings were often held during multiple time
frames to accommodate working families and in an attempt to yield more representative
participatory meeting samples. Speakers were given more time ifneeded. In an interview
with former HSC head Paul Kirk, Dr. Kirk states that "the meetings often went as late as
necessary to ensure that everyone that wanted to speak was given time, and to give as
much time to speakers as they felt they needed and to grant everyone a speaking slot"
(Kirk, Paul. Phone Interview. 7 December 2007). In practice, this often meant the
meetings went hours longer than scheduled.
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The HSC went above and beyond the most ideal efforts to solicit participation and
to include lay participants. Those involved in the HSC and especially active meeting
participants reported the interests of those most affected were truly taken seriously. Ellen
Pinney confirms the willingness of the HSC to accept and immediately adopt any and all
suggested efforts to include and respect participant needs and views. Additionally, HSC
Commission members voluntarily and informally attempted to solicit feedback from the
medically poor and other marginalized populations outside of the community meetings in
an effort to understand their needs. Former HSC Commissioner Ellen Lowe recalls going
directly to laundromats and soup kitchen in at attempt to reach out to Oregonians that
might be concerned and affected but unable or unwilling to attend or participate in the
meeting format.
On several occasions, I decided that some of the people that I really wanted to
hear from would not be able to come to these meetings, and that was young
working families. So I went to places like laundry mats on a Saturday and
introduced myself when I saw a young mother with children in there or others ...
Some people didn't want to talk to me but it was amazing how many people
opened up, so I did some of my own fact-finding. I also did that at food pantries
and soup kitchens, where I could go out on my own and hear from people what
they wanted in health care and what was important to them. And I know some
people on the HSC did the same kind of thing. (Lowe, Ellen. Phone Interview. 16
Novembers 2007)
These efforts more closely resemble ideal normative notions of deliberative criteria along
respect measures. This is an admirable attempt to listen to the underrepresented and
represents the remarkable efforts of the HSC to take the marginalized and medically
indigent position into consideration and show respect for the underrepresented.
High levels of respect were exhibited as far as discussion among meeting
facilitators and participants as well as between them discussion. All sources examined
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including secondary sources, meeting minutes, and interviews with Commissioners and
public representatives support this claim. Within the HSC meeting process, interview
subjects reported high levels of respect often without being explicitly asked. Specifically,
representatives of the medically poor reported their constituents being taken seriously by
the HSC in meeting testimony. Additionally, these interview subjects also reported that
suggestions regarding mechanisms to enhance participation of the non-participants, i.e.
the medically poor and the community writ large were incorporated.
If respect issues were raised, they usually arose from a small group of participants
that perceived a lack of respect over prioritization as a valid operating premise.
Additionally, within the prioritization process a lack of respect could be inferred when
services were excluded or ranked lower relative to others competing services. For
example, former Commissioner Yayoe Kuramitsu summarizes stakeholder frustration
with any prioritization evidenced in meting minutes:
They [meeting participants] did not understand our process and a lot of people did
not understand prioritization. It is like how could you limit people and not give
them the health care that they need, and we are saying you have to look at getting
zero as opposed to getting maybe 5 or 600 different services and a lot of them
could not get it, that here's what you would get and here's what you get now. It
was what some people referred to as thinning the soup and we said isn't soup
better than no soup? You would get down to examples like that and that was very
hard for people to grasp (Kuramitsu, Yayoe. Personal Interview. 5 December
2007).
Ellen Pinney confirms the perceived lack of respect over framing the health care
reform process around prioritization:
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The folks when I came on board were really outraged that the questions
predetermined the answer. The questions of course suggesting that we have a
limited pool ofmoney and the only decision we have to make within that pool are
how the dollars are allocated across populations and services. And they felt there
was this whole unnamed expenditure: administration, profit margins, and excess
technologies that wasn't even in there and people were not given an opportunity.
So I came on, people were mad, and we went to the last meeting and said 'this is a
stick up,' there is enough money to fund health services for all these people and
where we really should focus is on this waste spending (Pinney, Ellen. Phone
Interview. 15 November 2007).
Despite some reservations with the HSC - such as prioritization itself and
prioritization outcomes - interview subjects reported feeling taken seriously, genuinely
listened to, and reported that the HSC made serious efforts to include and respect all
participants. For example, Sirianni and Friedland write that "within the health reform
process, advocates for people with disabilities, poor women and children, and mental
health and chemical dependency services found the deliberative process to be open to
their concerns" (Sirianni and Friedland 2001, 160).
Every request by Ellen Piney and OHAC to structure the meetings to ensure the
meeting participants felt included and respected was incorporated into the HSC meeting
process. This was done by Paige Metzler, a staffer for the HSC at the time, and OHAC
certainly made numerous suggestions and requests. Pinney recounts OHAC's extensive
requests in a phone interview on November 11, 2007:
Any public meeting has to have at least 6 weeks notice and that you have to
drastic public outreach...developing flyers in Spanish and English...6 weeks
notice, the combination of media and grassroots outreach and engagement, the
meetings had to be accessible to people with disabilities and had to be in the
evening so working families could attend. They had to provide food or something
that would make people feel comfortable and like people are getting off of work,
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they are hungry, and maybe they have had dinner but maybe we could do snacks
or something. We want a daycare on sight, we want an interpreter.
We talked about how most public hearings in the legislative arena, in our
state or any other state, the DM sit at a dais, at an elevated platform and they look
down on you and you are sitting there all alone, everybody is behind you and you
cannot see their comment, there is no interaction at all .. .if you really want public
input you really have to put the public at ease...we don't want these folks sitting
on a dais, we want them at our level, we want them in a circular fashion, we want
the meeting not to start with the slam of a gavel, but with comments from each
one ofthe HSC about why there are there and why they care about this stuff and
who they are so that people in the audience know who they are talking to. We
want an opportunity not only for free flowing public discussion about what public
benefits are important to people, but we also want an opportunity for people who
are uncomfortable doing oral or written testimony to participate by using surveys,
or filling out forms, so that there is a multiplicity of tools for gathering public
input. All a/that happened [emphasis added].
This quote supports similar claims ofopenness and attempted inclusion in secondary
sources. Secondary sources assert the HSC meeting process as open and inclusive.
Despite all the aforementioned efforts to include the medically poor, it is
important to also note that not everyone was always satisfied with the HSC meeting
process. Despite the extensive efforts to include and respect all interested groups or
individuals, certain groups nonetheless did not universally feel respected. Some groups
did not always feel they were taken seriously as in the HSC meeting process. As
mentioned earlier, in an interview with Ellen Lowe she states that the HSC could have
been more sensitive to their needs and done better outreach as some members of the
disability community may not have always feel included. In addition to the disabilities
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community, some members also remained unhappy with any attempt to ration care at
Former HSC Commissioner Ellen Lowe reiterates this concern over potential
perceived lack or respect when discussing the disabilities community. "I think there were
some within the disability community that did not always feel included. I would say
people with disabilities are one of those areas where I can think of times where we could
have been more sensitive" (Lowe, Ellen. Phone Interview. 16 November 2007).
Conclusion- In interviews and meeting minutes, participant stakeholders reported
high levels of perceived respect by and within the HSC. Participant stakeholders did not
mention feeling disrespected by other meeting participants. When respect concerns were
raised, individual members of the public, OHAC, and other individuals such as those with
disabilities resisted the HSC's efforts to frame the provision of state level health care in
any rationing terms or in rationing terms used to bound OHCR discussions (according to
OFS and OHAC). Some of the participant comments and secondary sources examined
provide examples where individuals and several organization representatives perceived
framing the debate in rationing based terms as disrespectful. The HSC insisted on
sticking to the rationing framework which displeased some, despite the HSC's accurate
insistence that rationing exists whether we explicitly identify it or not.
66 For example, Ellen Pinney states "nobody really knew what it meant to provide a package of benefits to
everybody that is defined by those service that do the most good for the most amount ofpeople...our
biggest concern was always the prioritization of health services and what it meant when you were going to
do this. Weare going to prioritize services that did the most good for the most number of people (Pinney,
Ellen. Personal Interview. 15 January 2008).
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Within the HSC itself, meeting participants meet report perceived adequacy along
minimum deliberative respect conditions. Participants felt included, genuinely listened to
and taken seriously by meeting participants and the HSC Commission itself. This is
illustrated in Table 7.
Table 7: Perceived Mutual Respect within HSC
Min. Ideal Inclusion Heard Incorporated
Del.
Conditions
IV: Structure, Yes: HSC's hard Yes: HSC actively Yes: HSC inc. public values.
I Behavior provides the extensive, structured different e.g. stakeholders feel valuesideal resources and participatory fonnats: go were reflected in the initial
structures to solicit to soup kitchens, stays prioritization process & list
feedback. after hours, etc.
DV: Yes: OFS and OHAC Yes: OFS and OHAC reps. Yes: OFS and OHAC reps.
Perceived report exemplary efforts and public meeting report that public values were
Adequacy to elicit statewide minutes confInn HSC incorporated into broad HSCparticipation. efforts to hear all public prioritization scheme
commentary
2. Respect and Perceived Adequacy outside the HSC
Findings- Measurable statements that reported perceived disrespect were
repeatedly mentioned in interviews and in HSC meeting minutes. However, these
statements focused on issues outside of the HSC meeting process. That is, certain groups
and individuals were not included in the initial reform discussions between politicians
and the major health care stakeholders. Interview subjects also felt excluded from the
creation and population of the HSC and establishing the HSC's guiding principles to be
used in making rationing of care decisions. These concerns were reiterated in meeting
minutes and will be examined in the following section.
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A. Perceived Adequacy
Some groups chose not to participate and expressed concern with the role of other
interests in the process surrounding the HSC and within the community meetings.
Concerns about respect were also raised by participant stakeholders in meeting minutes
and in interview with questions that explicitly asked specifically about any perceived
respect concerns. At times, representatives of the uninsured, disabled, and poor
populations expressed frustration leveled primarily at the outside political environment in
which this issue took place. These stakeholders were concerned enough to make their
concerns a part of the public record. However, these concerns were aimed at the influence
the HSC decisions process outside the HSC and not to the HSC itself.
These statements centered on issues outside of the actual design and
implementation of the HSC meeting process. That is, certain groups such as Oregon Fair
Share and Oregon Health Action Campaign, as well as other organizations and individual
members of the public (community testimony) expressed frustration. This frustration was
framed as exclusion. This was exclusion from a) the initial creation and framing of the
purpose or direction of the rationing experiment and b) with the interests associated with
conceptualizing the rationing experiment and c) pushing the OHCR to consolidate around
the guiding principle of the HSC's rationing experiment, roughly conceptualized as the
notion of the greatest good for the greatest number.
These group's representatives reported a perceived lack of efficacy, due to the
initial appeal by Kitzhaber to certain powerful interest groups such as the health industry
and not others for example; the ideological bounding that assumed the nature of
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prioritization efforts; and the undermining of the HSC process and erosion of decisions
regarding standards (most notably universal coverage, level of coverage funding).
Dana Brown, past director of the Human Rights Coalition, attributed the board's
decision in part to finally oppose the OHP was partially related to discussions or lack of
discussion with the state legislature, viz. Senator Shoemaker and Kitzhaber's office. 67 A
few groups reported an inability to contact Kitzhaber or other state representatives (e.g.
Senator Shoemaker) and officials with their concerns (Pinkerson, 1992). At times
meeting participants perceived a sense of disinterest with their perspectives expressed in
hearings or meetings about the formulation of the HSC and the framing of its mission
(Kitzhaber and others left the room at times during testimony). This led to some distrust
and feelings of "lip service" inclusion and respect (Pinney, Ellen and Marshall, Joy.
Phone Interviews. 15 November 2007). This and other actions fueled concern that the
HSC was ultimately a creation and a product of elite interest group control.
Joy Marshall states "It definitely came down to the probably the head of the
hospital and Kitzhaber and you know maybe three other people who made a lot of the
final decisions" (Marshall, Joy. Phone Interview. 15 November 2007). Or, in a phone
interview with Ellen Pinney, she mentions lay public and public advocacy concerns over
Kitzhaber convening a group of "thinkers" assembled in a closed process meeting
ostensibly to discuss framing the proper approach to health care rationing at Willamette
67 Oregon Fair Share is a citizen action group which opposed Senate Bill 27. Oregon Fair Share advocates
elimination ofprivate insurance in favor of a single payer system run by the government.
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University, which was offlimits to the public or the press, and where "nobody knew what
they were doing" (Pinney, Ellen. Phone Interview. 15 November 2007).
In a phone interview with Ellen Pinney she recalls her perceived exclusion and
bias with OHCR when she was first hired by OHAC. Pinney remembers how various
stakeholders and members ofthe public were upset that OHCR was largely pre-
determined before the public was really involved. For example, recall Pinney's concern
over questions that were asked throughout health care in community meetings that
predetermined the answer while ignoring other health care expenditures such as
administration, profit margins, and excess technologies (Pinney, Ellen. Phone Interview.
15 November 2008).
Furthermore, representatives of the lay public (poor or uninsured) felt that the
prioritized list was ultimately eroded, under funded, or even ignored in the subsequent
political process that took place outside the HSC meetings and its decisions. Joy Marshall
says:
How good was the process? Well how good could it be? It is like let's throw a
little bit more money into Medicaid and let's try to do it rationally. Well that is
not a bad thing to do, but how are you really going to solve the (bigger) problem?
(110) Costs keep going up and you are going to keep cutting items off the list,
start kicking people off OHP, which you know they did. And poor people have
little political clout, so once Kitzhaber left government they just kicked people off
the program once money got tight. ..Unless everyone is in the same boat, if you
have poor people' health care and regular people's health care, poor people get
the short end of the stick. And of course if you don't really control costs seriously,
you can't afford to give health care to poor people, comprehensively (Marshall,
Joy. Phone Interview. 15 November 2007).
Other interview subjects also agreed that there were practical policy limitations,
related legislative and fiscal concerns, and vested interests (insurance industry and
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doctors/hospitals). According to respondents, these stakeholders were not interested in
keeping the resulting decisions ofthe HSC when it meant the new OHP potentially
threatened their livelihoods with mandatory employee insurance or limitations on
expensive procedures. This mayor may not have changed the HSC list and ranking of
items. John Kitzhaber, Darren Coffinan, and Ellen Pinney (among others) felt that
external forces did influence the process in multiple ways that served to erode quality and
extent of coverage over time. Darren Coffinan, Executive Director of the HSC, in an
interview in March of2008, confirms the outside influence ofbusiness interests in
affecting the OHCR legislation but not the process oflist prioritization.
If you are talking about why did the employer mandate not stick, yeah that is a
completely different answer [than the Medicaid reforms] in terms of [addressing
changes in OHP over time], yes political forces even more so at the national than
at the state level because we had to get a waiver of the ERISA laws in order to
implement the employer mandate and while we had the pioneering spirit at the
state level there wasn't quite that same spirit at the federal level. That was clearly
the reason why that piece of the original OHP did not. ..
In a phone conversation with John Kitzhaber in June 2008 he reiterates his
concern in the erosion ofthe OHCR reforms by interests external. This erosion was
contradictory to the intent of the HSC, its participants, and legislative intent.
Here is what happened. AOI, which was a very powerful organization up in
Salem, supported the employer mandate in SB 27, it is very interesting. This was
in 1989. Because almost all oftheir members were larger employers that were
picking up the cost shift and they got it. They understood that. What happened
then is that the composition ofAOI leadership changed and AOI began to
compete with NSIVfor membership. So it began to try to attract smaller
businesses into its fold. So it evolved into an organization that had a mix ofpeople
that offered insurers and didn't offer insurers. And so come the '91 session, they
were very interested in getting out from under the employer mandate. So that is
when they got that provision stuck in. [emphasis added]
------------ ---------_ ... _ ...._-----
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What is important about the changes in the plan over time through the role of
outside forces is that this served to generate perceptions among some HSC meeting
participants that they were not really taken seriously. Some groups (especially those
representing the medically poor) report that they were assured the Oregon Plan would
actually cover all Oregonians, resulting in truly universal care. These groups were also
assured that the needs of Oregonians would be adequately met. This assurance was based
on some sort of minimum package of benefits. This package would provide services that
were truly the most important based on the greatest good for the greatest number. Some
feel the plan didn't tum out that way. Ellen Pinney states:
If there was any problem it was what they testified to did not become reality. In
this proposed package every Oregonian is supposed to receive the same health
program. But instead this package became a package only for Medicaid enrollees.
That in my mind was the biggest violation of public understanding of what they
were participating in the first place. And you know I have to say that that wasn't I
don't think there was some intentional manipulation of semantics. I think the
private insurance industry... (The prioritization process) has a very innovative
way for determining how benefits are the most important and it acknowledges that
while there are some practitioners who would always espouse certain treatments
they may be motivated to do that by the money they were going to get by doing
that treatment and not by whether that treatment is the most effective [emphasis
added] (Pinney, Ellen. Phone Interview. 15 November 2007).
Representatives of the poor did not feel they were taken seriously. From their perspective
promises were made and then broken. From this vantage point, the process outside seems
to matter more than what takes place within the HSC and its deliberative forums.
Under these conditions, whether intentional or not, it is difficult to expect full
deliberation, i.e. that the traditionally marginalized groups and their representatives
would genuinely seek out HSC meetings and take the process seriously.
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Conclusion- All sources examined-HSC members, state po1icymakers, and
representatives of the poor in the HSC meetings, meeting minutes, and secondary
accounts examined-were unable to discover any widespread or systematic lack of
respect concerning the implementation of and the conducting ofHSC public meetings.
Interview subjects report and meeting minutes confirm that meeting participants felt the
HSC's genuinely attempted to demonstrate a willingness to listen and genuinely cared
about what all Oregonians had to say. However, concerns were repeatedly raised about
the initial framing, composition, and establishment of the guiding prioritization principles
outside of the HSC. Members of the lay public and advocates ofthe poor stressed that
their exclusion from parts of the policy making process that occurred outside the HSC led
to feelings that in some ways the process and decisions of the HSC didn't really matter.
This sense of exclusion and outside erosion ofthe HSC process certainly served to erode
the perceived legitimacy of the HSC and may have ultimately influenced participation
among the medically needy or other public stakeholders.
Outside the HSC, meeting participants meet report perceived inadequate
minimum conditions of deliberative respect. Participants did not feel included, genuinely
listened to or taken seriously by the various stakeholders outside the HSC meeting
process. This is illustrated in Table 8 below.
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t t'd HSCdM t lRT bl 8 Pa e erce1ve u ua espec ou Sl e
Min. Ideal Inclusion Heard Incorporated
Del.
Conditions
IV: No: prioritization No: initial prioritization No: a public process did not
Structure, discussions did not always discussions did not exist to clearly incorporate or
Behavior include public always structure public measure the incorporation of
or relevant stakeholder public or stakeholder input
input
DV: No: participants report that No: HSC Participants No: participants reported that
Perceived Kitzhaber did not provide report that Kitzhaber did a closed prioritization
Adequacy the necessary resources and not allow multiple discussion excluded relevant
structures to solicit a broad relevant stakeholders to public and stakeholder value
range of community be heard in initial incorporation in initial
feedback in initial prioritization discussions prioritization discussions
prioritization discussions
IV. Discussion: Perceived Adequacy and the Role of Representative Deliberation
Ideal deliberative theoretical participatory standards require articulation,
influence, and robust participation of all relevant groups if not all affected individuals
(Cohen, 1989). Despite failing to meet this central deliberative standard, HSC meetings
are considered a deliberative success. When examining meeting minutes, HSC
documents, interviews, or secondary sources there are no complaints about taking all
actors perspectives into account and having real influence in the prioritization process.
Neither the medically poor nor their advocates are on record as being unhappy about the
lack of full participation. In the following chapter conclusion, I will summarize and
discuss HSC evidentiary findings to resolve ideal deliberative participatory standards
with stakeholder perceived adequacy. The central conclusion ofthis chapter suggests
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representative deliberative or discursive representation as a potential reconciliation
between ideal and non-ideal deliberative theory.
1. Re-evaluating Deliberative Participatory Standards
Even by the strictest theoretical deliberative measures, the failure of
representative participation is notfor lack oftrying by the HSC. These meetings remain
widely cited by representatives ofthe poor that were present at these meetings as the best
example ofpublic state sponsored deliberative meetings in Oregon that exist to this day.
In fact, the strength ofdeliberative access claims lies not in numeric participatory results
but in genuinely active and creative attempts by the HSC to solicit the opinions ofthe
medically needy into a conversation about health care. 68
Ifthe process within the HSC somehow excluded the poor it is likely that public
testimony or other evidence examined would have revealed this perception.
Representatives of the poor, other concerned members of the lay public, or the poor
themselves would have raised concerns about the deliberative process either within the
HSC or outside it. Instead, all observable records suggest otherwise (e.g. interview
subjects present at the HSC meetings and meeting minutes). The examined evidence
68 Ellen Pinney, Joy Marshall, and others believe the creation of and the real and attempted inclusion of lay
representatives on the HSC Commission and in community meetings, and especially the structure and
conduct of the HSC meetings themselves were of higher deliberative quality overall than other meetings
conducted at the community level with other statewide formats. Specifically, within the HSC meetings the
Ellen Pinney believes the HSC did a better job of dealing with power discrepancies than had been
witnessed in the health care arena before, and was as good as practically possible given the numerous
constraints. In fact, Pinney believes that the HSC meetings were the best she had ever seen and are still
drawn from an exemplar case by other agencies and organizations when looking to develop deliberative
meeting processes (Pinney, Ellen. Personal interview. 15 November 2007). These active attempts to include
the public have been confmned in multiple interviews with original HSC board members and lay reps for
the poor including Paul Kirk, Ellen Lowe, Yayoe Kuramitsu and advocates for poor Oregonians such as
Ellen Pinney (Oregon Health Action Campaign) and Joy Marshall (Oregon Fair Share) and are supported
extensively in numerous secondary sources as well.
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supports claims that the HSC undertook serious attempts to solicit and include public
opinion and the most directly affected members of the public in the prioritization process.
This lends credibility to and satisfaction with the prioritization process.69 Instead of
complaints about participation or the meeting process, without specific prompting, each
interview subject repeatedly stated that the HSC took many significant and extensive
steps, both formal and informal, to solicit participation, despite the fact that a diverse
sample did not consistently tum out. Despite these efforts, why did those potentially most
affected - the medically poor - not participate in the HSC meetings in substantial
numbers? Despite the inclusive efforts of the HSC, was there some sort ofperceived
power imbalance in the reform process? The most commonly cited explanation for non-
participation of the medically poor asserts that the poor and uninsured were simply
dealing with more immediate concerns. Many participants within the HSC and
deliberative critics maintain that the public at large just don't want to and will not
participate in the HSC or other participatory forums no matter how well these forums are
designed and implemented.
Many of the medically poor are working multiple jobs or long hours to provide
for their family. These individuals doubt the efficacy oftheir political participation and
would be intimidated in a public forum dominated by affluent educated groups. Clearly
affluent stakeholder groups are more familiar and comfortable with intense issue
advocacy or political competition involving public speaking, writing letters, and so forth.
69 This evidence includes interview with former HSC Commission members, HSC participants as
advocates of the poor (and others directly involved in the HSC) as well as previous research into the OHCR
by Dr. Mary Pinkerson, among others.
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There are also real differences among stakeholders concerning perceived stakes in a
given policy area.
Take for example, the relevant participatory incentives of the poor, middle class,
and the wealthy. Experts actively perceive and are willing to fight for concentrated gains
to be had from a process that grants, for example, their insurance company more
generous payments for common services. Conversely, many uninsured are either unaware
of potential gain and losses or unsure about how to navigate and compete with other
health industry interests groups (Fung and Wright, 2003). The vast remaining majority of
the potential participatory public is either too busy or feels largely unaffected or
powerless and therefore has no incentive to get involved one way or another (Fung and
Wright 2003,38). Most members of the middle class have their own insurance. Most do
not meet coverage levels for these changes.
This lack of direct impact arguably makes many potential participants view the
process as a diffused cost issue. That is, most members of the middle class view OHCR
largely a policy issue that affects them only indirectly and with minimal impact (this is an
example ofthe problem of diffused costs - a small percentage of their annual income
tax).70 As a result, at worst this potentially leaves the poor and uninsured no real
advocacy. At best, the interests of the medically needy are articulated by unelected
"representatives" who may not have necessarily lived or always be able/willing to
articulate the experiences they seek to speak on behalfof.
70 For a detailed discussion of the logic of diffused costs and concentrated gains is taken from Mancur
Olson's The Logic a/Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory o/Groups, published in 1965.
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When referring to complex or contentious aspects ofpublic deliberation within a
given issue area, subjects often reported that extensive and diverse participation ofthe
poorest or most polarized individuals or groups may not be necessary, realistic, nor even
appropriate for genuine a deliberation process. When asked about recruitment issues,
Ellen Lowe states, "I think you always have that" (Lowe, Ellen. Phone Interview. 16
November 2007). While the HSC meetings were not necessarily ideal, Joy Marshall and
Ellen Lowe (reps of the medically poor) were both clear that equality of power and
participation among the poor could always be better. Despite this, interview subjects
repeatedly stated and deliberative critics also argue that no matter how extensive the steps
to include the medically poor or other marginalized groups many groups or individuals
representing these groups did not and cannot, or will participate little ifat all. Marshall
confirms the difficulty in soliciting any participation from traditionally marginalized
participants even under ideal conditions.
People who are not already in a position ofpower or expertise in the field. And
you cannot meet until you fill those slots and you have a budget for it because
they cannot pay for the gas and take offof work to come. And then you have to
overcome the cultural obstacles (193). And you have to have a number of them.
Because if you have one person for 5 doctors, you know, then the poor person is
suddenly intimidated and doesn't have any clout now (Marshall, Joy. Phone
Interview. 15 November 2007).
The non-ideal deliberative literature also supports multiple interview subjects'
claim as to the difficulty of full recruitment under unlikely but more ideal conditions.
"Leading reformers in each of our experiments realized, or learned through
disappointment, that most non-professionals lack the capacities to participate effectively
in functionally specific and empowered groups" (Fung and Wright 2003,29). Critics of
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deliberative theory and some deliberativists themselves suggest theoretical participatory
standards may be unrealistically high.
Empowered participation demands too much in terms of depth of knowledge and
level of participation from ordinary citizens, and the knowledge, patience, and
wisdom that they are expected to possess or in short order acquire. It may be that
the citizens in contemporary capitalist societies are generally too consumed with
private life to put forth the time, energy, and commitment that these deliberative
experiments require. (Fung and Wright 2003,38)
These robust, idealized conceptions of public participation may be unrealistic for
practical policy work. Workable standards that satisfy all relevant stakeholders (such as
perceived adequacy in the HSC) may meet stakeholder standards of perceived adequacy
and therefore be "good enough."
2. Perceived Adequacy and the Role of Representative Deliberation
Deliberativists still insist that inclusion of the poorest, most marginalized, directly
affected is still necessary to legitimize genuinely deliberative claims (Fung and Wright,
2003). Ifdeliberative participation requirements cannot be met even under the HSC's
most ideal attempts to solicitfeedback and mitigate inequities within the meeting and
prioritization process (according to HSC meeting participants and representatives of the
poor), is participatory deliberation really possible or practical at all? The HSC was also
viewed as a deliberative institution in structure and process by the representatives of the
poor at these meetings. Additionally, HSC participants felt the interests ofthe absent
members (poor, uninsured) could be and likely were adequately represented by the
Commission members or through the representatives of the poor and marginalized
populations that were present at the meetings.
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For example, former HSC Commissioner Paul Kirk says "I think the people who
were being excluded from access to health care were quite well represented mainly by
advocates" (Kirk, Paul. Phone Interview. 7 December 2007). HSC members had all
worked with the Medicaid populations and had lay voting members on the Commission.
The HSC meetings included poor representative from groups like Oregon Fair Share or
Oregon Health Action Campaign.
By attempting to and actually generating participation that is perceived as "good
enough," HSC stakeholders appear to be willing to genuinely seek our deliberation and
behave in deliberative terms. This suggests a different deliberative standardfor
participation. While genuine deliberation necessitates that all affected interests are
articulated and seriously listened to and taken into account, it does not follow that there
must necessarily be high levels ofparticipation by all relevant groups and individuals
within an particular issue area. That is, deliberation may be more impacted not by who
participates but how participation occurs. While all interests and discourses need to be at
the table, this case (as the other cases examined in this study confirm) and the most recent
findings among other deliberative researchers suggests that more affluent and less
affected direct representatives ofmarginalized groups can, under certain conditions,
advocate successfully in these deliberative forums and generate outcomes that are
favorable to those marginalized groups that are most affected.7 !
71 The cases examined in this study and other independent research substantiate this claim and suggest
conditions for representative deliberation: drastic changes that generate improved coverage for Oregon
uninsured, improved community relations for all members of the gay community, improved watershed, fish
habitat, and water quality outcomes or funding ofprojects for tribal populations or poor Oregonians in rural
III
The findings from this case and other recent independent deliberative research
suggest adequate conditions of representation include: a) extensive institutional steps to
identify and solicit participation and feedback among all relevant interests, especially
those most marginalized and potentially most affected by proposed policy change; b)
extensive institutional steps to achieve relative parity, and finally; c) extensive attempts
to identify and then ensure participation and articulation of all relevant discourse interests
in the issue area. John Dryzek, in his recent November 2008 publication APSR, calls this
"discursive representation," or substantive acting for others in the discourses or interests
they represent. Most importantly, d) satisfaction with steps a-c (above) is required by all
relevant interests, which includes representative and discourse identification and can be
measured in a number of different ways.72
Interviews and meetings minutes suggest participants were satisfied with steps a-d
within the HSC but not outside it. Only when a completely different, more ideal process
is created, where lay representatives are firmly in control of the meetings and the HSC
itself and only when the outside political environment does not affect a deliberative
process (as in the HSC) could test whether extensive participation would be sought by the
most marginalized populations. Since these ideal conditions were approximated within
areas across the state. Proper institutional devolution and centralization increase the chances of
representative deliberative success as well.
72 John Dryzek's most recent research supports on of the central independent research finding concerning
representative deliberation in this case study as well. Importantly, Dryzek suggests a modification of ideal
deliberative theory regarding participation. Specifically, Dryzek want to reconceptualize participatory
deliberative standards on the identifying and articulation of all relevant discourses rather than the ideal
deliberative focus on measuring participatory standards as including all affected (Joshua Cohen 1989) (too
many) or ascriptive characteristics such as race, class, or gender (may not represent a discourse). An
interesting and cogent discussion on discourse selection methodologies and satisfaction with them is
presented in Dryzek's "Discursive Representation" on pages 487-489 of the November 2008 APSR.
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the HSC and remain no more likely in other participatory forums, it follows that
development and testing ofnon-ideal deliberative participatory standards are not only
appropriate but necessary.
In conclusion, extensive deliberative claims have been made regarding OHCR
and other deliberative cases without a clear set of standards, making any evaluation of
these claims ambiguous.73 In the end, Oregon's explicit public debate and discussion over
health care coverage within the HSC enjoyed considerable support among actual HSC
participants and among major statewide health care actors. Upon closer examination, it
appears the HSC structured numerous deliberative opportunities within and to some
extent outside the OHD and HSC meetings. Additionally, participants expressed
perceived adequacy consistently along numerous theoretical deliberative criteria such as
power and respect.
This does not mean the HSC itself and especially the OHCR fits the description of
an exemplar deliberative case. In the end there are still potential shortcomings along ideal
deliberative standards within but especially outside the HSC. While strong attempts were
made to bring in the medically poor, they may have been skeptical of the HSC, no matter
how deliberative, due to the outside political environment. Ideal deliberative theorists
would support this conclusion by citing the fact that the medically poor did not
participate widely (at least proportionate to their numbers).
73 For example, in extant deliberative literature, the formal openness of the HSC is often cited for
deliberative support, a standard that more closely resembles orthodox instrumental theories of behavior.
V.O Key's Equilibrium theory (instrumental), that asserts affected and interested actors will activate and
mobilize effectively to the extent they are threatened. In the case of the HSC meetings, extensive
participation among the most potentially affected actors did not emerge.
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However, it is uncertain that meeting ideal deliberative institutional standards or
other conditions of relative parity within the HSC would lead to increased ideal levels of
participation, considering the participatory efforts in this case. Only when deliberative
issues of transparency, inclusion, and influence outside of deliberative institutional space
are adequately met can ideal participatory claims be more decisively tested. While
unfortunate, it is also shortsighted to expect and assume adequate relative parity outside
of institutional deliberative forums. However, as a result, this further reinforces the need
for different, non-ideal deliberative participatory standards such as Dryzek's discursive
representation (Dryzek, 2008) to begin to better facilitate, measure, and improve
deliberative participatory forums.
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CHAPTER III
CASE STUDY II. EVALUATING EXEMPLAR DELIBERATIVE CLAIMS
SURROUNDTI\JG THE OREGON WATERSHED ENHANCEMENT BOARD
I. Introduction
1. Background
Collaborative watershed management initiatives are not unique to Oregon.
Community based, collaborative planning is an established form of environmental policy-
making in Oregon and is increasingly used throughout the American West (Bidwell,
2003/6; Rosenberg, 2005; Fox 2007,9). Watershed management represents one of the
most common examples of community based collaborative environmental planning. This
is supported by the dramatic increase in collaborative watershed management initiatives
over the last 15-20 years. Oregon's watershed management initiative represents one of
many state level collaborative watershed management programs currently in existence. 74
These watersheds programs explicitly seek to utilize a cooperative, collaborative grass
roots approach with state level authority or capacity devolved to these agencies and their
locals.
74 The Natural Resources Law Center estimates there are over 400 watershed initiatives in the Western
United States (Kenney, 2000). Also, you can find his paper on page 11 at the following web address:
http://www.cde.state.co.us/artemis/ucb6/UCB6582C762000INTERNET.pdf
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Oregon's current watershed management program is associated with the Oregon
Watershed Enhancement Board. The state legislature in Salem voluntarily devolved
authority in this policy area to a single state agency.75 Originally referred to as GWEB,
the Governor's Watershed Enhancement Board was initially established by the passage of
SB23 during the 1987 legislative session (Governor's Watershed Enhancement Board
Report 1995, 1997). The bill was a response to "the concerns of environmental groups,
private citizens, organizations, and federal and state agencies over the continuing loss of
water quality and quantity in Oregon's streams and degradation offish habitat, forests,
and rangelands" (Governor's Watershed Enhancement Board Report 1997, 1).76
GWEB is now called OWEB. This state agency evolved from the Governor's
Watershed Enhancement Board (GWEB). OWEB was created by the 1999 Legislature
(HB3225) to promote the restoration and enhancement of Oregon's watersheds. 77 The
Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board is a state agency led by a policy oversight board.
Together, these two groups promote and fund voluntary local watershed projects and
organizational actions that seek to enhance Oregon's watersheds. 78 "OWEB programs
support Oregonian's efforts to restore salmon runs, improve water quality, and strengthen
75 The voluntary emphasis of OWEB and the devolution of authority can be found at:
http://www.leg.state.or.us/ors/541.html.This link contains legislative policy or principles of watershed
management and enhancement. These statutes contain legislation that concerns OWEB and the Oregon
Plan.
76 The beginning of the Oregon Plan can be traced to the original efforts to restore salmon and watershed
health (referred to by OWEB as its foundational document, originally was originally entitled The Oregon
Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative or OCSRl). This founding document ultimately led to the guiding
principles and the actual creation of GWEB and then OWER
77 http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/executive/watershedlwatershedduties.htm
78 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/
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ecosystems that are critical to healthy watersheds and sustainable communities.,,79 This
support is most readily associated with local watershed council support.
OWEB 's primary purpose as originally legislated, has always been "to grant
funds to local watershed councils (LWC), Soil and Water Conservation Districts, or
private citizens in support ofprojects that will restore, enhance, or maintain Oregon's
watershed health" (Secretary of State 2000, 2). To create and maintain healthy
watersheds, OWEB funds local projects that restore, maintain, and enhance the state's
watersheds throughout the state. OWEB fosters the collaboration of citizens, agencies,
and local interests, of which local watersheds are a central focus. 8o
Previous scholars have stated that OWEB exists to promote watershed health by
facilitating diverse citizen participation and influence over the outcomes from
partnerships that enable citizens to negotiate in trade-offs with traditional power-holders
in order to satisfy the various interests concerning economic and environmental positions
(Rosenburg 2005, 102).
Precise rationales for seeking to form local watersheds vary to some degree.
However, the major response to community-wide economic and environmental
polarization has been for community leaders to form watersheds and watershed
partnerships. OWEB and local watershed councils are viewed as a partial response to
address the various range of conflict regarding issues of the local economic development
79 hUp://www.oweb.state.or.us/
80 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/
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and environmental concerns. Deliberative standards are a primary and explicit goal of
OWEB and local watershed councils to help resolve these conflicts and enhance
watershed health.8I
The OWEB Board meets four times a year throughout the state to publicly discuss
and act on applications for funds to accomplish watershed restoration activities. OWEB is
responsible for establishing Oregon's long-term strategy for achieving sustainable
watershed health. OWEB is accountable to the State Legislature and the Governor as
OWEB is required to report progress ofthe Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds
biennially.82
OWEB's primary mechanism to accomplish watershed restoration involves the
administration of a grant program. This program is "funded from the Oregon Lottery, as a
result of a citizen initiative in 1998, federal funds and salmon license plate dollars.,,83 In
81 "The Board [OWEB] fosters the collaboration of citizens, agencies, and local interests."
http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/WSHEDS/about us.shtml "The two primary guidelines provided by the
legislature are: 1) that the watershed council be a voluntary, local group, and 2) the council represents a
balance of interested and affected persons within the watershed."
http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/WSHEDS/wsheds councils overview.shtml
82 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/board main.shtml
83 http://www.oweb.state.or.us/
http://www.oregon. gov/OWEB/GRANTS/
OWEB's budget varies considerably due to its reliance on fluctuating revenue sources and legislative
appropriations. The following figures are an example ofOWEB budgetary appropriation to local
watersheds. As a result of the passage of Measure 66, is was estimated that OWEB would administer nearly
43.4 million in natural resource restoration and protection funds during 1999-2001 biennium. In actuality,
grant funding approved for the 1999-2001 biennium will result in an average grant funding of 15.3 million
per year. The Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board provided $31.1 million dollars for watershed related
activities that was then matched by 74.6 million (federal and private) in the 2001-2003 Biennium (OWEB
2003). In 2004-2005, total funding was over $96 million. From 1995 to 2005, the total funding for reported
investment in restoration and protection projects exceeded $388 million. In the 2005-07 biennium, OWEB
awarded over $48 million to landowners, watershed councils, soil and water conservation districts and
others for watershed enhancement work.
--------
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1998, Oregon voters approved ballot measure 66 that amended the Oregon Constitution
and set aside 15 percent of net lottery revenues for restoring Oregon's salmon,
watersheds, and state parks to be shared among state parks and salmon, watershed, and
habitat restoration. Half of these funds are dedicated to OWEB to administer funds to
protect native salmon, wildlife habitat, and watersheds. Other sources include a Salmon
License Plate revenues and federal Pacific Coastal Salmon Recovery Funds.84
"The grant program supports voluntary efforts by Oregonians seeking to create
and maintain healthy watersheds.,,85 Also, "the grant program at OWEB manages how
project applications are processed, reviewed, and recommended for funding to the
OWEB Board, and how grants are tracked during their imp1ementation.,,86
To summarize, OWEB functions essentially as a capacity building agency. The
primary goal of OWEB is to enhance the capacity ofloca1 citizen groups to assess
watershed health conditions, and to plan, prepare, and undertake successful restoration
projects. oWEB does this by supporting the "capacity oflocal watershed-based citizen
groups to carry out a variety of restoration projects; promotes citizen understanding of
watershed needs and restoration ideas.,,87 OWEB's grant program is the central
84 This infonnation was gathered from multiple sources, such as the OWEB webpage:
http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/index.shtml as well as interviews with OWEB staff (Ken Bierly, Tom
Byler, and Melissa Leoni,) as well as other secondary sources.
85 www.oregon.gov/OWEB/about us.shtml
86 In this process, OWEB staff and the Board utilize numerous criteria such as utilization of best practice
standards and deliberative criteria such as stakeholder representation. More info about grant eligibility,
review, and implementation and monitoring can be found at: http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/GRANTS/
87 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/WSHEDS/about us.shtm!
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institutional feature of OWEB and the primary mechanism it uses to accomplish these
goals.
These "capacity-building" grants assist watershed groups as they equip
themselves with the planning, human resources, project management, and technical skills
necessary to carry out complex restoration projects. Examples ofthe most common types
of grant awards include projects that involve watershed assessment, data gathering,
monitoring, fiscal management, various workshops, student programs and outreach
programs. 88 "OWEB also provides technical skills to citizens working to restore urban
and rural watersheds and monitors the effectiveness of investments in watershed
restoration.,,89 Furthermore, OWEB "strives to prioritize funding for projects that foster
cooperation, pursue matching-funds, provide for local involvement, include youth and
volunteers, and promote education about watershed concepts.,,90
The federal government has listed the Coho and other salmon populations under
the Endangered Species Act. Despite this, the state of Oregon has continued to promote
state level solutions through OWEB utilizing a grassroots, voluntary approach to Salmon
management and restoration (taken from OWEB webpage and from a personal interview
with OWEB Executive Director Byler, Tom. 28 June 2007). Former Governor John
Kitzhaber and current Governor Ted Kulongoski and his staffhave and continue to
88 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/WSHEDS/about us.shtml In addition to the grant program, OWEB also
provides a variety of services to support watershed restoration in Oregon. These programs are considered
secondary to the mission and actual bulk ofOWEB's funding and action items.
89 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/WSHEDS/about us.shtml
90 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/WSHEDS/about us.shtml
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provide support to OWEB and its locals, integrate state natural resource agency efforts,
and promote federal-state cooperation to help direct salmon recovery efforts. This unique
and innovative approach to species management and recovery is often referred to as a
model for other states and governments. The reliance on voluntary restoration is seen as
key to its mission and its success (Rosenburg, 2005).
2. Why OWEB? Untested Deliberative Claims
OWEB is the single state agency charged with "administering salmon and
watershed maintenance, restoration, and enhancement through dedicated lottery funds"
(Secretary of State 2000, 1).91 Watershed management is now widely accepted as an
important component of healthy ecosystems. Success in watershed restoration has been
attributed to OWEB but has been collectively defined through local watershed groups
that engage participants with diverse perspectives in ongoing dialogue about social,
economic, and environmental issues surrounding their respective watershed. Numerous
scholars and their existing research has highlighted "hundreds of success stories"
(Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000). The Oregon Watershed Board and its associated local
watersheds have been grouped and cited by Sabatier (2005), Fox (2007), Wright (2000),
and Rosenberg (2005), among others, as an exemplary case of community based
collaborative natural resource management.
The attention that local watersheds receive in the media and in research studies is
often favorable. Secondary sources examined often hold locals in high regard along
multiple deliberative claims while simultaneously assuming away the deliberative nature
91 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEBIWSHEDS/wsheds councils overview.shtml
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of OWEB itself as it relates to LWCs. Locals are referred to as grass roots based,
inclusive bodies that empower localities to solve their problems at the local level using
deliberative governance standards. Importantly, OWEB is not separated or distinguished
from this type ofcommentary. For example, Rosenberg states that
The Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds is a model for other collaborative
efforts ...There are lessons from this research that can be applied to other
watershed programs and other collaborative initiatives. By providing local
communities the opportunity to design and implement their own strategies for
improving watershed health, within existing state laws and regulations, diverse
watershed groups have emerged that reflect local conditions (Rosenberg 2005,
121).
Finally, OWEB Board members, deliberative theorists, and policy researchers
also endorse the position that most and increasingly all local watershed councils are or
are becoming more "successful, " and include deliberative claims and the influence of
OWEB in these statements ofsuccess. 92 However, the OWEB Grant Program only acts to
support voluntary efforts by Oregonians seeking to create and maintain healthy
watersheds. Local watersheds canform and continue to exist with or without the blessing
orfunding of0 WEB. Local watershed groups or other state and federal organizations can
choose to tum to OWEB or not and can function entirely outside of OWEB.
92 Numerous scholars and policymakers support deliberative claims. For example, in "Swimming
Upstream," Paul Sabatier (2005) examines causes for and design of the collaborative approach, a new
governmental approach to watershed decision-making and cites Oregon as an example in this discussion of
collaborative watershed partnerships. "The more recent collaborative approach involves face to face
information exchange and problem solving among all relevant stakeholders, usually under fairly strict
civility guidelines and some form of consensus rule. This method emphasizes win win solutions ... [and
examples include] Massachusetts, Oregon, Washington, Pennsylvania, and Ohio" (Sabatier 2005, 7 and
48). Or, Fox states that "Oregon's watershed council community has been used as an exemplary example of
a community based collaborative natural resource management model in the developed world" (Fox 2007,
11).
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Additionally, previous secondary studies have found clear differences in
watershed process and accomplishments. Some locals have received national awards for
their "excellence in collaborative efforts." However, interview statements among OWEB
meeting participants and OWEB Board and staff members themselves substantiate
variance in and actual deliberative shortcomings endemic to various local watersheds.
More than one researcher has stated "all case study councils are widely regarded as
highly successful - often along multiple measures - in the state of Oregon" while
simultaneously claiming that "every watershed council is different" (Rolph, 1996;
Rosenberg, 2005; Fox 2007, 14 and 21). It is unclear how each local can be considered
equally successful and therefore also deliberative under conditions of extreme variance
(even if uncommon), suggesting that different standards are applied when attributing
terms like "deliberative" and "success" to local watersheds.
Despite the establishment of OWEB and the proliferation of local watershed
programs largely due to OWEB support, a) there is not only little careful explication of
the deliberative criteria used to collectively assess OWEB and LWC as a collaborative
institution, there also exists little b) systematic testing ofoWEB separately as a
deliberative body, andfinally c) little systematic testing and evaluation ofoWEB and its
role in deliberative variance among local watershed councils. This renders substantive
evaluation of exemplar claims ambiguous. 93
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the largely unexamined exemplar
deliberative claims surrounding OWEB. This will be accomplished by assessing explicit
93 Almost no deliberative research exists on OWEB itself (Margerum, 2005).
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and testable deliberative criteria against the existing evidence in this case. The following
chapter shows that OWEB is perceived as a deliberative institution by numerous
stakeholders within and outside OWEB along measures ofparity and respect. That is,
stakeholders view OWEB as sufficiently open, inclusive, and receptive to their concerns,
even when controversial. Finally, stakeholders understand that deliberative Lwe
variance is outside of formal OWEB control and in fact often prefer the existing
voluntary nature ofparticipation with OWEB despite previous and existing LWe
deliberative transgressions.
II. Evidence: An Accounting of Power
1. Power within OWEB
Findings: OWEB lacks significant ideal deliberative institutional authority along
devolution and centralization standards. Despite these constraints, current voluntary
standards and practices of OWEB (access, influence, and stakeholder representation)
indicate numerous institutional steps taken within OWEB to establish deliberative
standards along measures of relative parity. OWEB grants institutionalized access and
influence to relevant stakeholders. Relevant stakeholders perceive these efforts along
criteria of adequate deliberative parity. OWEB's institutional behavior is examined in the
following section. Additionally, I will present and assess OWEB's behavioral role in
addressing Lwe deliberative variance in institutional structure and practice. Evidence
such as interview data and meeting minutes will be examined to show that OWEB was
able to meet significant ideal and perceived deliberative standards along parity measures.
---------------------_.. - .
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A. Institutionalized OWEB Access and Influence
Access ofall relevant stakeholders to the OWEB decision-making process is a
central minimum deliberative criteria and basic institutional feature of OWER OWEB is
extensively open and at times actively attempts to recruit and solicit stakeholder input.
All stakeholders are welcome and encouraged to participate. OWEB meets access criteria
due in part to its organizational transparency in theory and in practice. The OWEB
Executive Summary of the Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds explicitly states its
commitment to inclusion of all relevant stakeholders:
Oregon's Plan is an adaptive strategy that will change and improve over time
based on constructive suggestions from the public, key partners, scientific
reviewers, and the Legislature. Over the long tenn, the Plan will continue to
change as we implement agency measures, build local support, obtain voluntary
commitments, and monitor the ongoing success ofthose efforts.94
Transparency and openness represent central, minimum deliberative criteria and
are central institutional features of OWEB The transparency and openness of OWEB is
part of an effort to stress the actual participation ofall relevant stakeholders. Extensive
stakeholder participation in OWEB is a central and is explicitly linked to local success
and legitimacy. On its website, OWEB calls for
Projects that foster cooperation, pursue match-funding, provide for local
involvement, include youth and volunteers, and promote education about
watershed concepts. OWEB provides grants to support the capacity of citizen
groups to assess watershed health conditions, then to plan, prepare, and undertake
successful restoration projects. These "capacity-building" grants assist watershed
groups as they equip themselves with the planning, human resources, project
94 http://www.ccb.state.or.us/OPSW/archives/ocsrimar1997/FExec.htm1
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management, and technical skills necessary to carry out complex restoration
. 95projects.
The actual process surrounding the Board's prioritization of funding is transparent
and attempts to elicit broad levels ofparticipation by creating structural participatory
incentives. All information, meetings, and other relevant decision-making procedures are
open to the public. OWEB goes to considerable lengths to make sure information on and
actual discussion and reaching of Board decisions are public. OWEB holds regular
announced meetings across the state. At these meetings the general public is invited to
attend and steps are taken to ensure that the public feels welcome.
Food is served at OWEB meetings. The staff and Board mingle with the public
during breaks. Extensive physical and online documents are provided for the public
regarding past meetings and future agenda items. Time for public commentary is
periodically included at every major decision-making step in the Board's deliberation. A
comprehensive, regularly updated website with meeting minutes, progress reports,
contact information, and grant award criteria are all posted and regularly updated.
B. Perceived Adequacy within OWEB
Are the actions of OWEB viewed in deliberative terms? OWEB is perceived as
reaching various stakeholders standards of relative parity. OWEB accomplishes this by
carefully institutionalizing a deliberative culture of openness and inclusion in decision-
making. OWEB statute demands citizen and relevant stakeholder inclusion. Self-reported
interview responses among several staff and Board members such as Dan Powers, Tom
95 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/about us.shtml
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Byler and Melissa Leoni, Jane 0' Keefe, OWEB meeting minutes and direct meeting
observation, and other secondary sources establish and substantiate the perceived
deliberative steps that OWEB takes to ensure stakeholders are engaged and incorporated
into OWEB policy making and practices.
Tom Byler, Melissa Leoni, OWEB Board members, and independent assessments
such as The Secretary of State or other lay participants agree that OWEB (OWEB Board
and staff) engages in adequate deliberative practices. These adequacy statements can be
characterized as either the best possible deliberative governance under its current
legislative scope or governance practices that avoid bias and are consistent with its
legislative scope and intent. However, according to Tom Byler and Melissa Leoni,
OWEB still views itself as a work in progress. OWEB continues to work hard at utilizing
best practice standards. This is done in an effort to develop better mechanisms to improve
and develop deliberative democratic governance standards at all levels, both intra and
interagency wide.
Jane 0'Keefe and others have suggested the deliberative reputation of OWEB is
due to the OWEB's attempt to meet deliberative standards ofinclusion and openness.
[OWEB's deliberative reputation is due to the] Openness of the process. Because
the staff is considered professional and so the information that comes to the Board
that we deliberate on is considered professional and credible, I think the statewide
geographic mix allows people to feel like a lot ofdifferent viewpoints are
considered. Anybody that goes to one ofour meeting can see that you know
Board members are not shut down and can speak fairly freely (0' Keefe, Jane.
Phone Interview. 9 July 2007).
Direct observation of OWEB Board meetings and interaction with OWEB itself
through staff and Board members also repeatedly met the highest standards of openness
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and transparency. OWEB incorporated multiple steps to generate inclusion. Both OWEB
Board members and staffwere friendly and accessible. OWEB staff and Board members
provided extensive help in locating previous meeting minutes and securing interviews.
With one exception, audio tapes ofmeeting minutes from 2007 and direct observation of
two full days ofmeetings in Salem in May 2007 did not produce public commentary
which could be categorized as a desire for OWEB to further regulate LWC due to
deliberative variance. In fact, public commentary often featured extensive support for
reduced levels of state level oversight.
OWEB was both proactively and reactively open. Meeting minutes showed
OWEB to be concerned and responsive to all public commentary, even welcoming and
incorporating the comments that were critical of the Board, locals, or OWEB staff.96 The
direct observation of OWEB meetings in Salem in May 2007 represents a good example.
After the Board received critical public commentary about a particular LWC, voting
Board member Skip Klarquist, Portland Fish and Wildlife Commission Representative
insists that the Board address these concerns during a discussion of improving LWC
96 For example, On May 15th, 2007 during a 2 day OWEB meting period in Salem, a local lay participant
proceeded to raise objections during a public comment period. The objections were highly critical of the
local watershed, calling it exclusive as it "shuts out individuals from attendance, won't send out its agenda,
and threatens to call the police," OWEB for not investigating these claims, and the OWEB Grant Review
Committee, calling it "incestuous and possessing a conflict of interest." Despite running over the time limit,
this person was granted more time for testimonial. OWEB staff also made an attempt to explain the process
ofgrant review and its shortcomings as well as steps being taken to improve it (grant application went from
90-20 pages, 8 criteria, trying to make more consistent rules for awards to ensure merit based). At this
point, the Board proceeded into a discussion about the difficulties in making the award process formulaic
(e.g. not funding underachieving locals could mean their demise entirely). Additionally, OWEB Board
members validate these claims and promise to take them seriously and to investigate this situation. After
this testimonial Dan Heagerty, current OWEB Co-Chair states that "OWEB takes this seriously and will
look into this. I have talked to others and we will look into this. Give Bonnie Ashford your information. We
appreciate your information and comments." After the conclusion of the meeting, I observed that this
person was approached by Bonnie Ashford and Roger Smith, both OWEB staffers.
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through grant funding prioritization before they approve funding for any Lwe. The staff
then proceeded to substantively address the concerns raised during this commentary in
public before the Board moved forward with any funding decisions.
Also, during regular meeting intervals, staff and Board members actively solicit
public feedback by conceding the defects in the LWC evaluation process and by stressing
the need for public feedback to help improve this process. Additionally, the Board allows
public testimony to continue until everyone that has signed up has had a chance to speak.
The Board attempts to respond to all concerns raised directly or by specifying the nature
of a later response if either the Board or the public feel morelbetter follow-up is
appropriate.
Meetings are open and inclusive while also drawing on real expertise. OWEB also
uses these public forums to make their decision processes transparent. Former OWEB
Co-Chair Jane O'Keefe supports this statement. "You know I honestly don't know how
we could be any more public. Our meetings are held, all of the information that we
consider is public, you know, I don't know what else you would do" (O'Keefe, Jane.
Phone Interview. 9 July 2007).
Additionally, institutional attempts structured time to "get to know each other and
forge working relationships." OWEB Board members suggest this type of action is
representative of a broader deliberative culture. Board members such as Dan Powers and
Jane O'Keefe attribute this behavior and attitudes to the ability of such a large group to
work effectively in a deliberative manner (O'Keefe, Jane. Phone Interview. 9 July 2007;
Powers, Dan. Personal Interview. 20 July 2007).
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The examined evidence indicates OWEB is a responsive institution along ideal
deliberative criteria. That is, when local or other stakeholders approach OWEB directly to
acquire information or testify at its meetings, for example, OWEB is responsive and
open. However, OWEB does not always appear to actively reach out and solicit and
acquire unstructured feedback, especially from the most marginalized and affected
populations. For example, in a June 2009 email survey, I asked a random sample ofLWC
"does OWEB ever proactively reach out to your local watershed organization to solicit
your input in their decision-making, e.g. invite you to their meetings?" One LWC
Coordinator responds by saying "being a smaller council, we don't have as much
interaction as some of the larger councils might, so I can't say that we are approached
directly for our feedback" (Interview 19). This LWC respondent and others feel that
OWEB is open and responsive when approached, and while satisfied overall, OWEB
does not always reach out proactively to solicit participation and feedback from all
relevant stakeholders.
Finally, statutory limitation mandates OWEB remain a voluntary organization.
OWEB is not and never will be a finished deliberative/policy product (Byler, Tom.
Personal Interview. 28 June 2007). Despite this, OWEB staff and OWEB Board members
as well as researchers and other independent parties believe that OWEB is publicly taking
the right steps to improve LWCs on deliberative terms (Leoni, Byler, and Powers.
Personal Interviews. 2007).
OWEB is moving rapidly toward facilitating more openness, inclusiveness, and
influence the lay public has on the decisions oflocal watersheds. Take a March 17th 2000
130
report released by the Secretary of State, for example. An independent audit of OWEB 's
grant review process (requested by OWEB) detennined that "OWEB's multiple level
review process provides the opportunity for consistent evaluation of project grant
applications and is appropriately based on the criteria found in the statute" (Secretary of
State Audit Report 2000,2).97 Furthennore, from this analysis, the report also determined
that "review guide and practice includes significant provisions from relevant statutes and
appeared to be free from extraneous evaluation that may bias approval toward a particular
group or watershed area" (Secretary of State Audit Report 2000,2).
Conclusion- OWEB does not necessarily ascribe to ideal deliberative standards of
devolution (deliberative population of OWEB and budgetary control). Additionally,
OWEB does not meet ideal deliberative centralization standards (OWEB is completely
voluntary in authority). OWEB does not meet ideal deliberative participatory standards as
OWEB does not aggressively solicit and acquire feedback from all relevant stakeholders.
However, OWEB does meet many of the ideal deliberative standards in its current
institutional practice. OWEB meetings are inclusive. OWEB seeks to incorporate experts
as well as interested participants in its meetings and decisions. In particular, OWEB
outside stakeholders assert that seems genuinely interested in actively responding to
concerns and feedback driven by affected and interested stakeholders in local issue area
concerns. OWEB shares power with and encourages interaction with multiple
stakeholders. OWEB is also open in its sharing of information and in its decision-making
whenever possible.
97 Essentially, this means that the grant review process provides a multiple step review of applications that
includes the grantee, OWEB staff, independent regional reviewers, and the Board.
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In sum, OWEB approximates minimum theoretical, institutional deliberative
relative parity standards and practice among stakeholders within OWEB's meeting
process and the agency generally. OWEB is open to the public. While not ideal, at times
OWEB does solicit and acquire unstructured feedback from relevant stakeholders.
Participant stakeholders confirm this when reporting perceived adequacy concerning
minimum conditions of relative parity within OWER This is illustrated in Table 9.
Table 9: Relative Parity within the OWEB
Minimum Access Actively Solicit Public Stake
Ideal
Deliberative
Conditions
IV: Institutional Yes: meetings are Yes: OWEB does not always Yes: five voting Board
Structure and public; all information seek relevant stakeholder members are citizen
Behavior and decisions participation in agency representativestransparent decisions; involvement
opportunities exist for
stakeholders that are present
at meetings
DV: Perceived Yes: participant Yes: participant stakeholders Yes: Board members
Adequacy stakeholders report report that seems genuinely report representative
OWEB is open to and interested in and actively satisfaction. No
tries hard to balance responds to any concerns and participant stakeholder
all relevant interest feedback brought to OWEB representation concerns
concerns were discovered
2. An Accounting of Power outside OWEB
Findings- The initial inception and framing of the Oregon Plan meet ideal and
perceived deliberative standards. However, the creation of OWEB itself does not
conform to ideal deliberative devolution and centralization criteria. Examples include
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state level legislation which voluntarily devolves complete authority over defining and
implementing watershed restoration projects to voluntary, local watershed organizations
rather than OWEB directly, 98 the legislation that created OWEB also substantially limits
the agency's control over total budgetary allocation and specific budgetary
appropriations, and even the process of conceiving and populating the OWEB Board.
Despite this, the data examined suggest the Board is viewed as a highly representative
institution. In the following section, OWEB's institutional structure, framing, and
composition are examined and evaluated according to deliberative standards.
A. Inception, Framing, and Composition
Inception and Framing- The origins of GWEB can be traced to Governor John
Kitzhaber and OCSRI. In October 1995, Kitzhaber announced the planning effort to
conserve and restore Oregon's coastal salmon and steelhead. Initially, framing the
mission of the Oregon Plan started with a fundamental assumption that Salmon health
were in serious and relatively recent decline. 99 This assumption appears to have been and
98 While not attributable to OWEB directly, it is important to note that a lack of a minimum set of
consistent deliberative standards within the local watershed councils due to severe regulatory limitations in
OWEB's authority has led to LWC variance on deliberative grounds such as ideal adequate representation,
equal influence, and perceived legitimacy. In fact, the examined evidence raised concerns that at times
went further than deliberative concerns to include outright exclusion and a lack of stakeholder influence in
the decisions of local watersheds.
99 Native populations of salmon, steelhead, and trout have declined, some dramatically, in Oregon during
the century and a half since the region has been exposed to industrial-scale development. Many populations
of salmon, steelhead, and trout are extinct today; other populations are at risk of extinction, and relatively
few are in a condition that may be considered healthy. Thus the principal purpose of the Oregon Plan is
summarized from a passage in the Oregon Plan drafted in 1997. "The Oregon Plan recognizes an historic
decline in coastal Coho populations. The Oregon Plan is designed to reverse this decline and return salmon,
once again, to healthy levels" (the Oregon Plan 1997, 5).
----------------------- ----
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remains uncontroversia1 and shared by the vast majority of Oregonians and stakeholders
in salmon and watershed restoration.
A basic tenet ofthe Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative (OCSRI) is that
"All Oregon citizens share responsibility for the changes to the natural systems that have
hurt salmon and, likewise, share responsibility for restoration" (the Oregon Plan 1997, 5).
Additionally, the Plan states that "for the long-term, the challenge is to negotiate societal
decisions that address the complex, conflicting issues of human population growth and
competition for natural resources. "This must be done in a manner that meets the needs of
both salmon and people" (the Oregon Plan 1997, 12).100
Former governor Kitzhaber and the state legislature intended the majority of this
heavy lifting or implementing of watershed and salmon restoration to take place locally
through LWCs. Policy implementation was to be voluntary and collaborative. LWC
organizations and their policy agendas were to be diverse in order to reflect the various
social, economic, and physical conditions and resulting diverse set of preferences and
needs ofloca1 watersheds. This variation is readily linked to state legislation that actively
encourages LWC variance and does not any set of mandated, minimum standards. The
Oregon Revised Statute itself establishes the general mission of the Oregon Plan which
states that "Use of voluntary and collaborative process to achieve the mission of the
Oregon Plan whenever possible" constitute the primary goal of the plan ORS 541.405
(2)(b)(J).
100 Perhaps this is best captured in the mission of the Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative, which
is "to restore our coastal salmon populations and fisheries to productive and sustainable levels that will
provide substantial environmental, cultural, and economic benefits" (the Oregon Plan, 12).
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It appears that previous to widespread public involvement, these basic purpose
and mechanisms of the Oregon Plan were in place. Namely, the Oregon Plan's basic
goals and mechanisms were strong enforcement of existing laws and regulations within a
voluntary and cooperative action. Voluntary and cooperative action was stated as the only
approach that would generate the support and commitment across all sectors, from
landowners and industry to government agencies-to restore salmon and their natural
systems. The plan's purpose and ability to succeed was initially and remains framed as
requiring an unprecedented level of cooperation and coordination among local, state, and
federal agencies (the Oregon Plan, 1997).
However, it is important to note that Kitzhaber was careful to consult and work
with key governmental agencies and other important stakeholders early in the process of
the Oregon Plan. On page 27 of the 1997 Oregon Plan Executive Summary document,
the commitment to public stakeholders is clearly stated. "It is essential to build all
stakeholders into the recovery effort: soil and water conservation districts, the Oregon
State University Cooperative Extension Service, watershed councils, local governments,
landowners, industries, and citizens."IOI
One of Kitzhaber's first steps was to establish a collaborative or self-identified
"team approach" for developing an action plan that would lead to restoring the health of
!OJ While deliberativists insist devolution is crucial to generating effective deliberation there must also
simultaneously be accompanying centralization standards which are postulated as leading to greater
deliberation among all involved groups. Centralization generally consists of setting of basic minimum
standards and assistance in facilitating local priorities (Dorf & Sabel in Democratic Experimentalism).
Kitzhaber insisted on extensive, explicitly stated and codified institutional standards and efforts toward
public and stakeholder inclusion which included independent review of the policy process and findings and
public transparency among others in extensive attempts to build public and stakeholder input and
legitimacy.
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coastal salmon and trout populations. Another early step was to require directors (issue
area stakeholders) of key state agencies (called the Salmon Strategy Team) to meet with
the Governor bi-weekly, reporting progress and resolving interagency obstacles.
Additionally, an Outreach and Education Team, consisting of relevant existing issue area
organization representatives and governmental stakeholders, began to work with other
key agency stakeholders, identifying other stakeholders and asking for their advice and
ideas (the Oregon Plan 1997, Chapter 2).102
The Outreach Team initially took numerous steps to reach out to the public and to
effectively solicit input from known and unknown stakeholders. "The comprehensive and
inclusive outreach and education effort extends to private groups. The Salmon Watch
Program and the proposed Oregon Heritage Stocks Program are examples of
conservation organizations getting involved" (the Oregon Plan 1997, 78). Or, "Print and
electronic media have been kept closely informed of OCSRI efforts and have been
invited to attend demonstration projects. The publicity gained by media attention has
placed a spotlight on salmon restoration and highlighted successes" (the Oregon Plan
1997, 78).103
102 The Outreach Team took extensive steps to detenmne and elicit participation from all relevant and non-
participant stakeholders. Utilizing the opportunity of reaching more than 200 attendees at a February two-
day workshop on salmon/watershed education co-hosted by Oregon State University, the Outreach Team
conducted a survey asking respondents to identify all audiences that should be targeted for salmon
education, specifically to identify audiences OCSRI was not reaching. Fourteen major audience categories
were identified: Landowners, Conservation Groups, Local Government, State and Federal Government,
Civic Groups, Education, Seniors, Youth Groups, Media, Recreation, Business, Cultural, Religious, Others.
In all 110 potential stakeholder groups were identified.
103 Specifically, the Outreach Team "assisted in marketing the original OCSRI Draft Plan by coordinating
distribution at 110 public sites throughout the coast and affected regions. Copies of the plan were placed at
public locations including libraries, city halls, extension offices, soil and water conservation district offices,
watershed council offices, and ODFW district offices. The Outreach Team also placed an electronic version
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According to the report 1997 Oregon Plan, public commentary on the plan
frequently reiterated the need for more significant Outreach and Education Chapter to
raise public awareness and build stakeholder involvement. In response the 1997 Oregon
Plan report details extensive follow-up efforts to reach out and educate the public as well
as statewide stakeholders as to the need for public involvement in the Oregon Plan. 104
of the Plan on the Governor's web site. A news release infonning the public of the availability of the plan
was written by the Outreach Team and distributed to statewide media. The Outreach Team produced an
Executive Summary of the OCSRI Draft Plan in September and distributed it widely to interested parties.
Hard copies were made available at eight OCSRI community briefings in September and October. Copies
were mailed to an extensive list of interested parties. An electronic version was also placed on the
Governor's web site with links to other agency web sites" (the Oregon Plan 1997: Executive Summary and
Overview). Additionally, "the Outreach Team reviewed public comments on the OCSRI Draft Plan and
assisted in preparing written replies to those comments. The team also produced a brochure consisting of
the most common questions and answers that resulted from the community briefings. The brochure was
distributed to every attendee of the briefmgs, as well as other interested parties."
104 http://salmonplate.com/OPSW/archives/ocsri feb 1997/workfiles-html/Sectll.html
The Outreach Team also planned and organized a series of 8 public informational meetings, which were
sponsored by county commissioners, in September of 1996 to "target key groups and interested individuals
in the following locations: Astoria, Tillamook, Newport, Coos Bay, Grants Pass, Gold Beach, Roseburg,
and Portland. Local leaders and potential stakeholders were personally invited to attend the workshops, and
news releases were sent to local media to promote the briefings." According to the Oregon Plan documents,
More than 540 letters were mailed from the Governor's Office encouraging citizen attend and infonning
Oregonians of the importance of these presentations. Local newspaper and editorial boards were also
contacted and visited as a mechanism to further raise interest and attendance at public meetings. 104
"Members of the governor's staff provided an overview of the draft restoration plan and fielded specific
questions from attendees and allowed time for public comment...They explained the general decline in
salmon populations, and then listed major components of the draft plan and how they would affect local
citizens and require grassroots involvement" (the Oregon Plan 1997, 77-78). In addition, there were
"special briefings" provided to the various sponsoring county commissions. "An executive summary of the
plan was distributed to interested parties two weeks prior to the meetings. Agency directors and staff were
present at all of these meetings to answer specific or technical questions that were received from the
audience." (the Oregon Plan 1997,77-78) Finally, the Outreach Team "gathered questionnaires from
attendees and mailed a written response with answers to the 'most frequently asked questions' to all 575
citizens who attended. Specially researched and written responses were prepared for detailed questions.
These briefmgs allowed interested citizens, local officials, and interest groups an opportunity to meet with
agency leaders and staff who were directly involved in the drafting of the restoration plan" (the Oregon
Plan 1997,77-78). The Outreach Team also "assisted in the planning, coordination, and implementation of
a two-day workshop on salmon/watershed education in February 1997 at Oregon State University,
sponsored by OSU Extension Service. Nearly 200 educators, extension specialists, and representatives of
public/private agencies and watershed councils attended the workshop. Participants were able to share
information and ideas during the workshop. As part of the event, the Outreach Team presented the
compendium of salmon education which also began to identify specific needs and gaps in salmon and
watershed education."
---------------------------
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Finally, an independent "science team" was established to review and to evaluate
technical issues in a non-partisan manner (the Oregon Plan 1997, 9).105 The Oregon
Conservation Plan itselfis a synthesis of the first draft of the Oregon Coastal Salmon
Restoration Initiative Plan, which was conceived and then released for public and
scientific peer review in August 1996. This was then followed by a subsequent legislative
review draft which was prepared in February 1997.106
The result of this was, of course, the Oregon Plan (to restore salmon and
watersheds). As originally conceived, the Oregon Plan consisted of four essential
elements that sought to solicit and bring together multiple stakeholders in an innovative
manner: "(1) coordination of effort by all parties, (2) development of action plans with
relevance and ownership at the local level, (3) monitoring progress, and (4) making
appropriate corrective changes in the future. Along deliberative concerns, most notably
105 According to the full version of the 1997 Oregon Plan Report, this independent team of scientists
interacted with the Implementation Team (a state level committee responsible for integrating state
agencies) on a routine, ongoing basis. The purpose of this interaction was to evaluate the effectiveness of
the Conservation Plan, make recommendations for change, and provide an "external" evaluation of
progress. Agencies, stakeholders, and NMFS staff worked together to develop action plans designed to
address management practices and environmental factors that were identified as affecting salmon
production. All of these steps "occurred on a fast track and a draft was submitted to the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) in August 1996" (the Oregon Plan: restoring an Oregon legacy through
cooperative efforts, 1997).
106 http://library.state.or.us/repository/2006/200612260850302/
Public input was also compiled. "To improve the Plan through a series of eight community briefings held
throughout western Oregon. In November 1996, a group of scientists reviewed the Plan and suggested
improvements. Then, over six months, the many agencies and their staff working on the Coastal Salmon
Restoration Initiative met regularly with staff of the National Marine Fisheries Service and other key
partners to improve and strengthen the plan. In February 1997, a revised and updated draft was presented at
legislative hearings in Salem. This provided an opportunity for the Legislature to address concerns and
make needed changes to the Plan. This final draft is the cumulative result of these efforts.
----------------------------
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the Oregon Plan explicitly attempted to solicit, coordinate, and incorporate multiple
stakeholders" (the Oregon Plan 1997, Executive Summary and Overview, 1_2).107
OWEB: Inception and Framing- Now called OWEB, this state agency continues
to gather and incorporate scientific and stakeholder data. OWEB is charged with and
explicitly recognizes the efficacy and legitimacy of the Oregon Plan lies in its capacity to
develop and incorporate better measures and practices. OWEB is charged with and
recognizes that success must come from continuing to build local support and in
obtaining voluntary commitments in the ongoing efforts toward watershed and salmon
restoration.
In practice OWEB was largely a legislative process of negotiation between the
governor and the legislature rather than deliberative outreach process that took place in
Salem. OWEB itselfwas formed by the state legislature during the regular 1999 session.
The public and any interested stakeholders could attend and comment on the extensive
107 http://www.oregon.gov/OPSW/archives/ocsrimar1997/FCH01.htm1
Step 1, or coordinated agency programs in the Oregon Plan document acknowledges the need to coordinate
state and federal agencies administer laws, policies, and management programs. Coordination efforts were
considered necessary as they "have an impact on salmon. These agencies are responsible for fishery harvest
management, production of hatchery fish, water quality, water quantity, and a wide variety of habitat
protection, alteration, and restoration activities." (the Oregon Plan 1997, 2) Previous to the Oregon Plan,
these agencies conducted business largely independently. Under this plan, "all government agencies that
impact salmon are accountable for coordinated programs in a manner that is consistent with conservation
and restoration efforts." Secondly, community-based action was incorporated as a central premise of the
Oregon Plan. The Plan states that "actions to conserve and restore salmon must be worked out by
communities and landowners, with local knowledge of problems and ownership in solutions...Watershed
councils, soil and water conservation districts, and other grassroots efforts are the essential vehicles for
getting the work of these efforts accomplished" (the Oregon Plan 1997,2). Government programs will
"provide regulatory and technical support to these efforts." In sum, the Oregon Plan established the
framework for and precipitated eventual creation ofOWEB. The Oregon Plan was conceived in an
institutionalized process which acknowledges the role of and actively solicited suggestions from the public,
key partners, scientific reviewers, and the Legislature. The plan was conceived as a collaborative,
voluntary, and adaptive strategy. In this new approach, Oregonians themselves will manage watersheds
rather than imposing top down and fixed regulatory solutions to watershed and salmon management.
Finally, the Oregon Plan is clearly intended to continually change and evolve.
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legislative proposals to create OWEB but stakeholders were not involved nor were they
actively solicited. This is explained in the following interview passage. According to an
OWEB staffer I spoke with in May 2009 (this current OWEB staff member was involved
in OWEB at its actual inception)
Since it [OWEB creation] was a legislative process, access was restricted to those
parties that could come to Salem or be represented in Salem. Non-governmental
entities played a significant role in framing the discussion (Oregon Business
Council) and provided input on priorities (Umpqua Watershed Council, others).
However, since it was a legislative process, much ofthe specific language was
negotiated between the legislative branch and the administration (Interview 18).
The OWEB staff member continues to explain the formal process ofOWEB's creation:
The process was (personal involvement speaking) painful to the extent that there
were morning and evening sessions two days a week for months. The
deliberations about make up of the Board, voting rules, statutory guidance to the
agency, etc. were debated at length. The public had the opportunity to comment at
each public hearing [emphasis added] (Interview 18).
Multiple opportunities clearly existed for public input. The legislative process provided
formal institutional stake to interested stakeholders. However, the process did not
actively solicit public. As a result, the creation of OWEB can be characterized more as a
legislative bargaining process than an actively open, ideal deliberative venture.
oWEB Composition- The composition ofthe HSC was and is not a public or
participatory process nor was not intended to be. OWEB Board members are not elected
nor chosen by the public in a deliberative (e.g. open and directly accountable) process.
Jane O'Keefe, former OWEB Co-Chair confirmed this in a telephone interview on July 7,
2007. "You know that is their decision, not Board members or Co-chairs decision of who
is on the Board."
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The constitution ofthe Board an insular process. Under Senate Bi1123, OWEB is
governor appointed and legislature (Senate) approved. That is, the process is independent
of OWEB or the lay public. The fonnal authority of this mandate is directly vested in and
interpreted by the governor alone. Other stakeholders are not given any fonnal influence
over this decision. Additionally, the 6 non-voting OWEB Board members are not chosen
in a public or participatory process. Stakeholders have no fonnal influence in this
process. This is true for all 6 non-voting Board members as According to Dan Powers.
Powers is the non-voting EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) representative that
serves on the OWEB Board is internally appointed. Powers explains that while the
governor can refuse to seat this representative, they cannot select this representative.
"This is the case for all 6 non-voting members as well" (Powers, Dan. Personal
Interview. 20 July 2007).
However, original legislative standards were put in place in an attempt to ensure
major stakeholders would be represented on the Board. The Legislature originally
established a small OWEB staff (formerly GWEB) as a separate agency. Now, OWEB
"is to be guided by the expanded citizen Board." Governor Kitzhaber and the Legislature
added six new members to the Board, "requiring broad geographic distribution and
staggering the four-year terms."I08 Also, a state archival document entitled The Oregon
Agreement Project December 2002 Progress Report calls for
108 Gathered from the Secretary of State website. These statements were taken from one of former
Governor Kitzhaber's released statements on October 1, 1999:
http://arcweb.sos.state.oLus/governors/Kitzhaber/webpages/governor/press/p991001.htm
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A partnership representing all levels of government, key stakeholders and local
participants working together to benefit the environment, economy and
communities of Oregon. This agreement offers opportunities for federal, tribal,
state and local participants including landowners and businesses to design,
improve and test strategies, improve their cooperation and collaboration to make
more efficient use ofpublic resources and reduce regulatory gridlock. 109
According to OWEB's website, eleven of the Board's seventeen members are voting
members. Decisions by the Board are made through a simple majority vote. One voting
member is a tribal representative, and five others are citizen representatives. Together this
constitutes a majority ofthe Board's vote. The remaining five voting members are
drawn from governing boards and commissions of five state agencies: the Board
of Forestry, Board of Agriculture, Environmental Quality Commission, Fish and
Wildlife Commission, and Water Resources Commission...Ofthe six non-voting
Board members, five represent federal natural resource agencies with expertise in
forest and agricultural land management, water quality, and salmon recovery, and
one represents the Oregon State University Extension Service. 110
It remains unclear exactly how representative OWEB is or even if OWEB (or any
organization) is truly capable of ideal representativeness as multiple and at times
contradictory evaluative criteria might be simultaneously employed. 11 1 However, in
practice, when populating the Board, the governor and the legislature have taken steps
that partially conform to deliberative standards of Board representation. 112
109 http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/governors/Kitzhaber/web pages/governor/nat/OregonAgreement.pdf
110 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/board main.shtml
111 Ideal representative schemes are not agreed upon in the deliberative literature across issue area
(Rosenberg, 2007). Should those most affected by an issue be disproportionally represented? If so, how
much? Applying this idea, in watershed issues, should we constitute Board representation by area
proportional to population areas or by allocating more representation to populations in sensitive upstream
or downstream watershed areas? How should we represent marginalized populations that have or currently
rely on salmon populations for their cultural and or fiscal livelihood?
112 While a deliberativist like Dryzek might partially disagree, an institutional deliberativist like Fung
proposes meeting deliberative representation by "choosing participants that demographically mirror the
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Numerous stakeholders have been incorporated in order to build perceived
adequacy around the representative constitution of the OWEB Board. The current
composition of the OWEB Board attempts to grant multiple, diverse, and traditionally
marginalized stakeholders real authority in OWEB decisions. This was done
intentionally, according to OWEB staff, in an attempt to ensure that multiple interests,
demographics, and regions are represented in OWEB decisions.
Multiple interests are represented by the OWEB Board to ensure multiple
divergent interests are always a part of decisions. OWEB consists of seventeen members
that are to be chosen to "represent the public at large, tribes, state natural resource agency
boards and commissions, and federal natural resources agencies." 113 The composition of
the Board is as follows: of the Board's seventeen members, eleven are voting members.
At least one voting member is a tribal representative, and five others are citizen
representatives. The remaining five voting members are drawn from governing boards
and commissions of five state agencies: the Board of Forestry, Board of Agriculture,
Environmental Quality Commission, Fish and Wildlife Commission, and Water
Resources Commission. Of the six non-voting Board members, five represent federal
natural resource agencies with expertise in forest and agricultural land management,
population" (Fung in Rosenberg 2007,162-163). This can be accomplished in a number of ways, either
through randomized selection or affirmative action through recruitment, for example. Participation may be
difficult to solicit or may not be perceived as legitimate without substantive representation on institutional
entities with some form of decision-authority. Having representatives that appear to reflect various
stakeholders may help enhance and legitimize the discourses that are presented in a given deliberative
body.
113 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/board main.shtml
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water quality, and salmon recovery, and one represents the Oregon State University
E . S . 114xtenslOn ervlce.
Also, the geographic areas of the state are given serious consideration. In fact,
currently 6 Board members are from Western Oregon and 5 are from the eastern parts of
the state. 4 of the 6 public and tribal representatives are from Eastern Oregon. In an effort
to represent a diverse set ofwatershed stakeholders and to represent watersheds rather
than merely people, the relatively sparse populations of Eastern Oregon enjoy
considerably more representation per Board member than the exponentially more
populous western portion of the state (See Figure 2 below).
Figure 2: OWEB Board Voting Members
---------------------
114 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/board_main.shtml
I
--~
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Finally, "original stewards ofOregon's salmon and watersheds," the Native
American tribal population (a traditionally marginalized group) is also given a
substantive stake in the process. liS As a result, the general public rather than wealthy
landowners, removed federal or state "experts" - or any other group arguably possessing
narrow interest in watershed and salmon health - are vested with majority control in the
process.
Legislative Role: Devolution- Voluntary devolution to solve problems is not only
a theoretical deliberative criterion, 116 but is also seen as essential to real policy solutions
and an essential premise upon which OWEB was created. OWEB generally conforms to
theoretical devolution standards (Dorf and Sabel 1998) which require voluntary and
substantial devolving of vertical authority to local control over watershed and salmon
liS In the "Report to Governor's Office of Legal Counsel and the Legislative Commission on Indian
Services Activities of the Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board on Jun 16th, 2006, pursuant to
Kitzhaber's Executive Order 96-30, staffmember Ken Bierly states that OWEB works with Oregon's nine
federally recognized Indian tribes on a government-to-government basis to address watershed restoration
interests to Oregon agencies and the tribes. OWEB involves tribes at all levels of the organization. The
Governor appoints a tribal representative as a voting member of the OWEB Board. This position has been
extremely valuable in shaping the awareness ofOWEB responsibilities and opportunities to more fully
involve tribal representatives. The Board member has been an effective voice for tribal interests and has
improved awareness by OWEB staff of the significance of tribal issues with the projects and grant
applications being managed. At the program level, tribes have specific standing at three levels; watershed
council members, small grant participants, and regular grant applicants. The statute that identifies
watershed councils (ORS 541.388) specifically identifies "federally recognized Indian tribes" as potential
members ofloca1 watershed councils. Many of the tribes in Oregon are active members ofloca1 watershed
councils. When OWEB developed the small grant program (OAR Chapter 695, Division 35) tribes were
identified as a member of each "small grant group." In this role, the tribe is a member along with watershed
councils and soil and water conservation districts of a group empowered to make decisions about grants of
up to $10,000 for watershed restoration purposes.
116 Recall the previous discussion of devolution in chapter 1. Deliberative theorists such as Dorf and Sabel
define devolution as voluntary and substantial granting ofvertical authority to local control (Dorf and
Sabe11998,316-317).
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restoration. ll7 In fact, voluntary devolution of state authority over watershed regulation to
local communities constitutes the central premise or centerpiece of OWEB. In theory and
practice, OWEB enjoys considerable autonomy over its goals and activities, such as
control over the conditions of awarding and monitoring grants or other appropriations.
The Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board has broad authority to carry out a
watershed enhancement program under the provisions ofORS 541.351 to 541.415. Under
SB23, the legislature gave and later substantially expanded authorization for full time
employees and mandated administrative support from other related state level agencies
(e.g. Water Resources Department). Specifically, OWEB provides technical assistance
and grant funds to Oregonians or organizations undertaking efforts to:
•
•
•
•
•
Fund projects that restore, maintain, and enhance the state's watersheds.
Support the capacity oflocal watershed-based citizen groups to carry
out a variety of restoration projects.
Promote citizen understanding ofwatershed needs and restoration ideas.
Provide technical skills to citizens working to restore urban and rural watersheds.
Monitor the effectiveness of investments in watershed restoration. 118
OWEB 's Board has the authority to allocate funds to projects deemed worthwhile.
These include "restoration, monitoring, technical assistance, small grants, education and
outreach, watershed council support, land acquisition, in stream water leases and
transfers, research and other related activities that advance the purposes ofthe watershed
II? However, this does not mean OWEB is an ideal example of devolution. As mentioned previously,
OWEB exercises limited control over legislative budgetary appropriations, OWEB budgetary control, and
the OWEB board composition itself. OWEB's budget and its allocation are partially constrained by
legislative appropriations or in flux due to state revenue sources.
J18 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/about_us.shtml
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enhancement program." 119 Through legislative statute, OWEB was also given authority to
approve all standards and provides guidance for all application requirements and
processing; evaluation criteria, agreement conditions, and distribution of funds such as
accepting and reviewing applications for watershed enhancement projects, grant
. d -C.' 120agreements, mteragency agreements, an any contracts lor servIces.
However, OWEB was also mandated to empower localities to defme their
environmental concerns, raise awareness over, and ultimately solve their own
environmental problems. The reliance on devolved authority to local communities to
undertake watershed restoration effolis is the key to the Oregon Watershed Enhancement
Plan. In a speech in 2000, former Governor Kitzhaber said "the Oregon Plan was
designed to involve, empower, and incentivize private landowners to make voluntary
commitments to watershed restoration and habitat restoration" (State of Oregon, Office of
the Governor, 2000).
Or, according to OWEB's executive summary titled "The Oregon Plan: restoring
an Oregon legacy through cooperative efforts,"
OWEB recognizes that actions to conserve and restore salmon must be worked out by
communities and landowners, with local knowledge ofproblems and ownership in
solutions. Watershed councils, soil and water conservation districts, and other
grassroots efforts are vehicles for getting the work done. Government programs will
provide regulatory and technical support to these effolis, but the bulk of the work to
119 http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rules/OARS_600/0AR_695/695_004.html
120 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/docs/rules/GrantAdminRules]ublicCommentDraft.pdf
http://www.aocweb. org/em/Portals/2/Applying%20For%20A%20Watershed%20Restoration%20Grant.pdf
Examples of funding priorities and policies are listed later in the OWEB Centralization discussion. A
specific example of a funded local watershed project can be viewed at:
http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/GRANTS/docs/GrantApplications/CouncilSupport_l008/ExampleApp_Co
uncilSupport.pdf
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conserve and restore watersheds will be done by local people (the Oregon Plan,
1997).121
The initiative for implementing riparian area restoration and management projects was
given to persons and agencies at the local level (OWEB Program Status Report 1997, 2).
Budgetary Funding and Appropriations- In practice, OWEB's authority is
constrained along budgetary appropriation with only partial control over the total amount
and type of allocation ofbudgetary funds. Of the 15 percent ofnet lottery funds, measure
66 dedicates halfofthe fund to create, maintain state parks, ocean shores, public beach
access areas, historic sites, recreation areas. The other half goes to OWEB, which must
use at least 65 percent for capital expenditures. Additionally, in practice the legislature
exercises control over where a substantial amount of these funds are directed as 66 only
stipulates what percentage of lottery revenue OWEB receives and in what way a
percentage of the funds must be spent (capitol versus non). 122
During one interview in 2007, I spoke with a Board member who specifically
addressed the substantial limitations OWEB Board members and agency staff exercise
over OWEB appropriations:
Well the Board sets funding priorities for different types ofgrants. For instance,
capital, non-capital, education, technical, assistance, and research. The bulk ofour
money, because of the ballot measure that created us - goes to capital type
expenditures. So, you know, culvert replacements or different acquisitions are
considered capitol, things like that. The rest of the money we figure out non-
capitol, what the legislature, the other thing you have to understand is that the
legislature makes a lot ofoutfunding decisions, without our input, other than we
]21 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/publications.shtml The full executive summary can be found at this link.
122 This information was gathered from interviews with Board members and staff and from the OWEB
website: http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/ as well as http://oregonvotes.org/nov398/guide/measure/m66.htm
--------------~~-----~
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can go testtfY before a legislative hearing, but it is not a collaborative process
[emphasis added] (Interview 16).
Former Co-Chair Jane O'Keefe confIrms the limitation and re-routing of funding for
OWEB:
They give us well the measure 66 dollars, that is the basis for the money we get,
but then from there they direct how we spend, a good portion of that measure 66,
part of it of course goes on these grants, and that is kind of a non-capital, and that
is pretty much directed by the verbage in the ballot measure that created OWER
But then the rest of it is this non-capitol which the legislature has made the
decisions to send to other agencies (O'Keefe, Jane. Phone Interview. 9 July 2007).
This biennial fluctuation in funding totals and allocation also constrains
deliberative devolution claims on OWEB authority.
B. Perceived Adequacy: the Oregon Plan and OWEB
In the inception and framing of the Oregon Plan, initially extensive and
deliberative attempts were taken to involve and include interested and affected
stakeholders. However, the actual inception, framing, and actual institutional
conceptualization (e.g. institutional features) of OWEB itself do not conform to
theoretical deliberative minimum institutional standards of relative parity. The process of
creating OWEB, while formally accessible, did not actively solicit public or stakeholder
feedback and did not grant these parties a substantive institutional stake. Additionally,
OWEB does not currently meet minimum institutional standards of relative parity along
deliberative standards of devolution or centralization (budgetary or LWC regulation and
OWEB Board representation). Examples include extensive participatory inclusion or
OWEB Board representation.
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However, do these deliberative shOltcomings really matter in practice? In other
words, is OWEB still considered adequately representative according to various
stakeholders inside and outside ofOWEB? OWEB's regulatory lack of control over
LWC's standards and practices viewed as a deliberative problem originating with
OWEB? Are LWC deliberative limitations viewed in terms ofoutside forces/institutional
constraints or due to actions or inaction by OWEB's? Are these theoretical deliberative
shortcomings nonetheless viewed in adequate terms?
Chapter 2 of the 1997 Oregon Plan OCSRI Outreach and Education Chapter
ascribes to ideal deliberative standards of stakeholder identification and recruitment. The
extensive steps taken by the various initial Oregon Plan committees demonstrate the
willingness and ability to further Oregonians' understanding of the Coho salmon crisis.
The extensive steps also helped to build a broad-based partnership ofdiverse groups and
interests, e.g. coordinated and comprehensive outreach and education programs.
The Oregon Plan is referred to by OWEB as the founding document for Oregon's
cunent plan for salmon and watershed restoration. 123 The Oregon Plan serves to guide
OWEB's basic purpose operational principles. An examination of archival documents
suggests that Kitzhaber initiated an innovative and aggressive exemplar attempt to
immediately identify and then reach out to and grant numerous relevant stakeholders
opportunities if not stake in the conceptualization of the Oregon Plan. 124
123 http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/publications.shtml
124 In fact, in the chapter 13 of the original Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds, or the Independent
Scientific Assessment ofThe Plan, the review team supports the innovation, deliberative steps taken by
Kitzhaber and the OCSRI. "The OCSRI has taken an important and unprecedented step to reduce
institutional barriers. Governor Kitzhaber brought together all the relevant state agencies (Agency Planning
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Additionally, when Measure 66-the primary source of funding for OWEB-was
presented to the public for a vote, the measure was approved and received wide support
from numerous public and private stakeholders. "An alliance of environmental groups,
political leaders and corporations has raised almost $500,000 to put the measure on the
Nov. 3 ballot and promote it. Nike Inc. founder Phil Knight provided $100,000." Measure
66 also had the support of former Oregon governors ''Neil Goldschmidt and Bob Straub,
former Sen. Mark O. Hatfield, the Oregon Forest Industries Council and a number ofbig-
name environmental and outdoors groups such as the Audubon Society, the Mazamas and
the Sierra Club" (The Oregonian, October 14, 1998).
According to an article published in the Oregonian on October 14, 1998, "as
Oregon grows, we need to protect our last great places," said Russell Hoeflich, director of
The Nature Conservancy of Oregon. It is an investment "in our legacy." Additionally, the
article states that "The campaign has drawn no organized opposition" to funding OWEB
and salmon/watershed restoration. 125
Some stakeholders may have disagreed with the initial conceptualization and
framing of the initial Oregon Plan. However, in practice the evidence examined does not
Team) to develop and implement the plan to restore salmon in Oregon's coastal basins. In addition,
grassroots watershed councils, the Soil and Water Conservation Service, and OSU Cooperative Extension
Service will be incorporated into the OCSRI implementation. These are unprecedented steps" (the Oregon
Plan 1997,20).
125 However, some Oregonians are on record as opposing the use of state sanctioned gambling to raise
revenue in general and others would prefer the lottery funds were allocated in other areas, like education.
The lack of organized opposition has also been supported in interview with multiple subjects involved with
OWEB directly within and outside of the agency. The lack of organized opposition is further supported by
a comprehensive Lexus Nexus multiple keyword search ofpublic newspaper documents before January 1,
2000. This search revealed multiple documents which explicitly identified extensive support for OWEB.
No public statements ofperceived exclusion in the initial framing and conception of the Oregon Plan and
even OWEB itself were documented.
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support this and the Oregon Plan's initial deliberative attempts to identify and solicit as
well as grant formal stakeholder input exceed ideal deliberative standards.
OWEB Composition- OWEB does not ascribe to ideal deliberative representation
criteria. However, substantial efforts have been made to achieve representativeness. Is the
Board itself viewed as representative? Is the appointment process viewed as legitimate? It
appears that at a minimum, OWEB is perceived as reaching various stakeholders
standards of representativeness. OWEB appears to do this by giving a seat to all major
stakeholders and by choosing stakeholders that appear to possess cross cutting interests or
attributes. Independent assessments, secondary sources, meeting minutes, and interviews
found no reports ofperceived inequality of representation. Interviews with Tom Byler,
Melissa Leoni, OWEB Board members, and other independent assessment all agree that
OWEB (OWEB Board and staff) is adequately representative.
Former OWEB Co-Chair Jane O'Keefe states that "I have not received any
feedback that that [OWEB representativeness] has been an issue for folks" (O'Keefe,
Jane. Phone Interview. 9 July 2007). Executive Director Tome Byler agrees and states
this in more specific terms. "There is good geographic representation [on the Board] even
though this is not required in the statutes ...OWEB gives grants everywhere
[geographically]" (Byler, Tom. Personal Interview. 28 June 2007). Byler also confirms
the Board's perceived representativeness while conceding it could always be better:
[The OWEB Board is] very good architecture in how structured. Not perfect. For
example, there is not USF&W representation. [However, OWEB is] unique in
state governance, in operation due to all the interests, expertise, and perspectives
at that table...Oregon is trying new model, based on key stakeholders and locals,
agreeing on problems and solutions (Byler, Tom. Personal Interview. 28 June
2007).
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One Board member suggests there are positive and negative aspects to the
governor's appointment process. Despite this, this Board member also believes the Board
is highly representative:
[The] drawback is cumbersome process, lots of input from governor and
legislature which are not always in synch... and [this selection process] may not
get most knowledgeable appropriate person... [is also depends on] the objectivity
or the desire to put the best people for the OWEB position in the job (Interview
16).
The current OWEB Board is largely viewed by locals, staff, Board members,
media, and many OWEB researchers as a representative, deliberative, effective governing
body. Dan Powers states that OWEB is "Far more representative than almost any other
Board I have ever seen. East West federal state private tribal. I think it is an outstanding
model of how you get diversity" (Interview 20 July 2007). Additionally, Powers believes
that while the Board's selection process opens up the potential for politicized
appointments, the current composition of the Board is representative and deliberative and
implies this was done intentionally.
I would not say I am a typical regulator. Most of my work and input and
experience is actually external and not just within my agency and a program. I
would say that's, most of the people on the OWEB Board have a broad range of
experiences that are not just necessarily limited to - I mean you look at Dan
Carver, okay so he represent the ranching community, but he has been doing this
sustainable Oregon brand country beef- so we do I think go for individuals, and I
think agencies go for this too, you go for individuals who have experience in
collaborative process. Who don't come in with just experience in regulating
someone in a narrow program. But someone who has been exposed to a broader
range of collaborative or external process so you are not so locked into your
agency's perspective (Powers, Dan. Personal Interview. 20 July 2007).
Interview subjects agreed that the selection process has resulted in Board
members that exhibit traits of openness and experience working with other groups outside
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their current position and that these traits further enhance OWEB's representativeness.
"We have picked people, or people who have been appointed, have just been pretty
outstanding, in their breadth and in their experience, and just their nature. I mean they are
good-natured people" (Powers, Dan. Personal Interview. 20 July 2007).
Throughout my interview, Dan Powers repeatedly points out his concerns with the
OWEB and the Board. Even though Powers is a non-voting federal representative he is
deeply involved in OWEB. Powers believes his role on OWEB is largely to provide
expertise and important information on federal standards or best practice models (often
from the federal vantage point). This puts Powers is in a fairly unique position to be
candid in assessing the effectiveness of the structure and process ofthe Board. Despite
this relative autonomy from OWEB, his maintains the representativeness and
effectiveness of OWEB on deliberative terms.
I would say they [OWEB Board] are usually very effective. We have a co-chair
set up, and generally the co-chairs that have been picked there is usually a broad
flowing ideas person and a taskmaster details person. There is usually an east west
with the co-chairs, at least we attempt to do that. It does not always work out that
way but that is the attempt. I would say it is usually very effective when you look
at the agendas we get though I am blown that we get through them with an 18-
member Board. It is a pretty full platter for a full day and Y2 usually (Powers, Dan.
Personal Interview. 20 July 2007).
However, the current structure of OWEB Board reserves spots for specific
stakeholder representation. In doing this, "the program brings together a broad base of
interests to tackle natural resource issues" in a process that attempts to grant real
authority and inclusion to local stakeholders in a deliberative institutional process (The
Governor's Watershed Enhancement Board: Program Status 1997, 1). This arguably
provides the public with real as opposed to symbolic authority rather than policy
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"experts" control of OWEB decisions by seating both state and federal agencies on a
single board and inviting the participation ofacademics, Native Americans, industry, and
environmental groups on supporting projects such as technical and advisory committees.
Interview subjects maintain that the current Board composition meets deliberative
criteria. This is reflected in perceptions that the selection process that is driven a concern
for members that are representative, willing to act in deliberative terms, and possesses
relevant experience or expertise in watershed issues.
However, in the absence of any clear and minimum (e.g. deliberative) formal
standards for Board selection, the representativeness of the Board appears to be a
fortuitous product of the current governor's selection criteria rather than a product of an
institutionalized set of standards. Interview subjects confirm this position when
acknowledging the potentially unfettered politicization that could occur in the current
appointment process. One Board member confirms this. "It can become a political
football- political appointment processes can become. And OWEB appointments yet
have not" (Interview 16). That is, future Board member selections may not be easily
replicated with a political switching of the guard. A new governor or legislature may
feels that a different set of criteria or outcomes is desirable in place ofthe current
method. The process mayor may not continue to be driven by careful attempts to choose
members that are representative of the larger statewide community, are open, and engage
in a deliberative institutional decision-making process. This would leave stakeholders to
view the Board in instrumental and or partisan terms.
---------
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The Budget- Board members, OWEB staff, and other watershed stakeholders view
OWEB's lack of control over its total budget and partial ability to control budget
allocation in unfavorable deliberative terms. For example, a general consensus exists
among the OWEB Board that the legislature's diversion oflarge pieces of OWEB's
budget are viewed as a violation of the intended use of these funds. Furthermore, this
legislative budgetary control unnecessarily constrains OWEB in carrying out watershed
restoration activities.
One Board member summarizes the budgetary constraints and frustration over
legislative control.
Even though we get to decide on funding projects, there is a huge chunk of
change that is diverted initially that we have no say over. And it is a very sore
point with Board members in general. But it is a very delicate issue because of the
need for the legislature to essentially authorize us to spend. Our spending
authorization is dependent on the legislature. And that to me is one of the biggest
problems (Interview 16).
This Board member reiterates the basic concern over budgetary control which was
raised repeatedly in the most explicit terms. "Even though we get to decide on funding
projects, there is a huge chunk of change that is diverted initially that we have no say
over" (Interview 16). One Board member, who asked to remain confidential, says "I think
a downside is that the legislature is involved. A lot of times agencies will go directly to
the legislature. And it is tough for us, but it has been easier since the last election. There
is much less micromanaging of what we do." This Board member restates this more
strongly in the following passage. "The money that is diverted directly to the agencies
[rather than in a public forum like OWEB], 1think that should be day lighted. 1think if
more people knew they would be furious" (Interview 16). Or,
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The legislature has made the decision to send quite a bit of the non capitol funds,
which I would consider are more flexible funds to other state natural resource
agencies. ODF and W, Department of Agriculture, Water Resources, agencies like
that...All of that money that goes to those agencies is not available to OWEB to
put in our funding strategies. But it does not matter what I think, that is what the
legislature does and that is that way it is, and there we are ...This is a very sore
point with Board members in general. But it is a very delicate issue because of the
need for the legislature to essentially authorize us to spend. Our spending
authorization is dependent on the legislature. And that to me is one of the biggest
problems (Interview 16).
This Board member cites a specific example oflegislative control over OWEB funds in
the following passage:
We do a tremendous funding of state police. We do a tremendous amount of
funding of OR Department ofFish &Wildlife staff...Ifyou want t talk about it
being problematic our process is limited to the amount of money the legislature
has authorized us to spend. So let me give you a real example: this biennium, 80-
90 million dollars, 20-30 million right off the top to the agencies, we have nothing
to say about that. So some of the framers ofmeasure 66, that actually got it
passed, said wait a minute, this is not what we intended when we passed this
(Interview 16).
OWEB does exercise considerable autonomy over their grant program. However,
the actual appointment of the OWEB Board and the legislative control over OWEB
funding allocation and priorities of Measure 66 dollars serves to limit ideal deliberative
devolution based claims. Interviews suggest a perception among Board members that
OWEB cannot optimally set, redefine, and accomplish its goals while the legislature
redirects significant pieces of OWEB funding sources that already fluctuate substantially.
Board members suggest that autonomy from legislative diversion of funds is important
for OWEB to better set and then meet its goals.
Conclusion- Initial public outreach and inclusion meets ideal deliberative
conditions. While originally conceived and originating from governor Kitzhaber's office,
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extensive collaborative goals were codified and then taken to incorporate multiple private
and governmental stakeholders directly into the creation of the Oregon Plan. Numerous
stakeholders were placed on foundational committees. Public outreach committees were
established to identify and solicit public stakeholder feedback. The state then provided
and continues to provide resources - through OWEB - to empower these stakeholders to
understand the Oregon Plan and to help them facilitate their own restoration efforts.
The process was open to the public but creating a new agency ultimately
necessitated "a legislative process" and consisted of negotiation between the Governor's
office and the state legislature (Interview 18). The actual creation of OWEB does not
meet ideal deliberative standards. However, the creation of OWEB did not receive any
substantive complaints. Instead, the creation of OWEB is perceived as a normal and
necessary part of the legislative process. Furthermore, OWEB was directly a result of
previous, more extensive and involved deliberation about the Oregon Plan itself. Previous
statewide, extensive public deliberation was to guide the mission and ultimately the
creation and governance standards of OWEB itself. The initial exemplar deliberative
standards and perceived adequacy of the initial conceptualization and framing of salmon
and watershed restoration (which led to GWEB and OWEB itself) are represented in
Table 10 below.
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Table 10: Relative Parity outside OWEB: Initial Conceptualization & Framing
Minimum Access Actively Solicit Public Stake
Ideal
Deliberative
Conditions
IV: Institutional Yes: extensive efforts were Yes: the Outreach Team Yes: nwnerous
Structure and made to identify and reach formally made extensive stakeholders were
Behavior out to all relevant statewide efforts to identify and recruited to assist in
stakeholders. The creation of recruit all relevant formulating policy
OWEB was a legislative statewide stakeholders. priorities. Stakeholders
process with formal access received no formal stake
DV: Perceived Yes: No evidence claimed Yes: No evidence Yes: Evidence
Adequacy that conceiving OWEB was examined indicated that examined does not
closed ad the campaign to stakeholder input was not indicate any concerns
create OWEB generated no actively or adequately with public stake in
organized opposition solicited in conceiving conceiving the Oregon
the Oregon Plan Plan
Furthermore, the examined data does not report any concerns of perceived
inadequacy regarding OWEB deliberative standards of centralization (standards of
openness, transparency, inclusion, and attempts to elicit participation). Interview subjects
routinely acknowledge the less than ideally deliberative process associated with the
closed nature of creating OWEB itself and constituting the Board. However, there are
simultaneously consistent reports of perceived adequacy. These reports acknowledge less
than ideal standards while simultaneously report satisfaction with policy process and
outputs.
Outside process (legislative, gubernatorial) such as populating the Board is
considered non-ideal in theory but adequate in practice. Interviews with current and
previous OWEB Board members and staff all report high levels of satisfaction with
governor Kitzhaber and Kulongoski's Board appointments while not necessarily the
constitution process itself. All interview subjects indicated potential problems or "cons"
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with the appointment process. Interview subjects were asked "what are the benefits and
drawbacks of this process?" In response, subjects would point out that there is no process
in place to guarantee that Board member selection continues to be representative.
Institutional standards and practice outside of OWEB do not meet either
minimum theoretical, institutional deliberative relative parity standards or standards of
perceived adequacy. Oregon legislative behavior frequently constrains OWEB standards
and practice through legislative mandate. OWEB's lack ofbudgetary control and total bi-
annual budgetary appropriation remains a particularly contentious point among OWEB
staff, local watershed representatives, and especially OWEB Board members. 126 All
interview subjects expressed dissatisfaction with OWEB's lack of budgetary control.
Underfunded locals are asked to do more with less. As a result, OWEB Board members
feel OWEB cannot guarantee that its most essential programs continue to receive a steady
revenue stream.
Legislative mandates devolve authority to local watersheds while simultaneously
neglecting to legislate minimum centralized standards. The OWEB appointment process
is outside the control of relevant stakeholders. As a result, Lwe also exhibit deliberative
variance in standards and practice. Despite all these ideal deliberative transgressions,
relevant stakeholders maintain that minimum conditions of relative parity are often met in
practice by and within OWEB. However, these stakeholders also acknowledge the
126 The legislature often directs OWEB to fund particular projects whether OWEB considers them related
or essential to OWEB's mission. At times the legislature diverts funds that OWEB may believe are a
priority elsewhere.
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deliberative concerns that are raised in theory and at times in practice. This is illustrated
in Table 11.
Table 11: Relative Parity outside OWEB: Representation & Budgetary Constraints
Minimum Access Actively Solicit Public Stake
Ideal
Deliberative
Conditions
IV: Institutional No: OWEB No: neither the governor No: the public is not given
Structure and composition and nor the legislature actively any formal vote in
Behavior budgetary decisions are seeks public input in legislative decisions over
"closed" to the public composition or budgetary funding
decisions
DV: Perceived No: stakeholders No: stakeholders express No: staff, Board members,
Adequacy express dissatisfaction concern that the public is LWC reps. all expressed
with the composition not actively included in dissatisfaction with the lack
and budgetary process and or aware of ofpublic accountability and
and its results composition and control over these decisions
budgetary discussions
III. An Accounting of Respect
1. Respect and Perceived Adequacy within OWEB Board
Findings: Interview subjects report and public testimony consistently confirm
high levels ofperceived respect among OWEB and within OWEB Board meetings.
Board members and meeting participants repOlt feel taken seriously, being genuinely
heard, and having their perspective taken into account in OWEB meetings. In this
section, the efforts ofthe OWEB to generate deliberative respect are examined. Next, an
assessment of perceived level of respect within OWEB meetings and among Board
members follows.
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A. OWEB Meeting Structure and Process: Perceived Adequacy?
Non-participant observation and meeting minutes confirm that Board meetings
were always public. At these meetings most ifnot all OWEB Board members spoke and
spoke often. OWEB meetings are run in a respectful manner. For example, in observed
public OWEB meetings, immediately preceding public commentary, the Co-Chair Dan
Heagerty informs the audience that OWEB is working hard to be open, transparent and
merit based about watershed funding issues. He goes on to state that the Board recognizes
the lack ofprecision in funding decisions. "We are trying to very sensitive about this
[LWC funding decisions]. We are trying to be fair but still be merit based. Unfortunately
we are still struggling to define as a technical issue something that is very vapid" (OWEB
Board meetings in Salem, May 2007). Heagerty then explicitly encourages public
feedback and input to help OWEB improve the grant evaluation process.
Immediately preceding public commentary, staff members also publicly
acknowledge the need for public input to improve the grant evaluation process. "[The
funding evaluation process] it is evolving and also improving and will continue to do so,
in part based on what you are going to hear today. And that is the kind of information that
makes it possible to continually improve the process" (Byler, Tom and Leoni, Mellissa.
Personal Interviews. 28 June 2007).
Dan Powers speaks highly about the efforts ofOWEB staff to be respectful.
Powers claims that OWEB staff builds respect by their fairness or merit-based
evaluations and by reaching out to locals proactively and then providing support.
Individual review teams are not saying ''well this is my pet project. There is a good
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enough mix ofpeople.. .I think that our regional review leads do a great job ofgoing out
and getting input from people so that the RPRs [Regional Program Representatives]. We
have them based in all the 5 regions. There is a huge effort to get out and met with the
locals and talk to them and they are very open and accessible, very un-government like in
terms of their, you know, always being willing to talk and help out" (Powers, Dan.
Personal Interview. 20 July 2007).
Immediately following public commentary, a public OWEB staff report is
presented by Laurie Dickenson, who is in charge ofLWC funding evaluation. Dickenson
explains evaluation process and the steps being taken to make the grant application
process more streamlined and merit based. Dickenson also mentions that the process has
been reduced from 90 to 20 pages and 8 merit based criteria. Importantly, Dickenson
publicly explains the process of choosing reviewers. The following is part ofher
explanation.
Each team had a representative from each region [geographic
representation] ... and were chosen [diversity ofperspectives] because we wanted
to have extended conversations in the process ... [experience] reviewers were
chosen that had done this before... and the mechanisms and limitations they
employed such as 6 weeks of independent review and scoring along specified
criteria that were then turned in and then scored cumulatively... (OWEB Board
meetings in Salem, May 2007).
When Dickenson fmishes, Dan Powers states that "I think this was a great effort
to make the process merit based and create some standard way to look at them. It doesn't
mean it is perfect and I had problems just like all of you did but [pause] I didn't have a
better option" (OWEB Board Meetings in Salem, May 2007). Whether the criteria are
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optimal or not, they are transparent. They are explicitly and publicly presented. OWEB
solicits constructive feedback on this and other OWQEB decision-making procedures.
These examples are clearly deliberative institutional mechanisms that meet
extensive deliberative criteria for relative parity and respect. There were no reports of
perceived inadequate mutual respect among the evidence examined. This evidence
included interviews, secondary sources, previous research, and OWEB meeting minutes.
Instead, high levels of respect were reported between OWEB Board members and by
OWEB meeting participants. All Board interview statements demonstrated high levels of
esteem for other Board members. These Board members stressed the role of individuals,
though often from separate backgrounds, as willing to listen to each other and take all
Board member perspectives seriously, even under conditions of controversy and
disagreement.
OWEB Board interview subjects reported high levels of satisfaction with the
agency staff, the deliberative nature of the OWEB Board and its public meetings, and
especially with the personalities of fellow Board members themselves. Specifically, there
were satisfactory claims regarding broad representation ofthe OWEB Board.
Additionally, when asked "if and to what extent the Board was a successful deliberative
body and why," OWEB staff and Board members offered respect as important for
explaining the deliberative success ofOWEB Board interaction.
High levels of respect among the Board and participating stakeholders present at
OWEB Board meetings were also observed during two days ofOWEB Board meetings in
Salem last May 2007. Similarly high levels of respect were observed when the OWEB
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Board audio taped from 2007 were examined. Interview subjects, self-reported claims of
respect largely concerned Board member's general perceived sense of trust. Subjects
repeatedly commented that Board members were genuinely open and willing to listen to
each other. According to interview respondents like current Co-Chair Dan Heagerty, Dan
Powers, and former Board member Jane O'Keefe, this leads the Board and meeting
participants to feel they are able to speak freely and generates a sense of inclusion.
Multiple Board interview subjects agreed that "We have some very open
members on the Board" (Powers, Dan and O'Keefe, Jane. Personal and Phone Interviews.
July 2007). Numerous statements by Board members praised the qualities of the other
Board members generally and in more specific terms at times as well. Dan Powers
expressed his high opinion he and other Board members share of each other when he says
"you have a pretty outstanding group ofpeople there" (Powers, Dan. Personal Interview.
20 July 2007).
Board members repeatedly emphasized the openness and lack of fixed positions
regarding individual Board members. According to Board members themselves, the staff
and the Board exhibit a willingness to work together to enhance the overall effectiveness
of public meetings and OWEB Board decisions. Both staff and Board members agree this
is possible because Board members "generally refraining from taking fixed or extreme
positions on ideological grounds" (Interview July 20, 2007). Powers believes part of this
openness is due to the diversity of experience the representatives brings to the Board,
citing the diverse set of experience ofBoard member Dan Carver as one example.
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In follow up questions, when asked why and how the Board works so well
together OWEB staff and Board members agreed with Power's sentiment that high levels
ofrespect were consistently indicated by observable data and interview statements.
Part is that there is a comfort and trust level and a willingness to not fight
everything because there is a trust that okay, if you know what my issues are, you
are not going to support something that is really going to really undercut or-
there is an amazing trust level on the Board, from my perspective. I think it has
something to do with personalities. We have some very open members on the
Board. We try to be as informal as we can. You know we have a no tie rule that
Tom violates, but we try to be informal, I think we try to schedule some dinner
and free time that we can talk to each other, and Board members are pretty good
at calling each other up ifthere is an issue and asking for support. We have had
very few cases where we have either voted for something that wasn't pushed up
and recommended or that we have overturned something. But there are a few
cases, but not many... I don't think it is groupthink, because it is a really diverse
group, but I think that there is a desire, I think that the staff does a good job of
getting us, you know we are not looking at dogs, and so I think that that is a key
factor. And I think the other factor I think is that personal relationship (Powers,
Dan. Personal Interview. 20 July 2007).
These statements are typical ofother Board members comments regarding their
respect for one another. Interviewed Board members stated that they felt they could and
did speak freely and that others did as well. For example, one Board member states that
"Anybody that goes to one ofour meeting can see that you know Board members are not
shut down and can speak fairly freely" (O'Keefe, Jane. Phone Interview. 9 July 2007).
The feeling of freedom to speak and the observed sense that others were frequently
speaking their minds is one strong indicator of high levels ofrespect within the Board
itself Perhaps even more important than feeling the ability to speak freely, as an indicator
of respect was the conditions that allowed perceived sense ofopenness, or willingness to
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listen to others as a necessary prerequisite condition that enabled Board members to feel
they could express themselves freely.
Despite their independence and self-acknowledged bias, Board members all still
speak quite highly of the current OWEB Board as far as its member's openness and lack
of fixed positions that are crucial in enhancing the deliberative component and ultimately
the effectiveness ofOWEB's functioning. In a follow up question, several Board
members were asked ''why are you so comfortable and willing to listen and respect each
other's positions?" Powers insists that Board members trust each other due to a perceived
reservoir ofpreviously established social capital through a regular exercising of
deliberative culture or norms actions that have establish durable and positive perceptions
of each other. 127
Even under conditions ofdisagreement, without exception, Board members spoke
very highly of one another. Board members universally reported high levels of
satisfaction with the overall effectiveness of the Board. For example, despite
controversial issues and disagreement, such as land acquisition issues Board members
reported satisfaction and even surprise with the effectiveness ofsuch a large group.
Despite representing divergent interests, Board members reported high levels of
satisfaction with other Board members ability to listen, include, and demonstrate a
willingness to cooperate. O'Keefe supports the existence of controversy while affirming
the ability of the Board to work respectfully through the deliberative process.
I wouldn't say that because our group is so homogeneous that you know, that
people don't have varying opinions, but you know, people on the Board generally
127 See earlier quotes by Powers.
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are professionals people, they have been on boards, they understand the public
process, they kind ofunderstand time limitations, so people are pretty darn good
about expressing their opinions, and understanding that at some point you have to
stop discussing and start voting (O'Keefe, Jane. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007).
More than one Board member was quick to point out that that there have been and
continue to be various agency issues (such as governance standards) with extreme
disagreement. One Board member admits that there have been significant problems in the
past, when the OWEB Board did not function as well as it could have.
For example, former OWEB Co-Chair Jane O'Keefe states that:
One of our most controversial issues continues to be acquisitions, especially large
dollar amount acquisitions. Last summer the Nature Conservancy proposed
buying some land in Wallowa county using OWEB funds. And a lot of the local
people were unhappy with that proposal. So we head a lot of feedback from the
local folks on that proposaL .. It is controversial because a fundamental belief that
money should not be spent, lands should be in private hands rather than, say,
owned by a trust, or by the government. They prefer to see land what they
consider productive and, don't like to see land taken out ofproduction or off the
tax rolls (O'Keefe, Jane. Phone Interview. 9 July 2007).
Clearly, Board members do not always agree. In 2 days of direct OWEB meetings
observations in Salem in May 2007, other controversial issues were raised. These issues
included but were not limited to OWEB Board criteria for issues of funding under-
performing locals, and issues of equity in grant prioritization between locals and state
agencies and researchers. Dianne Snyder, now current OWEB Co-Chair, raised the issue
of grant prioritization and equity. Snyder is concerned when other state agencies or
researchers come and ask for funding that is arguably the responsibility ofother agencies
and could even be considered outside the direct purview ofOWEB. "Is it fair for state
agencies to come to us directly when others [locals] go through a grant process?"
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Dan Thorndike (former OWEB Board member) and Dave Powers immediately
respond to Snyder's concerns by pointing out and focusing on the perceived unique and
crucial research taking place in these projects. They also emphasize the potentia110ss if
these projects are not funded. However, Dan Heagerty, a current OWEB Co-Chair, agrees
with Snyder. While conceding that this type ofrelated research and work is "important,
and it is sad that BPA (Bonneville) is not funding it. However, this is where discipline is
required. Watershed councils have only 5 million in the pipe, council budgets are being
slashed. Our mission is the watershed councils." 128 Despite these strong disagreements,
Board members consider each other to be open minded even under conditions of
controversy.
Board members come from different independent agencies and are not afraid to
represent divergent constituencies independent of OWEB itselfor other Board members.
OWEB Board members themselves admit their own bias toward their particular agency
and the perspective or constituency it may represent. In one instance during the Salem
Board meetings in May 2007, the Board was receiving a presentation of the At Sea
Research update. At this public presentation extensive stakeholder inclusion was being
declared by multiple Board members and meeting participants. 129 Bobby Brunoe, a
128 Board members have publicly expressed concem over clear, explicit agreement on funding
prioritization. Is it cutting edge research, as Dan Powers argues or is the fust priority the watersheds
themselves, as public representative Dan Heagerty suggests? Current Public representative and voting
member, Co-Chair Dan Heagerty, at the end of2 days of meetings in Salem in May 2007, in a discussion
with OWEB staff member Roger Webb about OWEB's role in best practice information sharing among
locals states that "our ruling document states that we are to consider "political, social, and economic
concerns. How do we do this? We never get to this? How do we keep to our mission? What is our role?" It
is clear from these discussions (and others previously mentioned) that Board members are not in agreement
over how to prioritize funding decisions.
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Public at Large voting representative (Tribal Representative) interjects and asks, "If this
project is so collaborative, where are the tribes?" (Taken from audio recordings of the
meeting in Salem on May 2007) Or, "I am biased towards regulation since I come from a
regulatory perspective" (Powers, Dan. Personal Interview. July 2007). This supports the
claims that various stakeholders are willing to fIrmly articulate their own perspective
(whether agency or other constituent position) and that OWEB's composition is also
somewhat independent of OWEB itself (e.g. non-voting agencies select their own
representatives) .
Intense controversy also exists among OWEB Board members over funding
criteria and prioritization issues. Despite this, OWEB Board members believe that all
member concerns are equally included and listened to. Some interview subjects attribute
the high levels ofrespect and openness in meetings and among Board members generally
to the personalities and or experiences of the Board members themselves. Others posit an
institutional explanation for the high degree of respect that is generated among Board
members as best captured at the public Board meetings. For example, when asked if the
Board members feel their perspective is included despite the need for practical limitations
in the meeting. Recall O'Keefe stating that Board members are able to express their
opinions to their satisfaction within existing time constraints (O'Keefe, Jane. Phone
Interview. 9 July 2007).
129 According to the presentation in Salem in May 2007, At Sea uses fishing vessels and is currently
working with multiple stakeholders to track and learn about salmon scarcity. At Sea is the largest project of
its kind in the US.
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Powers articulates a partially institutional explanation for the respect among
Board members:
[The OWEB] Board is unique in make-up and in state government. With 17
members - most other state boards are 5 - this creates a much different dynamic
in terms ofhow issues are discussed .. .r have had experiences with other boards,
and while I was initially panicked about trying to manage this Board. I have found
that in some ways it is easier, because you cannot have one individual dominate
and its actions like you might have in a smaller board environment. It [a dominant
member] tends to get muted by the total. [This does] not mean don't have strong
personalities, we do and that's ok too. The Co-Chairs we have right now are tuned
in to trying to bring out all members to give them an opportunity to weigh in on
decisions and have strong deliberation as we go through decision-making
(Powers, Dan. Personal Interview. 20 July 2007).
Ultimately, despite the varying explanations for respect, what is important is that
all these indicators of respect appear to be different satisfactory accounts ofrespect
within the Board and among Board members. While it may not be clear exactly why
OWEB Board members feel that they can speak their mind freely and without undue
restraint, they do. Jane O'Keefe supports this when she says "Boy ifthey are not
speaking their minds I would like to know what it is. People pretty much say what they
think." (O'Keefe, Jane. Phone Interview. 9 July 2007)
Conclusion- The perceived explanation for respect among Board members varies
by interview subject. However, interview subjects consistently report - and direct OWEB
Board meeting observations support - high levels of respect among Board members and
the various meeting participants at these meetings. Board members bring to bear different
experience and expertise and serve potentially divergent constituents. At times, Board
members articulate divergent perspectives and needs. Despite these differences, OWEB
Board members speak highly of one another along various measures of respect.
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Interviews, meeting minutes, direct meeting observations, and staff as well as secondary
accounts confirm the Board's respectful behavior. This respect exists not only among the
Board but also includes OWEB's attempts to treat other stakeholders within OWEB
Board meetings with respect. This is illustrated in Table 12 below.
Table 12: OWEB Board & Perceived Mutual Respect
Min. Ideal Inclusion Heard Incorporated
Del.
Conditions
IV: Yes: open and transparent Yes: OWEB meetings Yes: by statute OWEB is
Structure, standards and process to structure participant largely driven by local
Behavior facilitate inclusion; involvement; Board concerns; in practice OWEB
multiple opportunities for meetings actively requires and actively solicits
stakeholders to speak and responded to stakeholder expertise and relevant
participate in processes feedback when critical stakeholder input in OWEB
policy-making
DV: Yes: at OWEB meetings Yes: OWEB participants Yes: meeting participants
Perceived participants report report that OWEB repeatedly state that their
Adequacy inclusion in decision when actively listens to their concerns have been
reaching out to OWEB concerns incorporated, e.g. grant criteria
2. Respect and Perceived Adequacy outside OWEB
Findings- The behavior of OWEB is considered respectfully adequate overall.
Outside stakeholder perceptions ofOWEB meetings and decision-making processes are
generally viewed in highly adequate, respectful terms. Outside stakeholders cite extensive
efforts by OWEB agency staff and Board members to include, genuinely listen to, and
then incorporating feedback from LWCs in grant application and evaluation, for example.
In evaluating levels of outside stakeholder mutual respect, the examined evidence did not
indicate outside stakeholders concern over OWEB's role in allowing or encouraging
variation in local deliberative standards and practice (with one exception). When
concerns over respect were raised in OWEB Board meetings, interview subjects and
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public testimony occasionally cited some concerns such as unclear or closed grant
evaluation procedures, and a concern that favoritism may be occurring. Examined
evidence such as interview data and meeting minutes confirms that genuinely respectful
behavior was actively practiced. This evidence will be presented to substantiate outside
stakeholder perceived deliberative adequacy ofOWEB along criteria ofmutual respect
and in coping with LWC deliberative transgressions.
A. Perceived Adequacy
Clear variation in deliberative respect exists among LWCs. Does this matter as far
as OWEB's role is perceived by stakeholders outside of the OWEB agency itself (staff
members and the Board)? That is, are the actions of OWEB staff and Board viewed by
LWC or others outside ofOWEB in adequate, respectful terms? Is OWEB blamed
somehow for deliberative variance at the local level? It appears that at a minimum,
OWEB itself is perceived (as measured in public commentary in OWEB meeting
minutes) as reaching various stakeholder standards of adequate respect. 130
This is reflected repeatedly in public commentary. Local watershed
representatives and members of the public frequently go on record as feeling that OWEB
staff and Board members listen, value their feedback, and actively reach and assist locals.
Improving standards such as streamlined and increasingly merit based grant awards are
130 Extensive archival Lexus Nexus keyword searches ofpublic state and national level documents in the
spring of2009 failed to reveal any public commentary that reported perceived inadequacy along measures
ofrespect. This does not mean that all stakeholders agreed with the funding priorities of the Oregon Plan
(and later OWEB) or the sources of funding themselves (state sanctioned gambling). However, the
examined evidence suggests that OWEB was overwhelmingly supported by numerous stakeholders.
Conversely, organized opposition to the salmon and watershed restoration project itself or any issues
surrounding the initial conceptualization and framing of the Oregon Plan and now OWEB were and remain
absent from the public debate.
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frequently and publicly cited as evidence for these perceptions. Finally, an anonymous
survey was distributed by email to arandomsampleofLWCinApri10f2009. This
survey provided an opportunity to provide anonymous feedback about OWER It
included questions about perceived respect and treatment by OWER Only two
watersheds returned the survey and these LWCs did not report any concerns about mutual
respect.
Public commentary within OWEB meetings consistently praised staff and Board
members about attempts actively reach out to locals help them feel actively listened to,
valued, and assisted (OWEB public meetings in Salem, May 2007). Members of the
public and various stakeholders at these meetings do not debate these overall claims and
throughout the public commentary that follows. In fact, watershed representatives
. 1 . fi h l' I31consIstent y rem orce t ese c aIms.
Jane Van Dyke, Executive Director of the Columbia Slough Watershed Council,
Michelle Presario, Cheryl McGinnis Executive Director of the Clackamas River Basin
Council, Janelle St. Pierre, former coordinator of the Scappoose Bay Watershed Council,
131 There are two exceptions to this claim that 1discovered. During the 2 days ofOWEB meetings in Salem
on May 2007, there were at least 2 public statements that partially challenged OWEB's claims ofpracticing
complete transparency and openness. Wayne Hoffinan, the Coordinator for the Midcoast Watershed
Council, states that after the ranking process "then there is a process to decide how to allocate funds. How
much [funding] difference should there be between the highest and the lowest rank, what amount of
additional funding there should be or shouldn't be, and that kind ofprocess, at least from my perspective,
seems to be insulated from public input." While still framed in "adequate terms" Or public participant
Cindy Ashy, a participant in the Midcoast Watershed, states that "I was literally shocked to see the OWEG
Grant Review Committee rate the Midcoast Watershed as excellent. .. that is until 1 looked at the list of
reviewers. Then 1understood why. It is an incestuous review process. Both of the Region I reviewers have
significant conflict of interest. One of them was a board member of the Midcoast watershed council at the
time the application was submitted, and was a very active member of the tech team that reviews the
grants." While Ashy's concerns are more serious but isolated, Hoffinan's comment suggests perceived
adequacy but still levels concerns that some locals or other stakeholders may feel disrespected and that the
funding process is somehow less legitimate.
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Denise Laughlin, and other members of the general public all voluntarily and without
specific prompting support and reiterate similar claims ofperceived respect. According to
this public commentary, OWEB is referred to as listening, valuing their perspective,
improving their grant application/evaluation process, and actively reaching out to assist
locals.
For example, Wayne Hoffman, the Coordinator for the Midcoast Watershed
Council, states that "I have been involved in this process for several bienniums, and each
time we get a new grant application, each time a new set ofrules. And those changes in
the rules [and those] rulemaking committees offer lots ofopportunity for input in the
process, and the process has gotten better" (Hoffman, Wayne. Meeting Testimony.
Salem, Oregon. May 2007).
Additionally, Denise Laughlin, a watershed representative, who spoke during the
first public comment period at the meetings in Salem (May 2007), stresses the extensive
helpfulness and support she received from OWEB staff and the efforts of OWEB to make
the grant application process more streamlined. This is repeated by several other
watershed representatives in the same public comment period.
A previously mentioned, in April of2009, an anonymous survey was sent to ten
different, randomly selected watershed council representatives. In this briefopen-ended
survey, questions concerning respect, transparency, and inclusion were administered. If
serious respect issues were present, this survey provided an anonymous opportunity to
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voice these concerns. 132 Only three surveys were returned. Each respondent reported that
OWEB not only met but exceeded adequate levels ofrespectful treatment. In fact, LWC
representatives in this survey and in public commentary generally speak quite highly of
OWEB and the Board in particular.
For example, "OWEB attempts to be science driven in its policy decisions. When
the concerns of the locals are at variance with the science, the science wins. Otherwise,
OWEB tries hard to be respectful" (Interview 20). In fact, this respondent also spoke
highly of the OWEB Board and its attempts to generate transparency. For example, "The
Board is quite transparent. It's [OWEB] meetings are open to the public and generally
well-attended" (Interview 20). Another LWC Coordinator states:
I feel that we ARE treated with a high level of respect, both by the Board and
staff Being a smaller council, we don't have as much interaction as some ofthe
larger councils might, so I can't say that we are approached directly for our
feedback. I HAVE made comments to the Board at their meetings (though I only
attend one or two a year), and I feel they are genuinely interested in the comments
I have made, and their questions show a desire to better understand and improve
the functioning of councils. They fully understand that the individual councils are
key to restoring our watersheds, and have taken seriously their role to support
councils and the work they are doing (Interview 19).
132 These questions included: 1. Is OWEB respectful to the concerns oflocals? 2. Is OWEB open to
feedback from locals? 3. Is open transparent in its decision making? 4. Local watersheds differ at times in
their governance standards and practices. In your opinion, do you think this variance is ever a problem? If
so how? 5. Note: Ifyou answered NO to #4, please skip this question. If there are any problems in terms of
variation in governance standards and practice among locals, what (if anything) does OWEB do to deal this
variation? Should they do something else and if so what? In one instance follow up questions were asked
and included: Do you view OWEB as a open to your local watershed's (or other local watersheds)
feedback? That is, when you do interact with OWEB, do you perceive that you are treated respectfully (e.g.
heard and taken seriously)? How well does OWEB itself solicit feedback from other stakeholders (your
watershed, landowners, the public in general)? Does OWEB ever proactively reach out to your local
watershed organization to solicit your input in their decision-making (e.g. invite you to their meetings)?
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However, LWC representatives and public commentary at times express some
concerns with and suggest specific areas for improvement along the deliberative respect
measure. In OWEB meetings during public testimony, representatives ofloca1 watersheds
repeatedly expressed frustration at the fluctuating nature of OWEB funding. However,
these comments simultaneously and explicitly recognize OWEB funding as outside the
control of OWER LWC representatives also repeatedly identified the constant change in
watershed grant evaluation criteria toward increasingly merit based terms as generally
improving. At times, however, multiple statements also expressed remaining frustration
over the seemingly unclear, frustrating, and closed nature ofwatershed rankings.
Wayne Hoffman, the Midcoast Watershed Coordinator, reiterates the concern of
other local watershed agency representative testimony when he states that the difference
between each watershed ranking and how different watershed umbrellas "get what" is
closed. Hoffman requests this process be open to the public (OWEB Board meetings,
May 2007). Additionally, Hoffman asserts that OWEB funding levels "incentivizes
fracturing councils" or encourages splitting on to smaller watersheds. This was
immediately reiterated by several other watershed representatives in the public
commentary that took place at OWEB Board meetings in Salem on May 2007.
Conclusion- Previous studies, meeting minutes, and interviews all confirm that
deliberative LWC variation clearly exists, even if significant transgressions are isolated
and increasingly uncommon. However, none of the examined evidence placed blame for
deliberative variation among LWCs on OWER Public testimony at times reflected
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serious deliberative relative parity and respect concerns within LWCs. However, the
testimony did not implicate OWEB itself (with one exception already mentioned).
Instead, public testimony was overwhelmingly favorable from outside
stakeholders and public testimony (i.e. stakeholders other than OWEB staff and Board
members). Outside participant stakeholder testimony characterized OWEB behavior in
highly respectful deliberative. At worst, outsider commentary illuminated issues that
should warrant OWEB's careful attention in the future but acknowledged adequate
progress toward these goals. This is illustrated below in Table 13.
Table 13: OWEB and Outside Perceived Mutual Respect
Min. Ideal Inclusion Heard Incorporated
Del.
Conditions
IV: Structure, Yes: local watersheds Yes: OWEB actively Yes: OWEB standards require
Behavior define problems. OWEB solicits and responds to and OWEB actively solicits and
is open to all interested stakeholder input in utilizes diverse stakeholder input
stakeholders in decisions OWEB meetings and expertise in forming policy
DV: Yes: local watershed Yes: local watersheds Yes: local watershed reps. report
Perceived reps. report feeling reps report feeling feeling incorporated when
Adequacy included when heard when approaching OWEB
approaching OWEB approaching OWEB
IV. Chapter Discussion: Perceived Adequacy-Centralization & the Role of
Representative Deliberation
The initial framing and conception of the Oregon Plan (which let to GWEB and
then OWEB) meets ideal deliberative standards. However, the initial formation ofOWEB
and some ofOWEB's institutional standards do not meet ideal deliberative standards.
Despitefailing to meet numerous ideal deliberative standards, in practice OWEB is
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perceived by stakeholders in adequate deliberative terms. However, this does not mean
that stakeholders are satisfied with statewide governance standards surrounding
watershed restoration outside of OWEB (excepting participatory standards). The
following discussion identifies and assesses the importance of the perceived inadequacy
ofoutside deliberative parity standards, namely the constituting the Board, OWEB's lack
of adequate centralization standards, the lack ofbudgetary control imposed by the
legislature. Finally, perceived stakeholder satisfaction with lower participatory standards
will be discussed.
1. Institutionalizing Deliberative Board Selection & Behavior
OWEB Board member selection occurs in the absence of a carefully
institutionalized or democratic, transparent process. Despite this the Board itself is
perceived as able, effective, and deliberative. This is due to careful candidate selection by
the governor along criteria that are generally perceived as appropriate. These criteria
include openness, expertise, geographic and experiential representation. This is coupled
with careful institutional attempts to build camaraderie and rapport.
The actual participation of the affected watershed community seems less
important than the respect and openness the Board exhibit among themselves and in
relation to the general public. The voluntary nature ofOWEB and the agency's inclusion
and openness reassures stakeholders that the process is at worst open to and at best
actually does articulate the major relevant interests in OWEB's decision-making.
However, the current Board composition does not readily lend itself to transferrable,
institutional replication. Future Board composition may become a product of partisan
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shift, political entrepreneurship, or even luck. OWEB Board members and staffprivately
concede that previous Boards were significantly less deliberative.
Implementation of an institutionalized, democratic, and transparent process would
help or potentially enhance the replication of a successful (in more clearly deliberative
terms) candidate selection. Granting OWEB stakeholders influence in Board member
selection and directly involving the public in an open and transparent process would help
ensure replication of quality Board members. This process could also enhance
perceptions ofBoard's legitimacy over political time and with the inevitable changing
partisan electoral fortune.
2. Centralization Matters: Voluntary Largess v. Regulatory Mandates
Deliberative variation in local watershed standards and practice remains a
concern. However, OWEB exercises no formal control over LWC. Additionally, the
overall structure and practice of OWEB is perceived in highly adequate, deliberative
terms, including the agency's dealings with LWC. To the extent that OWEB may exert
some measure of informal influence over specific L WCs through the grant process,
deliberative LWC transgressions were perceived as unrelated to oWEB.
Despite failing to meet numerous ideal deliberative standards, there were no
serious, measurable perceived concerns leveled at OWER Stakeholders report that
despite these deliberative shortcomings, the behavior of the legislature, the governor, and
most importantly OWEB itself still manages to actualize or meet adequate deliberative
standards. This is achieved either in results (Board composition is seen as fair) or in
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practice (OWEB does enough or what can reasonably be expected overall). The
voluntary, capacity building function ofOWEB may help partially explain this lack of
senous concern.
Despite this, it should be noted that deliberative variance in standards and practice
among LWC has been and likely will continue to be a problem in isolated instances.
Complaints have been registered to the OWEB Board by lay participants at the local
watershed level. These reports include perceived marginalization and real exclusion.
Previous studies readily demonstrate occasional yet serious theoretical and perceived
deliberative variance among LWC in governing standards and practice. Perhaps most
troubling, LWCs are completely autonomous from not only OWEB or other governing
agents but also the communities themselves. To some, this means LWCs may view and
be viewed by local (or other) stakeholders as irrelevant. In any case, LWSc clearly do not
meet ideal or perceived deliberative criteria. 133 Ensuring minimum deliberative
governance standards among LWC that receive OWEB assistance remains an ongoing
concern. This is confirmed by OWEB staff members (confirmed in interviews with Tom
Byler, Melissa Leoni, and Ken Bierly).
Deliberative LWC variance SUppOltS Dorf and Sabel's (1998) basic deliberative
centralization hypothesis. As this relates the case of OWEB, additional regulatory state
level legislative action would be required to eliminate continued minimum deliberative
standard variation among LWCs. This could be accomplished by strengthening the
133 At times this is not always far from accurate. In previous research by Dianne Rolph, multiple Lwe
representatives stated that local residents were unaware of their LWe. For example, a survey of the
McKenzie watershed conducted of the upper river area by David Povey found that no more than 30-40% of
respondents were aware of the LWe.
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linkage between OWEB's deliberative standards and behavior and LWC or by facilitating
deliberation among LWC in response to OWEB itself Ideally, deliberativists would
require additional legislation to grant OWEB additional authority. This authority would
impose more explicit, minimum deliberative standards for any local or other community
organization under state law. This would be mandated whether they accept OWEB
funding or not. In practice, this mandate would effectively alleviate unacceptable
deliberative variance among state sponsored watershed organizations and bring them into
increased compliance along minimum ideal and perceived deliberative standards.
3. Representative Deliberation
Ideal deliberative standards that require participation of all affected stakeholders
(Cohen, 1989) may not be necessary to meet minimum perceived deliberative thresholds
along relative parity and respect. OWEB Board representation and LWC participation
further reinforce standards of representative deliberation. That is, the type of individuals
selected or the discourse they actually represent may be just as or more important than
the number of and extent of participation from any given group or demographic.
The OWEB [mdings further reinforce the viability and appropriateness of a
different non-ideal evaluative standard of stakeholder participation. The OWEB Board is
perceived in adequate representative terms by various stakeholders and LWC
representatives themselves along deliberative measures ofparity and respect. As
currently practiced in OWEB Board meetings, current Board members and stakeholder
participants are perceived as willing and able to articulate and adequately represent their
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respective constituent groups. The Board is also perceived as being willing to move from
their position and respect "other" perspectives.
Furthermore, concerns over lack ofdiversity and disproportionate representation
of certain demographic groups might be unrealistic and even acceptable on non-ideal
deliberative terms. If individuals or institutions exhibit or select on traits such as
openness, if OWEB grants real authority to lay participants, and the Board is perceived as
exhibiting genuine respect by traditionally marginalized populations, then participation
among all affected stakeholders or demographic groups may be unnecessary. 134 If
accurate, deliberative scholars might examine the optimal conditions under which these
representatives would be chosen. In any case, these findings support the adequacy of non-
ideal deliberative standards. This appears to disconfIrm ideal deliberative standards. At a
minimum, it suggests a needed reconciliation between ideal and non-ideal deliberativists.
134 This finding is supported in the previous OHCR case as welL The idea that selection is more important
than extensive participation of large numbers of individuals affected proportional the total population or
issue area impact is finding that other deliberativists such as John Dryzek (2008) are beginning to support.
Future research might more carefully attempt to determine the conditions under and the process by which
selections based on interest or discourse articulation are more appropriate than representative demographic
requirements or full participation of all affected or other wise relevant individuals and groups. The search
for a more workable yet robust conception of stakeholder participation supports the recent work suggested
by deliberativists such as John Dryzek (2008). Dryzek's notion ofdiscursive representation may generate a
process where stakeholder positions are more fully articulated and incorporated into policy decisions.
Representatives of interested or at1ected individuals may be more capable of articulating and engaging in
deliberative behavior than an ideal that evaluates deliberation through participation based on actual
demographic diversity or the total number of participants.
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CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDY III. EVALUATING EXEMPLAR DELIBERATIVE CLAIMS
SURROUNDING THE NEW COMMUNITY MEETINGS
I. Introduction
1. NCI & II: Background
Lane County residents were and remain distinctly divided along issues of "gay
rights" and sustainable growth. However, in the 1990s in particular, the Eugene-
Springfield Oregon metropolitan area in Lane County was at the center of an increasingly
polarized and conflictual community politics. The extreme division along issues ofgay
rights and growth and sustainable development had created major concerns as to
community livability due to this division (Stein, 2001; Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview.
27 June 2007).
In response, Gayle Landt, a Eugene resident and local community activist,
mediator, activist and founder ofBeyond War (a local non-profit dedicated to ending
armed conflict) put forth a model for community and regional controversy and conflict
resolution called the ''New Community Meeting" (NCM). Landt-who has more than 30
years experience in politics and public policy at the grass-roots, state and national
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levels-designed, facilitated, and mediated all institutional aspects ofNCMI and II
(Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007; Gwartney, 2002). In interviews
conducted in 2007, NCM core participants reported intense frustration and community
division. This led community stakeholders to view the NCM process as an important
experiment and as a potential viable alternative to the "normal politics" of competition
and self-interest. Core participants suggested that typical strategies of collusion,
manipulation, or control of "normal politics" had been exhausted.
The NCM model draws from a meditative and consensus (not explicitly
deliberative) based model ofpo1itica1 engagement and Landt's is designed to take place
outside ofthe intractable politics of polarization and competition. The NCM model is
built on the premise that "community conflicts can be resolved when key relationships
between citizen leaders - characterized by alienation, hostility, and polarization - can shift
to a base ofshared principles, identification of common ground, and willingness to
collaborate" (Gwartney 2002, 56).
To facilitate consensual and cooperative conflict resolution, the NCM model
involves a series ofwell-defmed, sequential steps over six to twelve months. These steps
are designed to build trust and effective working relationships among previously
alienated stakeholders. NCM brought together leaders on all sides ofdivisive and
contentious community issues in Lane County with a focus on the Eugene-Springfield
metropolitan area. However, the NCM models lack formal institutional authority.
Accordingly, the NCM process is structured with careful attention to ensuring that larger
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community "buy in" occurs in as well as after and outside of the NCM (Landt, Gayle.
Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
The NCM meeting process begins with "skill-building exercises in listening,
conflict resolution, and identification of operating principles or essential core values.
These exercises are then followed by structured dialogue and facilitated consensus
building on disputants' issues. NCM culminates with documentation ofparticipants,
common ground, reached entirely by consensus, in a written "Statement of Agreements."
(Gwartney 2002,56-57).
However, the goal of the NCM project in each case was not simply to bring
relevant stakeholders together, structure "buy in," and to measure success by forging
agreement about a specific issue. Rather, the process also seeks to "improve participants'
skills in listening, problem solving, and appreciating each other's differences and
commonalities" (Gwartney 2002, 57). To accomplish this, voluntarily recruited
participants engage in careful, intensive exploration of genuine listening skills, conflict
resolution techniques, and cultural and dialogue awareness training in order to positively
address the conflicts inherent in the issue.
NCMI- NCMI emerged over the controversy surrounding the state's "anti-gay"
initiatives and the growing tension in Lane County and Oregon over the preceding few
decades. This is reflected in extremely fixed, narrow, polarized, and negative attitudes in
neighboring communities (Stein, 2001). According to Landt (and other NCM
participants) Oregon's 'gay rights" issue clearly represented the most dramatic evidence
of the increasing polarization in the Eugene-Springfield community and in Lane County
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more broadly (Landt 1994, 1). "A split between conservatives, who are often
fundamentalist Christians, and more liberal or 'progressive' citizens had been widening
in Lane County for the last twenty years" (Landt 1994, 1).
In 1992 the Oregon Citizens Alliance (OCA), a conservative Christian political
organization, proposed Ballot Measure 9. This initiative would have amended the Oregon
Constitution to prevent what the OCA called "special rights" for homosexuals and
bisexua1s. 135 This was the most direct legal attack possible. The gay community
perceived efforts to pass initiatives such as Measure 9 (as well as other anti-gay rights
actions) as representative of a larger, deeply personal, unfair attack by the larger
community. For example, long-time politico Kathleen Sadaat still chokes up when she
talks about Measure 9. "It was not an easy time," she says. "You've been living in a
community for years - you go to the grocery store and wonder if the person behind the
d · ,,136counter vote agamst you.
One NCMI core participant summarizes this extreme divisiveness and frustration:
NCM followed a ballot measure that was very personal and very painful. I think
the whole community was incredibly damaged by what happened around that
ballot measure. It was hideous. It created rifts in neighbors, in workplaces, in
everywhere.. .It was so damaging and I think people were really tired of it
(Interview 5).
Nadia Te1sey, a core participant in NCMI, was extremely hesitant to participate
and thought Gayle Landt was "crazy" to even consider the NCM meetings a viable option
135 http://www.wweek.com/htm1l25-1992.html#oca
Measure 9 did not pass but 44% of Oregonians voted in favor of Measure 9.
136 http://www.wweek.com/htm1l25-1992.html#oca
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(Telsey, Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007). Statements like these were common and
reflect the destructive and divisive nature of the controversy. 137
NCMI consisted of a series of meetings between self identified fundamentalist
Christians and "gay rights" activists in Lane County (1994-1996).138 NCMI core
participants expressed satisfaction along deliberative parity and respect criteria, NCMI
was not entirely transformative. The NCMI Statement of Agreements did not result in
tangible policy agreements about the issue of gay rights. However, it appears the two
primary groups were able to move (slowly) from severely strained relations and fixed
narrow notions of blame and exclusion to a condition of mutual respect and general
acceptance (Stein, 2001; interviews with NCMI core participants).
NCM consisted of 12 core meeting participants chosen from Lane County.
Participants were chosen "due to their status as leaders within the community and
represented all sides of the 'gay rights' issues" (Landt 1994, 1). The participants were key
political activists, religious leaders, community leaders, the mayors of Eugene and
Springfield, as well as trained facilitators and mediators (from Statement of Agreements
1994; Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007; participant selection
documentation provided by Landt in 2007).
137 http://www.wweek.comlhtml/25-1992.html#oca
138 The NCMI sessions worked to develop the Conflict Resolution Center's curriculum developed by
Beyond War now called Foundation for Global Community ofPalo Alto, California. Internalization of
these principles (these principles can be found in the appendix) provide the foundation for a new, shared
cultural understanding of a "third way" for solving problems (Landt 27 June 2007). By "third way," Landt
means that "if you get high quality people to sit in a circle on both sides, they are going to learn to care
about each other and that gives them motivation and makes them come up with a third way or good
resolutions to the conflict. It makes that possible" (Landt, 27 June 2007).
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In addition to the core meeting participants, there was an Advisory Committee,
composed of twelve civic, political, and religious leaders. There was also a seven-
member community leaders' panel composed of the mayor of Eugene, Springfield, and
others. Finally, outside of the Advisory Panel and Community Leaders Panel there were 6
other advisors on an "Optional Panel" (Participant List, 1994. This list was provided by
Gayle Landt in 2006).139
NCMI consisted of more than 100 hours ofmeetings (Statement of Agreements,
1994). These meetings were conducted as weekly three-hour meetings for 9 months and
included two weekend retreats (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). The
NCMI meetings consisted of: an initial weekend retreat, two dialogue training sessions,
structured dialogue session about the issues, a sessions where the field was narrowed, a
second retreat were the statement of agreement was outlined, a writing of the agreement
139 The following is a list ofNCMI Community Leader Panel, Advisory Committee, and Other advisors
and was gathered from a list provided by Landt in 2006. The Community Leaders Panel consisted of: Ruth
Bascom, former Eugene mayor; Gerry Gados, Eugene City Budget Committee member and former
president of the Eugene Chamber of Commerce; Bobby Green, Lane County Commissioner; Annabel
Kitzhaber, past president of the League of Women Voters Lane County and League of Women Voters
Oregon; Gretchen Miller, Eugene Human Rights Commission member and former Eugene City Councilor;
Bill Morrisette, Springfield mayor; Jim Torrey, Eugene Mayor. The Advisory Committee consisted of John
Alvord, founder of Alvord-Taylor; Dorothy Anderson, member ofBoard of Directors, EWEB; John
Baldwin, Director University ofOregon Institute for a Sustainable Environment; Rob Bennett, President of
Bennett Management and owner of Downtown Athletic Club; Donna Buell of Buell Chapel, Springfield
Chamber of Commerce Board member; Galen Carpenter, Veneta Mayor; Susan Daluddung, Director of
Development Services, City of Springfield; Dave Hauser, Manager Eugene Chamber of Commerce; Bern
Johnson, Director Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide; Scott Meisner, Eugene City Councilor;
Margaret Nichols, Superintendent 4J School District; Mary O'Brien, Interim chair, City of Eugene Toxics
Right to Know Board; Gary Pierpoint, Senior Vice President, South Umpqua Bank; Craig Smith, member
Eugene School District 4J Board of Directors; Jean Tate, retired real estate business owner; Dan Williams,
University of Oregon Vice President for Administration. Other Advisors were: Tom Bartlett, former
Chancellor Oregon State University System of Higher Education; Doug McKay, General Manager North
Douglas Wood Products, McKay Investment; Phyllis Loobey, Director Lane Transit District; Jeff Miller,
former Eugene Mayor; Gretchen pierce, President Hult & Associates; Emily Schue, former Eugene City
Councilor.
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session, and a presentation ofthe Statement of Agreement to the community (Landt,
Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).140
NCMII- Landt also applied the NCM model to issues of growth and sustainable
development in the Eugene-Springfield Oregon metropolitan area from March 1997 to
March 1998 (Evaluating the Success of the NCMII 1999, 1).141 Statements of extreme
divisiveness and frustration in NCMI are not unique. Interview subjects, media reports,
and even current intractable political conflicts did and still continue to exhibit highly
polarized and divided community stakeholder positions along issues of growth and
sustainability. For example, Tom Bowerman states that "we are a polarized community
on issues of development" (Bowerman, Tom. Personal Interview. 5 October 2007). In the
following excerpt, one interview participant discusses the community divisiveness before
NCMII occurred.
Well I think there is an exhaustion in this community and we have sort ofhit a
wall and its really (frustrating), the city council continues to be divisive, any kind
ofmajor initiative around looking at land use, transportation issues, urban growth
boundary, economic development, continues to be stymied by different points of
view... you know there are a lot of people in that circle that had actually been, in
the public process either politically or in advocacy roles for a very long time and
were are, there is sort ofthis exhaustion level of! am kind oftired, trying to get
stuff accomplished and forever getting walled (Interview 8).
After NCMII, the community remained and remains divided on issues of growth
and sustainability. On March 19, 1998, the Impact Weekly reported that "the packed, six
page statement of agreements that 16 of 17 group members signed left severa11arge
140 The meeting outline can be examined in more depth in the appendix.
141 http://www.censusscope.org/us/m2400/chart pop1.html
At the time the population was approximately 322,000. More recent non-official data places the 2007
population closer to 340,000.
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elephants still seated in the community living room." Or more specifically, University of
Oregon professor and NCMII participant Robert O'Brien says "there are areas ofboth my
concern and other's peoples concerns that are not in here because we could not get
agreement" (Impact Weekly, March 19, 1998). The article states that, "among these issues
were growth itself' (Impact Weekly, March 19, 1998).
Unlike NCMI, an attitude of goodwill and willingness to work on the issues of
growth and sustainability varied considerably among core participants before NCMII
began. When the NCMII meetings began Bowerman perceived that
I think that there was a general sense that there was a common set of expectations
that if we work on something then we will be able to solve it. If we kind of tease
this out together pretty much you might say, you know, that a fresh group of city
councilors who have no previous political experience might be elected and that
they have a sense going into the processes that they are going to be able to
contribute to the solutions of the community and that they are going to be able to
work together (Bowerman, Tom. Personal Interview. 5 October 20007).
Bowerman believed that stakeholders had different ideas about growth and sustainability
but felt that community leaders were able and willing to work productively on these
Issues.
Community discussion surrounding growth and sustainability were not about
immediate rights and livelihood issues. The discussion about growth and sustainability
took place along positions that were not as far apart and fixed due to the political climate.
Interview subjects reported that most members ofNMCII and the larger community were
usually somewhat agreeable to ideas of sustainable growth and development. Rather, the
community stakeholders and NCMII participants were uncertain as to how this problem
should be defined and implemented.
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Nonetheless polarized community disagreement about growth issues among
community residents and business groups in the Eugene community most directly served
to precipitate NCMII. 142 During this time, the Conflict Resolution Center, in Eugene,
Oregon brought together "seventeen community leaders, representing pro-business and
pro-environment organizations, with diverse opinions on growth, to address the
challenges of sustaining a vigorous economy while respecting environmental realities"
(Evaluating the Success ofNCMII 1999, 1). These core participants "represented feuding
factions and voiced diverse opinions ofurban growth and development issues"
(Gwartney 2002,57).
These core participants included business leaders, environmentalists, and
community activists and were identified and enlisted by Gayle Landt. Twenty-nine
additional community leaders also served on an Advisory Committee and a Leaders
panel. The members of these panels included, among others, the mayor and former mayor
ofEugene, the former president of the Chamber of Commerce, and a county
commissioner. As in NCMI, these panels were designed to help generate participatory
buy in, act as community monitors, and enhance community impact of the meetings. 143
New Community II followed the institutional design and facilitation by Gayle
Landt ofNCMI. NCMII core participants discussed local growth and development issues
were discussed over the period of one year. The commitment ofthe core participants
142 This is readily acknowledged and substantiated from interviews with NCMII core participants, Gayle
Landt, as well as secondary sources and accounts. I use the term polarized to mean divergent but not
unwilling to work together. This type of polarization was perceived by Tom Bowerman in NCMII.
143 The complete list ofparticipants can be accessed in the Statement ofAgreements (March 1998). This
document is available to the public at the Eugene Public Library More. This list is also included in the
NCM Evaluation Document 1999).
192
entailed more than 200 hours of meetings. These meetings occurred four times per month
for three-hour sessions and also consisted of attending three weekend retreats over the
year-long period. At the end of this process, a Statement of Agreements was produced.
This document identified participants' consensus on community relationships, land use
planning principles, and process recommendations for citizen participation in land use
planning (Evaluating the Success of the NCM, November 1999; Final Report for the
NCMII, September 1998, 28).
As in NCMI, the second NCM meeting also generated a Statement of Agreement
that every member signed excepting Liz Cawood. This Statement of Agreements"
identified participants' consensus on community relationships, and use planning
principles, and process recommendations for citizen participation in land use planning"
(Gwartney 2002,57). As in NCMI, NCMII did not result in tangible policy agreements
about issues of growth and development. As in NCMI, NCMII core participants engaged
in an extensive process to improve conflict resolution skills. As a result, participants
"learned to regard their mutual dependence as complementary interests" (Gwartney,
2002, 72). As in NCMI, NCMII core participants report satisfaction along parity and
respect criteria.
Despite the fact that NCMI has received less scholarly attention and has been less
carefully studied, NCMII appears to have been less successful than NCMI,144 Unlike
144 Previous research by the now defunct Oregon Survey Research Laboratory (OSRL) and Patricia
Gwartney (2002) carefully exhibits the shift toward increased respect among stakeholders outside the
NCMII forums. The Final Report for NCMII (September 2000) also demonstrates numerous joint acts of
cooperation between previously divisive stakeholders. Initially this evidence suggests a more successful
process than NCMI.
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NCMI, interview subjects in NCMII never spoke of the process or other participants in
equally transfonnative tenns. Interview subjects often expressed dissatisfaction with the
ambiguity of the Statement of Agreements and its inability to produce tangible policy
agreements. Gayle Landt herselfconcedes that NCMII was less successful than NCMI.
"In tenns of the difference between NCM I and II, the differences in success, and NCM II
measures success, it was much less successful than NCM I, but it still did have some
benefits for the community" (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). An
NCMII core participant, Tom Bowennan speaks to the dissatisfaction he and others felt
in regard to the larger community impact and ambiguousness of the Statement of
Agreements. "I went back and read it fresh for the first time in like 6 or 7 years and I
thought you know this is not a very good product. .. I don't think it had any impact. That
is the sad part" (Bowennan, Tom. Personal Interview. 5 October 2007).
2. Why the New Community Meetings? Untested Deliberative Claims
Eugene resident and local community activist Gayle Landt designed and applied a
model for community and regional controversy and conflict resolution called the "New
Community Meeting" (NCM). The New Community Meetings were driven by the goal of
finding common ground in previously intractable, controversial community issues. Landt
intended the NCM model to be a collaborative process driven by principles of mediation.
That is, the NCM model was not explicitly and solely conceived in deliberative tenns
(Final Report for the NCMII, September 2000,2). Nonetheless, scholars, NCM meeting
participants (though this varies by case), journalists, and others refer to both NCMI and II
as a successful deliberative community based conflict resolution process.
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While the NCMI has been considerably less studied, participant interview
statements powerfully affirm the deliberative and at times transformative impact of
NCMI. For example, NCMI statements by meeting participants claim that "It forever
changed the way that I view things," Or "it [NCMI] convinced me that political
maneuvering is not answer," and refer to the NCMI as "[NCMI] was probably one ofthe
most meaningful experiences of my 73 years" (Interview quotes from NCMI interview
subjects on 9 July 2007, 15 December 2007, and 11 October 2007).145
NCMII is also referred to in deliberative terms. For example, Patricia Gwartney,
in a 2002 article entitled Measuring the Long-Term Impact ofa Conflict Resolution
Process Gwartney asserts that her longitudinal content analysis indicates a shift in
respectful views and interaction over time which positively affected the larger
stakeholder community.
The lessons participants learn in conflict resolution processes [in this case
NCMII] disseminate to their communities ... such dissemination can be measured
by content analysis ofparticipants' constituent organization newsletters ...NCMII
participants replicated their learned improved skills in their interactions with
constituents, as evidenced in the newsletter communication" (Gwartney 2002,69-
70).
Additionally, The Business News, in October of 1998 quotes the city manager as
saying that "it was a miracle that members of groups as diverse as the Friends of Eugene
145 Outside scholars also make deliberative claims about NCMI and II. Arlene Stein, in her book entitled
The Stranger Next Door, refers to NCMI in deliberative terms. NCMI engaged in a process that allowed
participants to truly see the "other" through a process by facilitating genuine listening, transplanting
dialogue in the place of divisive conflict (Stein 2001,228). Stein speaks to the NCMI process and its ability
to transcend the normal political model of exclusionary politics. "After meeting together for several
months, the group issued a statement decrying the unconscious assumption in cultural warfare that if one
side wins the other side will simply disappear" (Stein 2001, 228). All sides came to the conclusion that they
must all learn to live in this communiW together.
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and the Chamber of Commerce could reach agreement." Other articles praise the NCMII
with titles such as The Register Guard and its May 13th, 1998 article entitled "Diverse
Eugene groups find surprising consensus."
Il Evidence: An Accounting of Power
1. Power within the New Community Meetings
Findings: Numerous minimum deliberative ideal parity criteria were not met. The
NCM did not initially grant the general public a stake in the decision-making process nor
was the process open to all interested and or affected participants. Additionally, the
conception, structuring, and framing, as well as NCM participant selection was closed to
the public. The NCM process did not make its proceedings public. However, each NCM
project took steps to and was perceived by meeting participants as more than adequately
meeting any concerns ofrelative parity. Evidence such as interview data, trade
publications, and meeting minutes will be presented as confirmation of these fmdings.
The NCM design, creation, constitution, and facilitation are examined in this section.
A. Institutionalized NCM Access and Influence
Ideal deliberative theory requires formal institutional authority in any deliberative
process. 146 "The results of deliberation must be binding on all those involved" (Cohen in
Rosenberg 2007, 9). In the NCM cases, there was no formal state authority. Orthodox
deliberative standards of voluntary, state led or top down vertical movement ofpower to
local government and relevant stakeholders was not a part of the NCMI or II. Instead, a
146 Dorfand Sabel (1998) 316-317.
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bottom up community initiated process asked the relevant interested or affected local
community stakeholder representatives and political leadership to voluntarily grant Gayle
Landt and the NCM forum institutional authority.
This voluntary recruitment and endorsement by public governmental and private
community leader and stakeholders allowed Landt to legitimately organize, conduct, and
ultimately generate consensus based decisions in the NCM forums. These decisions or
Statements ofAgreement would then be taken by each representative to his or her
constituent community to advocate for the results of the NCM. Local leadership and
government were to help not only grant authority to the NCM project but to lobby for
acceptance and approval in their respective positions of formal authority as well.
The NCM process itself did not possess any devolved authority in the traditional
top down statist manner. This fails to meet criteria of ideal deliberative devolution. To the
extent that elements of informal devolution existed in both NCM cases, it was generated
by the community itself in a bottom up process within the NCM process. As mentioned,
representatives ofthe major affected or interested groups were sought out and voluntarily
agreed to give up individual autonomy and partial authority to Gayle and the NCM
process. Core participants agreed to a voluntary "buy in." Core NCM participants also
agreed to and followed the rules that established power equality such as giving every
position the full amount of time they feel needed as well as following rules of
deliberative communication such as respectful listening required by the NCM process.
The NCM project only partially and informally conforms to Dorfand Sabel's
institutional centralization standards along empowerment and setting 0 f participatory
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standards within the meetings themselves. 147 Deliberative transgressions include failing
to make deliberation public, inclusive, transparent, or granting any type of substantive
stakeholder state in NCM decisions. NCM forums were not open or transparent. NCM
forums did not generate and did not actively solicit or take into account extensive public
participation.
However, the NCM was explicitly designed to and actively practiced a number of
institutional steps that ascribe to other important deliberative standards. These steps
included setting and implementing numerous deliberative centralization standards along
parity criteria. NCM standards and processes sought to actively ameliorate real or
perceived power imbalances and ensure that participants treated each other with respect,
thereby establishing a "safe space" for discussing sensitive issues. Additionally, the
actual direction and nature of the substantive discussion and any agreement that was
reached, to the extent it existed, was to be determined by the core participants
themselves. As Landt states, ''they are in control of the content" (Landt, Gayle. Personal
Interview. 27 June 2007).
Landt explains the need to keep the meetings closed to the public and the media:
The reasons the meeting are confidential or secret. ..you cannot get to the creative
part, I would never do this in front of reporters, because people cannot sift and
sort, show their vulnerabilities and show their growing edges and if you are really
going to get to a solution you cannot take the risks that you need to take or you
cannot make the mistakes - the process of discovering a third way, the process of
discovering a whole new way to look at something, that messy, exploratory thing
- people can be crucified in the press over it and there are lots of forces that want
147 These standards can be found in Dorfand Sabel's Democratic Experimentalism (1998), page 315 or in
the previous discussion on ideal deliberative standards ofdevolution in chapter 1.
198
to do that. ..The process won't work like that (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview.
27 June 2007).
Additionally, the selection ofmeeting participants was not an open, participatory
process in either NCM case. In both NCMI and II, the lay public and the local media
were not invited nor allowed to attend or participate in meetings. Additionally, Gayle
asked the core meeting participants to avoid discussing the meetings with family,
coworkers - anyone not associated with the meetings (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview.
27 June 2007).
The NCM process began by generating, screening, and then enlisting members of
the NMS meeting process. These included: an advisory committee (8-10 members), a
Leaders panel (5-7 members), and then, with their assistance, the core participants
(originally conceived of as somewhere between 8-12 members). A similar approach was
utilized in NCMII as well (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007; Steps in the
NCM Conflict Resolution Model, 1994).
According to Gayle, the enlistment process took almost 18 months (Landt, Gayle.
Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). Gayle explains that such a strong initial focus on the
selection process is often necessary for successful deliberation and says this is often
recognized within the mediation community as well. Landt explains. "Many mediators
say that getting the parties to the table is 2/3 of the necessary work for a successful
mediation" (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). By successful deliberation
Gayle say she means establishing "groups that want to resolve conflict, learn to know one
another better, and change the polarized, alienated relationship that they have in the
community" (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). According to Landt, with
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a closed participant selection and meeting process as well as a limited number of
participants, you rely more on the quality and the broader community's perceived
legitimacy of the participants themselves. This entails an extremely careful up front
consideration of the selection process and institutionalization ofthe meetings as well.
Gayle did not let just anyone into the process. Group size was severely limited
and selection was explicitly controlled (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
This violates a basic and central minimum theoretical requirement ofdeliberative theory.
Deliberative theory insists on inclusion and through formal openness. That is, all
interested and affected actors must be allowed to participate in deliberative forums
(Rosenberg 2007,9). Landt believes that group size must be severely constrained. Gayle
explains: "The maximum for that is probably something like 18 people; [that is] for
people who are already in high regard for one another but want to think together. But if
you are in a conflict so that there is much more work to be done then I think you are in
the 8-12 range" (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
When asked to explain the need for this type oflimitation in group size, Gayle
says:
I think this has to do with several things. First of all I have people sitting in a
circle, so it is the distance across the circle. It's a sense of including everybody,
not just the people next to you. It has to do with even how loud you have to talk.
It also has to do with being able to track and care about what number ofother
people in a group, and so, I know as a facilitator, in my experience, I can really
track 8 or 9 people...People have an exaggerated sense ofhow important that
content is ... conflicts are much more resolvable than they think they are, because
of the human being's capacity to build relationships.
So if you get high quality people to sit in that circle on both sides, they are
going to learn to care about each other and that gives them motivation and makes
coming up with a third way or good resolutions to the conflict, it makes that
possible. So ifyou have a circle that's too big and you have people that are too
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physically apart, or there are too many of them to really get to know one another
in a deep way, then you subtract from the possibility ofbeing successful. ..Two
main reasons, its just the physicalness about it and then the ability to track the
complexity ofhow many minds and hearts, how many identities, how many
people you can care about (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
Also of crucial importance is the "fitness" of a participant. Members were also
chosen by what Gayle described as their constitution (or mental and physical health)
deemed important in stressful and demanding meetings over a year. Can the participant
handle the demanding time constraints and the stress that will accompany intense
deliberative work? Are potential participants in good physical health? Will they "cut and
run?" (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). Landt explains:
It is challenging to get people to come to the table and to commit enough time. for
a successful conflict resolution process you have to give people enough time and I
think there is structure to the process that I think you should go through to set
them up for success but then they need time, and they need time to work on the
content of the issue but they also need time to learn to care about one another and
really get to know each other so that's the relationship and content thing that I
keep talking about.
So it's a big challenge to get people to come to the table and agree to work that
long (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
The NCM process attempted to overcome the lack of formal authority through an
institutionalized Advisory Committee and the Leaders PaneL The purpose for these
panels was to ensure the legitimacy ofthe meetings process, create accountability for the
core participants, and ensure participants took the process seriously. The NCM forum
was endorsed by the major political leadership in the community (Eugene and Springfield
mayors and city councilors, University of Oregon president David Frohnmayer, as well as
other local private and religious leaders).
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To accomplish commitment and legitimacy, Landt believes it is vital to recruit the
most widely respected and high profile community members to constitute the Leaders
Panel and Advisory Committee groups, and the most influential issue leaders in the Core
Participant panel. Twenty-nine additional community leaders served on advisory panels.
Landt recruited community these leaders to endorse the NCM process and asked
participants to sign contracts of commitment.
Landt also incorporated a contract to achieve the full commitment of core
participants:
I did have people sign contracts. Those contracts should say, I know what the
meeting schedule is going to be and I have talked to everybody in my family, in
my extended family, everybody in my work life, and anybody else in groups that I
am in, that has influence on my schedule, and they know in advance that I have
made these commitments, and make them do that (Landt, Gayle. Personal
Interview. 27 June 2007).
This was done to help motivate the core participants to value the full time
commitment in the absence of any legally binding incentive to fully participate. These
panels were created to help act as community monitors for the somewhat high profile
participants. These highly respected, high profile community members were recruited to
facilitate "good behavior" among core participants. These panels were expected to
support the "buy in" process in other ways, even if the oversight was largely symbolic in
nature. Landt explains this in the following passage:
A big thing I did to address that ["buy in"] was to get those two big panels the
community leaders panel with the mayors and the business leaders, high profile
business leaders, and David Frohnmayer, first the dean of the law school and then
the president of the U of 0 - I guess he just did if for NCM 1. But anyway, it was
motivating to people to know that people like the mayors, and then there were
people like the advisory committee and it had other high profile, well-respected
people. It is challenge to get those people - you want to be as neutral as possible
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but also as high profile as possible - to behave as neutrals in those committees ...
These people are going to come to the beginning meeting, meet you, thank you,
bless you, and at the end they are going to come and they are going to se what you
found out, and they are going to care and they are going to - because you cannot
depend on the media - and they are going to help disseminate the resolution that
you designed. That is motivating. That is meeting one challenge ofgetting them
to the tab1e- and that was in my design (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June
2007).
How did Landt ensure the best (legitimate, influential, and deliberative)
participants were chosen? First, Gayle would need a mechanism to gather and then
carefully screen a pool ofpotential participants for these aforementioned traits. This
process began by involving the community. Landt actively solicited feedback from all
major representative stakeholders to build an adequate and "legitimate" pool.
[This] involved me going to lots ofmeetings, public meetings group meetings,
and also a lot of asking people. I picked out who had the energy in the group, who
were the other people listening to ... I also went around the community talking to
anybody, lots of people with a lot of profiles, and the question I began by asking,
I had a database around this, was who do you respect?... I certainly got to know
my community better and that helped identify who would be participants in the
process. I asked everybody that because you are looking for a participants in my
model, who not only will function effectively in the conflict resolution process
within the NCM, but who will also, once they walk out of there will be able to
sell, if you will, the resolutions that they come up with. And so they have to have
a pure constituent base that respects them (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27
June 2007).
This cast a wide net ofpotential applicants and served to tap into multiple sources
of community knowledge. This process was also designed to gather a list that was
community driven and was a step toward building community legitimacy.
However, Landt also needed a way to assess the deliberative capacity, reliability
and influence of this list. Landt screened for influence in by asking questions about
confiding. Landt explains:
203
I would ask who do you talk to, who do you confide in, who do you bounce your
ideas off? We did that later because it was part ofour process or measuring how
much influence we had, and what I observed was, the person who had 6 or 7
people that they confided in, and those 6 or 7 people included influential people in
the community, they were both the most effective participants and they had the
most capacity to influence other people in the community (Landt, Gayle. Personal
Interview. 27 June 2007). 148
This process generated the initial pool. Next, Landt utilized reference checks that
further screened the potential participant list. Landt asked others about the ability of
participant X to stay committed. "What I would say about the reference checks, is a key
question to ask is, does this person cut and run?" (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27
June 2007).
Landt also selected for what de1iberativists might refer to as "openness."
According to Landt, ideal participants are capable ofmutual respect through openness.
When asked to expand upon the traits of the ideal participant, Landt speaks of a
willingness to listen. Gayle also believes that one indicator ofopenness is a potential
participant is able to bond with others easily. "Another criteria for someone who is going
to do effective work is someone who bonds with other people" (Landt, Gayle. Personal
Interview. 27 June 2007). From this defmition participants can be divergent in their
perspective relative to other interests at the table but are not unwilling to see value in
another perspective.
Landt insists that these "bonding" personalities generally facilitate a more
deliberative forum. Landt describes these ideal personalities:
148 This is one key difference that was not controlled for in NCMI vs. II. In NCMI, this screening process
was not utilized. However, the relative deliberative success ofNCMI suggests this step is not necessarily
critical for proper core participant selection by itself
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They've got kind ofa juicy kind of personality, and they are affectionate and they
bond with other people and they care about other people, these are better
candidates. They will try harder to work with the content in a way that is
acceptable, than people who are more theoretical, more cerebral, and less into
bonding with one another. So that is a personality thing that I have observed that
is helpful. A higher percentage of the best leaders actually have that quality. But
not everybody (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
However, Landt realizes this trait is not always an absolute necessity. Landt states that
"leaders come in different configurations" (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June
2007).
Once viable participants were carefully identified participants were recruited. This
was done until a small group, with a roughly equal number of participants - proportional
to the major identifiable positions within the respective community - were assembled.
However, in a controversial and divisive issue like gay rights, identitying a list of ideal
participants did not readily translate to a working list of core participants. Once the ideal
potential candidates had been selected, many were initially resistant to the idea of and
even openly hostile to any deliberative community forums or even any interaction at all
with the "other" stakeholders in these issues, especially in NCMII.
Gayle speaks to these challenges first hand.
My method in going to talk to people is that I would briefly sketch what I
intended to do and then I would hear from them, and I would ask them questions,
and I would ask them about their experience in the conflict and the issue, I would
ask them, I would listen and listen and listen and hopefully they would give me
enough time so that I would listen long enough that so it would be respectful
because you can't dive right in, to ask them how it affected them personally... I
would schedule a minimum for myself of2 l;2 hours, and what I would say to
them is why don't you schedule a couple ofhours I would say, you may only
want to talk to me for 20 minutes I would say to them...And it was very effective
in enlisting people to spend that time listening to them. And I would have at least
two and usually three interviews with people before the process started so that
they trusted me. Because when you respectfully listen to someone and you really
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care what they think, first of all, for the mediator, it's invaluable once you get in
the room because you know what they need and you know what matters to them,
but also they have a trust that you do care (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27
June 2007).
The recruitment process resulted in Landt spending a lot oftime overcoming initial
resistance to participation and required extensive energy investments in listening to
potential participant's personal stake and concerns. These included issue such as
skepticism about the potential of the meetings to generate any real change. Concerns also
included participant alienation from other stakeholders and the extensive time
commitment that would be required. For example, Nadia Te1sey, a core participant in
NCMI, speaks to the hesitation initially experienced by many ifnot most participants: "I
was extremely resistant when Gayle first contacted me. I thought she was crazy" (Te1sey,
Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007).
The entire underlying purpose of the NCM model was to provide the tools and the
space to communicate in productive terms through mediative mechanisms of interaction.
Through this, Landt carefully structured and facilitated a process ofrelative parity
utilizing deliberative rules ofcommunication. While never demanding that participants
change their core values, they were expected to express them without domination or
rejection. Participants were provided educational materials and extensive opportunity to
gradually practice deliberative communication skills. This allowed the discussions and
decisions of the group to remain content neutral (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27
June 2007).
Interview subjects confirmed that this was a perceived and effective function of
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the panel. Interview subjects also stated repeatedly that the demanding time and energy
commitment ensured the participants took the process seriously as well and cared about
outcomes. For example, on participant captures the general attitude reflected among
interview subjects. Participants felt participants took the process seriously, citing the
extreme time commitment.
I mean there was a huge commitment of time, I mean we were meeting every
single week for like 3 hours and there were 3 or 4 long weekends away, doing the
retreat format. So the people who agreed to participate were making a huge
commitment. And so had to be bought into the process... There really was no way
to participate without really committing to the process" (Interview 8).
Both NCM meetings consisted ofweekly meetings and weekend retreats. The
meetings were convened and sponsored by the Conflict Resolution Center. 149 The
meetings consisted ofthe following elements in this order: Enlistment, The First Formal
Meeting, Listening Training and Practice, Powerful, Non-defensive Communication, The
Principles ofResponse, Weekend Retreat, Dialogue Training, Structured Dialogue of the
Issues, Narrowing the Field ofExploration, Weekend Retreat 2: Outlining the Statement
of Agreements, Writing a Mediated Statement ofAgreement, Presentation to the
Community: Final Formal Meeting, and Documenting the Results (from Categories of
People Who Participate in the NCM Model, 1994).150
While explicitly mediative in intent, Landt's 9 step process (New Community
Meeting Handbook 1994, 13), involved what deliberativists would recognize as
deliberative standard setting, practice, and implementation. Both NCM I and II followed
149 Gayle Landt is Director of the Conflict Resolution Center. It is currently located at 2300 Parkside Lane,
Suite 200. Eugene, Oregon 97403-2111.
150 The purpose and structure ofeach deliberative step is outlined in Landt's "Categories of People Who
Participate in the NCM Model" (1994).
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this procedure outlined in the NCM Principles ofDesign Handbook. The purpose and
structure of each step is outlined in Landt's "Categories ofPeople Who Participate in the
NCM Model" (1994). For example, the first formal meeting is referred to Landt as "the
wedding." This meeting is designed to enhance commitment of the core participants. The
participants receive public commitment from the Leaders Panel and the Advisory
Committee. The media and community members are at this meeting as well (Steps in the
NCM Conflict Resolution Model 1994 2-4).
Gayle spent a significant amount of time in NCM I and II establishing and
practicing mediative communication and building rapport. As Gayle puts it, "the NCM
process has a lot of structure in the beginning. And then much less structure toward the
end. That is another reason why the process has to be long enough. In my opinion, habits
are everything" (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007), In both NCM forums,
the first half of the meetings did not even attempt to address issue discussion. In the first
halfofthe NCM meeting process, the emphasis consisted of information distribution,
multiple sessions that engaged in extensive application of these principles, and rapport
b 'ld' ,151U1 mg exerCIses.
These sessions were designed to give core participants the vocabulary, new
insights, and skills in listening from standard "active listening" techniques to more "deep
listening" ideas (Steps in the NCM Conflict Resolution Model 1994). Next, a few
sessions were also devoted to introduce new "powerful, non-defensive" communication
lSI For example, other steps in the NCM process involve building a deliberative language to enhance
communication skills as evidences by the following steps: listening training and practice, powerful non-
defensive communication, the principles of response, and dialogue training (Steps in the NCM Conflict
Resolution Model 1994, 2-3).
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skills. Working on material related to tone ofvoice was considered particularly important
because of the recognition that tone change is the beginning ofconscious physical
changes in their relationships. A section on the design ofquestions was the other essential
part, where core participants have an opportunity to learn how to ask "pure" questions
without any element ofwhat Gayle called the "rhetorical question," which is standard
behavior between alienated leaders at public forums (Steps in the NCM Conflict
Resolution Model 1994; Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).152 Working
together in exercises to learn and use these new skills, Landt describes how NCMI
participant actively begin to co-operate, and to leave "ruts" of alienation with one another
(Steps in the NCM Model, 2)).
Next, Landt worked carefully to implement what was referred to by Landt as
"learning a new language" (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). Steps 4 and
6 also involved deliberative standards setting, namely Conflict Resolution Skills Building
and Exploration of the Process ofDialogue, respectively. In Step 4, participants are given
tools to more actively recognize and more appropriately respond to signs of interaction
induced stress. The NCM Principles ofDesign Handbook states ''when people are
stressed and unaware, they go to fight, flight, or freeze reflexes. When people train
themselves to be more aware, they are able to develop a range ofresponses to stress"
(NCM Principles ofDesign, 13). Next, in Step 6 Exploring the Process ofDialogue,
participants are asked to read David Bohm's book "On Dialogue." NCM participants are
then expected to discuss and repeatedly practice these techniques in various interpersonal
152 Gayle refers to "Don't be so Defensive!" Taking the War Out of Our Words with Powerful, non-
defensive Communication" by Sharon Ellison, 1998.
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exercises. According to Landt, only after this process has been clearly implemented do
interview subject begin to talk about their own values and then substantively discuss the
gay rights of sustainability issue (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
As a facilitator, Landt also followed up carefully in the NCM process to ensure
these standards were followed. Ifsomeone was interrupted or began to move toward non-
cooperative language, Gayle immediately worked toward identifying and acting to shift
this behavior. Landt utilized a number of active, procedural tactics during meetings to
facilitate conditions of relative parity. Landt explicitly identified deliberative behavior so
that positive behavior could be recognized and strengthened. Landt would also interrupt
discussion when necessary to allow others to speak or to shift the discussion from
tangential to relevant discussion (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). For
example, Landt describes some ofher efforts to facilitate parity in the NCM meetings:
What I watch for: they let me be almost a conductor to an orchestra almost. They
gave me, they respected me enough.. .I almost just use hand signals for people. I
try to sit by the person who has the most trouble running off at the mouth and I
have actually just put my hand on their shoulder and they know that means time
to be quiet and somebody next talks ... I think they learn it intuitively and I
explain it if! have to. If they are exploring, ''well I have been here but 1m
uncomfortable," and "I am starting to think about this but I am not sure, and ''this
is starting to occur to me and I wonder," of they are saying anything new - in the
beginning they have to do a certain amount of their tape so everybody hears it,
you have to let them say everything once or twice - by the time they are going
into their audio tape the third time you start to stop them, and that is the criteria I
use. So people who are saying something new or are bringing out something in a
different way or whatever, they are the ones that get to talk. (Landt, Gayle.
Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
The following quote articulates some other strategies Landt utilized to help
facilitate conditions ofrelative parity:
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[The mediators] are in charge of the process itself Who gets to talk when and
how long, setting the tone, all that. And that counts for a lot. The fact that you
have everyone sitting in an identical chair, in a small circle and they get the option
to talk equal amount of time, that is huge. And then you do other things to set the
stage and you stop people from disrespectful behavior and hopefully you use tact
and humor and diplomacy when you do that but you have a lot of control about
how people treat each other. And those are ways that you equalize things. So you
give that person, someone who may have come into the process looking like they
have less power, you give them enough space (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview.
27 June 2007).
An excerpt from a NCMI participant helps summarize and confIrm the deliberative
structure and implementation of the NCM model:
In the fIrst weeks we met, we read about this kind of thing [deliberative
communication]. About participation, about seeking other people's views,
thoughts and things rather than dominate, a group dynamic orientation. This
helped....when faced with the fact that we might have to make compromise, not
on convictions, Gayle was very strong on not compromising our position, but
compromise on way in which carry out convictions - rejection, judging,
evaluating, rejecting people on that basis [emphasis added] (Interview 4).
The purpose of the NCM model is to provide the tools and the space to
communicate in mediative tenns. This was accomplished utilizing deliberative principles
of communication. While not explicitly deliberative in intent, Landt carefully structured
model and actively facilitated a process of idea deliberative parity.
B. Actual Participation
Attendance was a central focus of the NCM design. Landt felt that extensive
participation was essential to substantiate successful claims in process and outcomes
utilizing a true a consensus ideal model (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June
2007). At both NCM meetings there was almost 90% attendance by all members in the
regular meetings. For example, the NCMII project comprised 40 meetings, plus three
weekend retreats, over the period of one year. This represented a commitment of
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approximately 200 hours. The average attendance at the weekly meetings was 87%, and
100% at the 2nd and 3rd retreat (gathered from NCM documents and in formal and
informal discussion with Landt).
While attendance was consistently high, it was not ideal. In NCMII, 2 participants
decided very early to withdraw from the process. Of the remaining 15 core participants,
only Liz Cawood missed the key consensus building meetings in which the Statement of
Agreement was drafted. These attendance numbers are similar for NCMI as well. One
member had to withdraw for personal reasons unrelated to the NCM process.
Additionally, a few members of OCA, a conservative Christian organization that had
placed an anti-gay measure on the ballot just before NCMI was initiated, left the NCMI
process very early (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007; Telsey, Nadia.
Personal Interview. 9 July 2007). The OCA members dropped out toward the beginning
of the meeting process, though one (Schanz) continued. "A few of the people from the
Oregon Citizens Alliance did not continue. There was one member who stayed." (Telsey,
Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007). In the end, only Cawood in NCMII and Larry
Schanz in NCMI chose not to sign the final Statement ofAgreements.
Participatory Demographics- NCM I and II violate ideal deliberative
participation requirements, meaning these community representatives were different in
some important ways from the rest of their constituent groups. The representatives ofthe
various interests in both NCM I and II were overwhelmingly more affluent than the
general community population and the various interests they represented. This was the
case in both NCM forums. In each case the core participants were almost entirely white
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and educated. While participants did not report income or wealth, interview subjects
readily acknowledged the NCM groups were generally affluent relative to the overall
community. Almost all the participants were college educated and several hold advanced
graduate degrees. 153 Additionally, at the time of the meetings, all core participants
excepting one (at the time of the meetings) was a high profile community member or
leader. 154 In NCMI, there were 8 men and 5 women. In NCMII there were 8 men and 7
women (gathered from the NCM I and II Statement of Agreements). One interview
respondent speaks to the lack ofdemographic diversity in NCMII:
Was it a very white group? Yes it was. If you are saying did that make us more
compatible? No. IfGayle was to do this event today, there would probably be
more effort to seek the spectrum across your economic views, but it might also be
looking at the political, your race, your background, yeah. And the reality is did
we have a homeless person on there? No. I don't believe we had a black person.
Latino? I know there were several asked but I don't know that any served
(Interview 8).
Nadia Telsey affirms a lack of racial and class diversity in NCMI as well when she says
that "I think racially it was not diverse; class wise it probably was not diverse so there
were intersecting issues that were not represented" (Telsey, Nadia. Personal Interview. 9
July 2007).
While most NCM participants were affluent at the time ofNCM, numerous core
participants had experience growing up poor. For example, one NCM participant states
that "several ofus came from families that were poor" (Interview 7). At least one of these
153 For example at least 8/12 of the core participant in NCMI held college degrees. This was taken from the
Statement ofAgreements (1994) pages 9-11.
154 By high profile community member/leader I mean that at the time of the meetings they were actively
involved in the community as either: CEO, founding member, or current member or head of a recognizable
community board. NCM examples include: TIle Chamber of Commerce, The Rotary Club, Friends of
Eugene, Lane County Bar Association, and so forth.
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representatives, Susan Ban, had extensive experience working with the absent,
traditionally marginalized populations. ISS For example,
I have played that role on a couple ofother committees. It is more like the
watchdog piece. It is like don't suggest any strategy that would have unintended
consequences by making it more challenging for disabled or disenfranchised
populations to access jobs, to get around, to increase wages, I mean that that had
to always be a part of the equation (Ban, Susan. Personal Interview. 12 December
2007).
Ban perceived her role was to bring a conscious and explicit concern to voice to the
interests of traditionally marginalized groups, such as the poor or disabled. Ban reported
her major concern was that meeting decisions and process maintained a "no harm"
principle regarding these groups (Ban, Susan. Personal Interview. 12 December 2007).
This skewed demographic representation was in some ways deliberate. Participant
selection was constructed to ensure that community stakeholders had representatives that
would articulate a given position. These participants also needed and be perceived as
legitimate representatives of their constituent base (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27
June 2007).
C. Perceived Adequacy: Relative Parity within NCM
Did stakeholders feel that Landt took sufficient steps to recruit relevant
stakeholders and to establish relative parity among NCM participants? Were the core
participants satisfied with her efforts and the NCM process in general despite its ideal
deliberative failings? While NCM fails to meet even the most basic ideal deliberative
parity standards, NCMI and II stakeholders also report consistently high levels of
155 Susan Ban was Director of Shelter Care, which provides housing, services, and advocacy for low-
income families and individuals with special needs. Ban was also an active member of several charitable
organizations at the time, such as the Lane County Domestic Violence Council and the United Way Agency
Director's Organization.
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perceived adequacy. There were no major concerns reported in examined meeting
minutes or in interviews. In fact, all interview subjects (in both NCMI and II) report that
the NCM process institutionalized conditions ofrelative parity to their satisfaction. The
NCM meetings also drastically changed the way other stakeholders were viewed and
provided more effective tools for conflict resolution. For some participants it profoundly
impacted their lives. These claims are supported in the following discussion.
Landt explains, and participants agreed, that the stakeholders benefitted from a
safe space to be open and honest even if this space was not necessarily public. These
closed forums offered an institutional space that built and stressed equal power, safety,
and respect. In return, this allowed candid conversation about issues that could not be
easily brought to public discussion (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
Interview subjects involved in the NCM process also attributed limited participant
selection, a closed process, and strong but limited stakeholder discourse representation
(as well as mediator facilitation) to NCM meeting success. Multiple interview subjects
confirmed the need to have a limited group size in order to really allow participants to
respect, connect to, and even care about each other. As previously mentioned, Landt feels
that 8-12 range is in the ideal range (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
Nadia Telsey confirms this. "It [the NCMI group] was big enough to have some diversity
within each side, but not so big that we couldn't develop some relationships" (Telsey,
Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007). John Koekkoek, another NCMI participant
confirms the need for a limited number ofparticipants. "Any more [than 12] is too much
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for self-expression. 12 was a lot. But no one was silent. Everyone participated and had
something to offer" (Koekkoek, John. Personal Interview. 11 October 2007).
John Koekkoek also speaks to the importance ofnot only limited but appropriate
participant selection. "I don't know where she got [the] list, but she had sharp people on
both sides. Not the same, a lot ofdVferentness, but a lot ofopenness [emphasis added]"
(Koekkoek, John. Personal Interview. 11 October 2007). One NCMI interview subject
chosen as a representative of the "conservative Christian" movement offered an
unsolicited comment about the impact and effectiveness ofNCMI. When asked if about
any concerns over relative parity in the group, one respondent explains how Gayle
facilitated an excellent process and the core participants implemented it:
In the first weeks we met, we read about this kind ofthing. About participation,
about seeking other people's views, thoughts and things rather than dominate, a
group dynamic orientation. Our ability to deal with it as or make this an issue or I
can care about you as a human being. This helped (Interview 4).
Core participants perceived the NCM process as more than achieving relative
parity within these forums. For many, what took place in the NMC process drastically
and positively affected them beyond merely facilitating deliberation within the NCM.
Nadia Telsey felt relative parity was achieved not only as a product ofthe NCM
process and the Landt herself, but at some point this radiated from the core participants
themselves.
I think Gayle was really on top of all that all ofthe time. By the end we were all
watching out for each other. By the end ofthe second retreat, we were drafting the
statement, one side would say to the other side are you sure this, it seems like
what you really believe is not really in here enough. We were taking care ofeach
other. It was very interesting (Telsey, Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007).
..----------- -
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Telsey also speaks to the immense impact she felt from the NCM process. "I think
it was very successful personally. So I guess I could speak to that fIrst. It forever changed
the way that I view things (process and other)" (Telsey, Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July
2007). Later in the interview, Telsey offers an unsolicited assessment ofthe effectiveness
and impact ofNCMI in their life: "Well to this day I teach a class at UO. When
discussion groups meet it can get pretty intense. And to this day I use the paper dialogue
versus debate to try to help people get to a different place. So it has had that huge impact"
(Telsey, Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007).
Finally, Landt herself speaks to the following transformative impact ofNCMI not
only on her life, but the lives 0 f the core participants as well.
What I love about this, with NCM I which you just mentioned, one year, we got
together a year later, because they wanted to, we got together a year later, and all
were more enthusiastic about, and more accepting of their written statement of
agreement than they were when they had just done the work in deciding what it
was. After a year they looked at it and they were even more bought in. To me that
was one of the more life affIrming moments ofmy life (Landt, Gayle. Personal
Interview. 27 June 2007).
However adequate, participants did not always perceive parity was necessarily
ideal. For example, Susan Ban mentions how it is impossible to achieve parity, no matter
the institutional efforts: "I think Gayle's process was designed to undermine that [issues
of power imbalance] or kind of erode it, but I don't ever think you get past the fact that
the guy sitting next to you used to be a state senator and is one ofthe wealthier lawyers in
town" (Ban, Susan. Personal Interview. 12 October, 2007). Also, in NCMII, Tom
Bowerman and Liz Cawood felt there may have been a slight bent to the "left" in
stakeholder representation. However, they also attribute NCMII's left leaning tendencies
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as due to the relative ease of recruiting from biased sample. 156 That is, perhaps fewer
conservatives were easily identifiable in Lane County or willing to sit down in this
forum.
In the end the even most critical core participants also felt satisfied with the
efforts and results ofthe NCM process along issues ofrelative parity. For example,
despite Ban's belief that parity can never be achieved and the concerns within NCMII,
she was ultimately satisfied with the efforts to achieve and practice standards of
discourse. "She [Landt] moved us into a place where most of us were talking about the
topics, not out ofposition and nor out of economic status but out ofkinda, I am another
vulnerable human being on this earth you know" (Interview 8). Or, Bowerman and
Cawood both reported dissatisfaction with outcomes and even certain standards or
procedures in NCMII. However, when explicitly asked, both respondents issued
statements of satisfaction with the standards and practice ofrelative parity in NCMII
(Bowerman, Tom. Personal Interview. 5 October 2007; Cawood, Liz. Personal Interview.
12 October, 2007).
Conclusion- In sum, NCM design and the meeting process itselfdo fully ascribe
to ideal deliberative minimum standards ofrelative parity. Landt alone designed, selected
and recruited participants, and conducted NCM meetings. The public was not given
access nor a real stake or substantive influence in the deliberative process. The NCM
model was not open to and did not actively solicit and acquire unstructured feedback
156 This is a reference to the so-called "liberal" reputation that Eugene enjoys, whether accurate or not, and
implies that finding other highly visible and willing representatives from other ideological perspectives
might be somewhat challenging.
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(excepting in soliciting a potential list ofNCM recruits) from the most marginalized
populations. Landt did not grant the public a deliberative stake in or access to any ofthe
substantive NCM meetings. NCM meetings were dominated by white, affluent
stakeholders.
At times, NCM I and II core meeting participants expressed dissatisfaction with
the NCM process. Participants raised concerns over attempts to grant access and public
stake to all relevant perspectives and to actively recruit appropriate participant
stakeholders. In interviews, NCM participants conceded the process did not meet ideal
deliberative representation standards.
However, despite these ideal deliberative shortcomings, NCM attendance was
quite high in both I and II and NCM. Additionally - along concerns ofrelative parity-
core participants generally considered the institutional process (if not always the
standards) exemplary. This is illustrated in Table 14.
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Table 14: Relative Parity within the NCMI and II
Minimum Access Actively Solicit Public Stake
Ideal
Deliberative
Conditions
IV: Institutional No: stakeholders were No: stakeholder input was No: stakeholders were not
Structure not given access to not sought during given formal influence in
NCM structuring substantive meetings NCMIIII
IV: Institutional No: meetings were No: input on potential No: no formal vote or
Behavior closed to the public. participants was actively influence was granted to
Core participants were solicited. Viable the public stakeholders
selected by Landt and participants were then
given full access aggressively solicited. All
other aspects were closed
DV: Perceived No: participants stated No: core participants No: participants expressed
Adequacy, that not all relevant reported NCM did not concern that participant
Structure stakeholders were aggressively engage the selection was inadequately
recruited community in structuring representative
DV: Perceived Yes: participants feel Yes: participants feel Landt Yes: core participants
Adequacy, Landt effectively brought in all core report general discursive
Behavior granted access to all participant input though representative satisfaction
core participant process and through and high satisfaction with
concerns in meetings balanced assertive core participants overall.
participant behavior.
2. Power outside the NCM
Findings- NCM inception, framing, and composition does not conform to ideal
deliberative parity standards. Landt exercised complete control over all aspects ofNCMI
and II. The design, implementation, composition, and NCM facilitation itselfwas closed
to and lacking in formal public or stakeholder input or oversight excepting informal
solicitation of an aggregate potential participant pool and in the final NCM meeting
where the fmal Statement ofAgreements was presented to the press and the public. At
times, multiple outside community stakeholders report perceived dissatisfaction with the
closed nature ofNCM meetings, the composition process and actual representation of
..----------------
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NCMI and II, and with the fixed nature ofthe meeting process. While many other
stakeholder statements express satisfaction along these criteria, the lack of formal public
and stakeholder access and input resulted in a lack ofoverall perceived adequacy along
outside deliberative parity criteria.
A. NCM Inception, Framing and Composition
Inception and Framing- Unlike OHCR or OWEB, the NCM was entirely
conceived and facilitated through a process that was exclusively under Gayle Landt's
control. Not only did Gayle design the NCM and recruit its participants, she was also the
primary facilitator and mediator for both NCM projects as well. This all occurred outside
the NCM meetings. There was no deliberative or political process involving multiple
stakeholders. No closed door negotiations occurred among stakeholders in conceiving
and framing the NCM process or in constituting its participants.
While the NCM process itse1fwas entirely closed to the public, in describing the
NCM model, Landt mentions instances of outside public stakeholder input. Landt drew
from community input in constituting the original list. Landt also allowed and solicited
public participation at the last meeting in each NCM when the Statement ofAgreements
was signed. Landt recalls planning well in advance to ensure extensive participation
(Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
Much like Kitzhaber in OHCR or OWEB, the outside role ofLandt in all aspects
ofboth NCM meetings is not easily overstated and is deeply tied to the success and
failure of the NCM. Landt conceived, implemented, and facilitated the NCM. Because of
this, to the extent that the NCM is viewed as successful Landt deserves and largely
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receives credit for its success as well as its failure. This is readily supported in interviews
with participants and in secondary sources as well.
When asked ''to what do you attribute the deliberative success of the NCM, to the
extent that it existed?" statements like this were common: "I think it was a great effort of
Gayle's part, and making sure that they identified the potential groups and the
stakeholders and making sure that they had reps from each and everyone" (Interview
10). Or, "from my perspective it was pretty deliberately, intentionally, assembled"
(Interview 8).
Telsey captures the view, especially consistent among NCM patiicipants, that
Landt and her process are to be credited, to a large degree, with the respect, caring, and
common ground that emerged from the process. For example, "if it had been anybody but
Gayle it would never have happened. She was a very unique person" (Telsey, Nadia.
Personal Interview. 9 July 2007). John Koekkoek supports this. "We had our own
nickname for her. Tinker Bell or Gorilla, she could be gentle or tough" (Koekkoek, John.
Personal Interview. 11 October 2007). Or, "I think a lot of this [deliberative success] was
how Gayle structured this. Everything from avoiding words that would trigger words so
that we could get to what was underneath; to the retreats they took us on, where we could
get real with each other" (Telsey, Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007).
In conceiving and designing the NCM model, Landt felt the NCM model needed
to draw upon a few basic principles learned from previous meditative experience. Landt
felt an intense, mediative model was clearly appropriate due to the polarized, personal
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nature of the discourse over these issues. 157 In designing the NCM, Landt settled on
several principles upon which to base the NCM, or framing principles.
We all live in this community together. The means are the ends in the
making... and the understanding that personal responses that will lead to a safer,
healthier community for all its members necessarily include the commitment to
the following 3 implications ofthe above principles: I will resolve conflict. I will
not use violence. I will not preoccupy myself with an enemy. I will maintain an
attitude ofgoodwill. I will work together with others to build a safe and healthy
community. I will take initiative and respond to conflict within these principles
and implications even when others are confused or lost in fight or flight reflexes
(Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
Landt's belief in the features ofNCM is unwavering, despite its violation of
deliberative norms of openness. As previously mentioned, Landt believes that for genuine
deliberation to occur the meetings must be "confidential or secret" (Landt, Gayle.
Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). Landt believes that ''the process ofdiscovering... the
process of discovering a whole new way to look at something, that messy, exploratory
thing - people can be crucified in the press over it. .." (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview.
27 June 2007).
Landt conducted lengthy and thoughtful interviews with leaders of all sides of the
gay rights issue which confirmed negative and polarized attitudes. Even in these
recruitment interviews Landt reports that interview statements became more balanced.
This preliminary work confirmed Landt's view that a private, safe space that practiced
157 As mentioned, Landt focused on building a model with a private safe space where people could be
honest and direct. Careful control ofparticipant selection was perhaps the most important feature of all.
Participants were carefully screened and many eager participants were not included. Finally, the meetings
themselves were structured in a manner that sought first and foremost to establish relative parity and
respect, like a traditional meditative forum. Extensive skill building sessions were structured to establish
respect and parity in practice before any substantive issue discussion was allowed. These steps were did not
report, include, or grant influence to relevant stakeholders. However, Landt felt she was designing an
institutional space under the requisite conditions that would facilitate a real space for genuine deliberation.
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balanced and respectful standards of discourse could potentially offer a viable forum to
discuss these highly charged issues. The principles that Landt developed were to be
presented, discussed, and agreed upon by all participants in order to be a part ofthe NCM
process. Landt states the purpose for establishing this principle base in her document
entitled "Essential Elements of the NCM Conflict Resolution Model." On page 5, Step 2
of the Essential Elements of the NCM model is entitled "Principle Base." This includes:
• Assist core participants in sorting their own values and ethics
• Provide core participants with an important reference point during the
challenging and chaotic experiences ofcreating new solutions
• Provide core participants with a shared cultural base to build on
[emphasis added]
Landt believes that the NCM model was to be realized through an extensive skill
building component that follows the agreement to these principles but precedes any
substantive issue discussion. Ifproperly understood and followed, Landt believes these
principles serve as a map to resolving confusing, emotionally charged issues. These
strategies are not just limited to the NCM project but can apply extensively to other inter
and intra personal conflicts as well (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). The
recognition ofthese necessary limitations in openness proved controversial according to
ideal deliberative standards. Landt's exclusive control over the framing and conception
of the NCM model, while expedient and even arguably appropriate, does not met ideal
deliberative standards.
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Composition- The process ofNCM composition violates theoretical deliberative
standards. Ideal deliberative theory does not acknowledge a role for limited group size
and highly selective participation that is closed to the public. 158 The composition of the
NCM core participants was generally not a public or participatory process. The initial
meetings among community stakeholders and the process used to create and populate the
NCM model was closed. Neither the public nor major stakeholders were given access or
voting rights.
Landt believes that in community forums that rest on an assumption of limited
group size, in divisive issues - like gay rights or sustainable development - getting the
right participants is extremely important. While not necessarily ideal, this means not
everyone can or should be allowed to participate or irifluence the participant section
process, according to Landt. "Selection or getting the parties to the table is 2/3 of the
necessary work for a successful mediation" (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June
2007). In the following passage, Landt speaks to the problem ofparticipant "fit" and the
need to filter and screen participants.
Wanting to be a part of it like that [asking to participate] is problematic. It might
be good and it might be bad, and in some cases it has been bad. I had someone in
the second one [NCMII] who should not have been taking up - I mean am
thinking ofone person in particular but even more - you can have that person
taking up space, because the way my process works every chair is really
important, you have to equalize power in order for everybody to function in a way
that is creative and everything. So you can have somebody taking up space and
making the circle too big and they're not the right person and just because they
want to be in on the action or they think it will be fun or something. That is not a
good reason to have them there. I mean I think they should participate and create,
I mean these people are really good people, but they are not necessarily going to
158 Ideal deliberative theory insists that deliberative success is most readily indicated by the actual number
and type ofparticipants (Cohen, 1989; Fung and Wright, 2003).
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be the most useful for resolving polarity or resolving conflicts in the community
in this process. The people I had to convince were some ofthe best people
[emphasis added] (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
While perhaps necessary to build a functioning deliberative forum, the NCM was not
composed in ideal deliberative terms. The inception, framing and composition were
driven by Gayle Landt. These standards and this process do not conform to theoretical
deliberative standards. The perceived adequacy of the NCM process by those outside the
NCM is examined in the following section on perceived adequacy.
B. Perceived Adequacy
Does it matter that the NCM was not composed in ideal deliberative terms? That
is, do NCM participants view the process in adequate, deliberative terms despite the fact
that NCM inception, framing and composition do not meet deliberative standards? This
section will assess the perceived adequacy of the NCM inception, framing, and
composition.
At times Landt drew criticism from the larger public and the media in particular.
These criticisms concerned privately soliciting and constituting the meeting participants,
closing the meetings to the press and public, and generally running the conceiving and
conducting the meetings in a non-transparent manner.
Landt recalls the irritation expressed by the media and particular community
residents, who were upset by their exclusion from the meetings. This is one reason Landt
believes her NCM remained less reported and less favorably portrayed than it might have
been if the media had perceived greater inclusion (Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27
June 2007; Discussion with Landt in 2006 and 2007).
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I had reporters were mad at me, especially after the first one, they were so dam
mad... they couldn't believe there was all this agreement and nobody told them it
was happening. They were offended. It was pretty interesting (Landt, Gayle.
Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
Landt also recalls instances of community residents who expressed frustration
over their perceived exclusion in the NCM process.
I was so quiet on the first one [NCMI] that nobody knew it was happening which
made some people very mad and I had some people come up to me and say I
should have been part ofthat process, you know I can't believe you left me out I
should have been part of that process, and then the second one [NCMII] I had
people showing up saying I want to be a part of it (Landt, Gayle. Personal
Interview. 27 June 2007).
Nadia Te1sey and one other NCMI participant recall the resistance and
dissatisfaction the OCA or the Oregon Citizens Alliance, (a group formed in Oregon in
1986 to oppose gay rights) expressed with the New Community Meeting I Process. 159
While originally involved in the NCMI meeting process, Te1sey recalls that "a few of the
people from the Oregon Citizens Alliance did not continue with that [NCMI] ...
[Additionally] one person from OCA was that he really couldn't get on board and ended
up [privately] accusing the conservative/olks a/being duped [emphasis added" (Te1sey,
Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007). According to interview subjects in NCMI, the
OCA dropped out when "they realized they could not control the process" (Te1sey
7/09/07). Although I did not speak directly with members ofthe OCA, I was told by other
interview subject that they viewed the NCM in non-legitimate terms, and claimed the
159 OCA is a conservative Christian political activist organization, founded by Lon Mabon in Oregon. It
was founded in 1986 as a vehicle to challenge then-Senator Bob Packwood who was a prominent fixture of
Oregon politics in the late 1980s and into the 1990s. It has sponsored a number of anti-gay rights ballot
initiatives: Measure 8 which passed an initiative measure that repealed Governor Neil Goldschmidt's
Executive Order banning sexual orientation discrimination in the executive branch of state government as
well as and Measure 9, Measure 13, Measure 19.
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process was fixed and unfair (Telsey, Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007; Koekkoek,
John. Personal Interview. 11 October 2007).
A core participant in NMCI and another in NCMII dropped out near the end of
the meeting process. In public newspaper reports and in a personal interview with one of
the core participants conducted in 2007, these participants cited what they characterized
as "irreconcilable differences" with the NCM. They were the lone dissenters in each
NCM group. Both expressed some shared frustration with the inefficiency of the process.
Cawood and Schanz were troubled by the ambiguous nature of the terminology contained
in the Statement of Agreements for leaving the process and refusing to sign the
agreement, among other reasons. Cawood and Bowerman, as well as other NCM
participants also recall feeling pressured and rushed to reach an agreement. Both of these
individuals represented what other interview subjects characterized as "more
conservative" elements of the community (Interviews with NCM participants in 2007).
Dissenters in NCM also expressed some dissatisfaction with the NCM selection
process. This may have contributed to their general attitude ofdissatisfaction with the
NCM. The concern over selection is supported by several other NCM participant
comments. In a few instances NCM participants raised uncertainty over the balance of
representation. For example, one NCMI respondent states that
You know there was one member of the OCA, and I think that was all. And I'm
not sure why that was, I mean I'm not sure there's any reason why that was or just
luck of the draw. Whether Gail wanted it that way or she had trouble recruiting
others or what. It would've been useful to have 2 or 3 [from OCA] (Interview 6).
In NMCII, another respondent expresses uncertainty over adequate representation
in the following excerpt. "I think that it might also be true that a careful dissection ofthe
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participants yielded a discemable slant to the left or to the progressive left. And I think
that was either conscious or subconscious on Gayle's part. I think that she had somewhat
loaded it" (Interview 9). Despite reported perceived adequacy overall, these statements
were expressed as concerns perceived along respect and relative parity criteria. However,
these statements suggest support for the views that the OCA, non-participants, the media,
and others at felt ambivalent or even unhappy about Landt's standards and process
whether due to their insularity or not. At times, this lack ofsatisfaction with NCM is
clearly linked to the exclusion of the public or relevant stakeholders.
Conclusion- NCM structure and practice does not conform to ideal deliberative
measures of openness. Landt exercised control over every aspect of the process. Landt,
however, believes that this is precisely what helped made the process work (Landt,
Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). As support, perceived adequacy was expressed
in terms ofperceived parity by NCM participants. Additionally, Landt and other
interview subjects believe there are numerous examples of a larger deliberative impact in
the larger community in both NCM I and II. 160
The closed process of the NCM problematizes an evidentiary assessment of
public complaints (outside NCMI and II) as they relate to specific non-deliberative parity
standards or behavior. For example, the controlled process ofparticipant selection and the
private meeting space mayor may not have been practical or even necessary to ensure the
considerable deliberative success of the NCM (if success ifdefmed by core participant
160 These examples will be examined more closely in the following discussion ofmutual respect.
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satisfaction). However, the absence of any extensive recorded public testimony regarding
concerns that might otherwise be raised by the larger community about closed
conceptualization, framing, constitution, and the meeting process make claims ofrelative
parity difficult to accurately assess. However, NCMI and II participants and outside
community stakeholders did report concerns about the adequacy ofNCM I and II along
framing, conceptualization, and participant constitution. These findings are summarized
in Table 15 below.
Table 15: Relative Parity outside the NCMI and II
Minimum Ideal Access Actively Solicit Public Stake
Deliberative
Conditions
IV: Institutional No: conceiving, framing, No: stakeholders were not No: stakeholders had
Structure and and constituting the solicited in framing or no formal authority
Behavior NCMIIII was closed to conceiving NCM; limited but outside of the NCM
relevant stakeholders active solicitation ofpublic in forums
constructing NCM pool
DV: Perceived No: stakeholders (in and No: at times stakeholders No: stakeholders (in
Adequacy out) reported dissatisfaction reported dissatisfaction with and out) criticized
with access: NCM framing, not being actively recruited numerous parts of
conceiving, and NCM NCM structure and
constitution lack of input
These findings suggest that ideal standards ofopenness may be unnecessary to
procure overall deliberative satisfaction among those within but important to stakeholders
(to a lesser extent or less conclusively) outside ofdeliberative forums. These challenges
to ideal deliberative theory will be discussed more closely in the following section on
respect and in the conclusion ofthis chapter.
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III. An Accounting of Respect
1. Respect and Perceived Adequacy within the HSC
Findings: Interview subjects reported high levels of respect within both NCMI
and II. Statements concerning perceived disrespect were not reported by interviewed
NCMI participants. In NCMII, statements of perceived respect were infrequent and
consisted of statements that focused on issues outside of the meeting process itself. These
concerns did not include mutual respect within NCMI or II. The following section will
present and evaluate these claims.
A. HSC Meeting Structure and Process: Perceived Adequacy?
NCMI- In NCMI, lengthy interviews with leaders on all sides of the "gay rights"
issue have confirmed that negative attitudes toward the "other" perspective stakeholder
group decreased significantly over time. That is before, during, and after NCMI (TI-T3).
An increase in respectful listening continued throughout the meetings and after the NCM
process in the larger community. Evidence of respect includes the Statement of
Agreements. The statement was accomplished by consensus and excerpts of the
agreement were published in the paper. In interviews with NCM participants, every
member expressed satisfaction with the overall respect the process generated.
When the NCM meetings first began, interview subjects recall feeling
disrespected, negative and quite tense. Telsey recalls "I remember when I walked in the
first day and I didn't know who these people were and I didn't know where to sit because
I wanted to know who they were" (Telsey, Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007).
Initially perceived respect was low at best (for most) and virtually non-existent for some
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(notably many in NCMI). However, as the meetings progressed levels ofrespect
consistently increased over time. All meeting participants observed and reported this in
both NCMI and II. At times, meetings engaged in transformative moments of respectful
interaction. For example, in one instance, John W. Koekkoek recounts one particular
powerful, transformative interaction:
There was one situation...Nadia looked over at me and said; I know that people
like you would probably as soon see me fry in hell as to even function in this
society. And I think when she said it she realized how strong that was. And it took
me totally offguard. And I just sat there for a minute. And then I got up and
started to walk across the room to her, and she got up and walked across the room
to me and we just put out arms around each other and just held each other for a
while. And I don't - you tell me what caused that. I recognized how much she had
been hurt by somebody representing my position, and she recognized that I maybe
wasn't like all the rest. That she had projected in her mind, right wing
conservative Christians (Koekkoek, John. Personal Interview. 11 October 2007).
Levels of respect continued to increase among NCMI participants during NCMI
and after the meetings had concluded. More than 15 years later, John Koekkoek still
supports this statement in a 2007 interview. In our discussion John cites language similar
to the 1994 Statement of Agreements in his explanation of support. "What we faced was
how continue to live in this community together? Are we going to continue to kick and
throw at each other or can we fmd a way? And I think all the members of the group were
concerned enough about the community that they realistically wanted to put that before,
right along side there own values and convictions" (Koekkoek, John. Personal Interview.
11 October 2007).
High levels ofrespectful treatment began to increasingly emerge and strengthen
as the meetings progressed. Once the participants were able to move past feeling as
though they had to defend their own values and perspective participants began to listen.
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Participants began to get to know each other and even form relationships that continue
today. Most came to like and respect the other core participants from divergent
perspectives, despite their disagreement. 161
This represents a profound shift that occurred in these meetings. John Koekkoek.
speaks directly to the drastic shift in respect that took place in these meetings.
For instance, as I said in first session, we sat 6 facing 6. By the end we were
totally integrated. I might be sitting by anyone ofthe participants and feeling just
as comfortable as if! was sitting by one of those that was supposedly Christian.
And that was not false. It was genuine. We really came to respect and appreciate
each other and I think a lot of misconceptions were clarified (Koekkoek, John.
Personal Interview. 11 October 2007).
Nadia Telsey confirms this drastic shift in respect over time as well.
I remember when I walked in the first day and I didn't know who these people
were and I didn't know where to sit because I wanted to know who they were...
By the end we were all watching out for each other. By the end of the second
retreat, we were drafting the statement, one side would say to the other side are
you sure this, it seems like what you really believe is not really in here enough.
We were taking care of each other. It was very interesting (Telsey, Nadia.
Personal Interview. 9 July 2007).
Without exception, interview transcripts support adequate levels of perceived
respect. For many though, the NCM process did more. John Koekkoek states
One thing [NCMI impact had] was it convinced me that political maneuvering is
not answer. And that trying to pass laws or bills or things like that are only going
to exacerbate or make things worse... I think when we get to the place where we
can accept each other as people. And recognize that at the far end of the religious
perspective there are religious crazies. And at the far end ofthe gay lesbian there
are crazies and if we start evaluating each other on the basis of that we will never
be able to talk through and come to any kind of consensus or understanding.
Therefore get to know some ofthese people, get to know them as people whether
161 Not only did civil, respectful interaction emerge but multiple lasting relationships were formed in these
meetings that continue today. Interviews with Landt, Telsey, Koekkoek, Bowerman, Alderman and others
support this.
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you agree with them or not. And the recognition that neither one ofus have the
right to force our opinions and convictions on anybody else. We can have them
and we can express them but you know in a pluralistic society like ours when you
start to make political statements and try to get people to vote on it you are
forcing something down somebody's throat and that's not going to work. Not in
our society (Koekkoek, John. Personal Interview. 11 October 2007).
For many participants, these meetings went beyond meeting basic respect criteria. The
NCM forums allowed participants to imagine and prefer a deliberative model of conflict
resolution and NCMI granted them the tools to do so.
NCMII- An analysis of interviews with core participants demonstrate increased
measures of respect over time. Meeting commentary shifted over time along respect
measures before, within, and after the meeting process (T1-T3). This is reflected in
meeting commentary and interview transcripts. Core participant accounts confirm that
discussions and attitudes changed significantly as stakeholders became more open and
respectful over time.
Core participants in NCMII report perceived adequacy in respectful treatment by
other core participants throughout the meeting process. Once inside the NCM forum core
participants increasingly encouraged and facilitated improved civility. While some
participants were not satisfied with the outcomes ofthe process or even the way the
meetings were facilitated, there were no reported serious or systemic respect concerns,
even when explicitly asked.
For example, the most dissatisfied core participant reports respectful structure and
behavior in the NCMII forums. "I think Gayle pretty much kept that from not happening.
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I don't think anybody hogged the mike so to speak" (Interview 7). Another core
participant reiterates the highly respectful nature ofthe NCMII structure and interaction.
Ifyou are asking did anybody feel like they didn't get to talk? I am not aware of
it. Usually we had to go around the room and everybody had and opportunity.
There may have been somebody that wanted more time but I am not really aware
of that (Bowerman, Tom. Personal Interview. 5 October 2007).
Multiple core participants in NCMII expressed disappointment over the perceived
lack of consensus over defming and generating concrete solutions to the issue of growth
and sustainable development. There was a lack ofpractical consensus in the Statement of
Agreements. Defming and dealing with issues ofgrowth and sustainability were not
adequately addressed. Some felt there was little overall community impact (Bowerman,
Tom. Personal Interview. 5 October 2007).162
Despite these disappointments core participants expressed satisfaction along
perceived respect. Not one participant in either NCMI or II expressed serious perceived
concerns over the standards and practice ofthe meetings along power or respect. Despite
the shortcomings identified by some core participant most participant stakeholders
simultaneously expressed a belief the NCM process made a real difference. Participants
162 Some core participants this suggests that the NCMII was not internally successful in important and
potentially even deliberative ways. While not a matter of respect, core participants like Tom Bowerman or
Liz Cawood might argue that this is partial evidence of the lack of important and deeper deliberation in
NCMII. At a minimum these core participants felt that NCMII itself did not but could and should have
generated real deliberative consensus in a practical and applied manner. For example, Cawood states "we
didn't even come to consensus. I mean people were, I wouldn't call it horse trading but it was not a pretty
picture in the end in terms of, you, because you had this pressure to write something, you know, a lot of
what I do on my work is writing and I am a quick writer, but you have to know what the content is to be
able to write. And we had not come to consensus on content" (Cawood, Liz. Personal Interview. 12
October 2007). Tom Bowerman supports the perception of being rushed to generate a consensus that did
not necessarily exist. "I think that it didn't turn out the way that she wanted or that we were hoping that it
would... there was definitely the sense that we didn't have that commonality that was intended to be
achieved during the process" (Bowerman, Tom. Personal Interview. 5 October 2007).
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often found more common ground than they expected before the meetings started.
Participants like John Koekkoek support the voluntary acceptance of and incorporation of
NCM rules and standards along criteria ofmutual respect:
In the first weeks we met, we read about this kind of thing. About participation,
about seeking other people's views, thoughts and things rather than dominate, a
group dynamic orientation. This helped ... Gayle was very strong on not
compromising position, but compromise on way in which carry out convictions -
rejection, judging, evaluating, rejecting people on that basis - and I think you
know, even the situation with Nadia, our ability to deal with it as or make this an
issue or I can care about you as a human being. So I think sometimes it was the
group, sometimes it was the orientation, the way Gayle set it up (Koekkoek, John.
Personal Interview. 11 October 2007).
NCMII may have been a disappointment to some or even many of the core
participants in meeting the perceived deliberative goals of "efficiency," or "solving" the
problem, or in reaching community "consensus" or achieving some other goal of larger
community impact. However, NCMII was remarkable in meeting the deliberative
measures employed in this case, namely perceived relative parity and respect within
NCMI and II.
Within the NCMI and II, meeting participants report perceived adequacy along
minimum deliberative respect conditions. Participants felt included, genuinely listened to
and taken seriously by meeting participants and the Landt. This is illustrated in Table 16
below.
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Table 16: Perceived Respect within NCMI and II
Min. Ideal Inclusion Heard Incorporated
Del.
Conditions
DV: Yes: participants reported Yes: participants Yes: participants reported
Perceived feeling very satisfied that reported feeling they feeling taken seriously and their
Adequacy all core participants were and others were more perspective was brought into
equally included than adequately heard discussions and decisions
2. Respect and Perceived Adequacy outside the NCM
Findings- Polarized, exclusionary, and at times disrespectful attitudes were
common in the larger community preceding NCMI and II. No direct concerns about
respect were raised by interview subjects in either NCM case when core participants were
explicitly asked about concerns along perceived respect. However, there may be some
indirect indicators ofperceived respect concerns by those outside the NCM project. At
times, stakeholders expressed an interest in participation as core participants or in another
capacity (e.g. Community Leaders Panel), and some interested stakeholders were
excluded from core participant positions. At times, core participants within each NCM
project also implicitly suggested some concern over the closed nature ofthe NCM
process. This is evidenced in questions about success, where interview subjects indicated
feelings that the process was inefficient or opaque. These claims will be examined in the
following section.
A. Perceived Adequacy
NCMI- A lack ofgeneral respect among community stakeholders existed outside
and before the NCM process began. This lack ofrespect is clearly acknowledged by all
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interview subjects in NCMI. NCMI core participants also felt that NCMI increased levels
ofrespect in the larger community.
Participants were especially upset by the exclusionary and disrespectful nature of
community discussion about the gay rights issue. As previously mentioned, participants
also agree that the efforts ofOCA and other conservative and liberal stakeholders or
members ofthe public were actively seeking to exclude and marginalize each other. This
served to entrench interests and exacerbate disagreement and policy stalemate in the
public mind and in the political arena.
All interview subjects admit that the community was extremely polarized and that
disrespectful statements and actions were common. One statement by Telsey captures on
side ofthis overall sentiment in the gay rights issue:
I think the whole community was incredibly damaged by what happened around
that ballot measure. It was hideous. It created rifts in neighbors, in workplaces, in
everywhere. I may have told you this before but one of my motivations was, I
used to patronize a little, I liked to patronize local businesses, and I used to go to
this gas station that was these two older guys, and I felt that I had to ask these
guys, do you support this ballot measure that says I am the same as a pedophile
and a necrophiliac, and they said yes, and I said I cannot come here anymore, and
they said but but but, and I said I can't do it and I left in tears and I thought I don't
want to live in this community [emphasis added]. I may have had an extreme
reaction but I think it was indicative of the feeling in the area (Te1sey, Nadia.
Personal Interview. 9 July 2007).
Many attribute the creation of and eventual willingness to sit down and tryout the
NCMI process was due to the contentiousness and escalating lack ofrespect in the larger
community. Telsey captures this feeling when she states "It was so damaging and I think
people were really tired of it. And I think the conservative community could point to
things the Gay and Lesbian community did that they felt like that were and mean and
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attacking and vice versa. It sort ofwent downhill to not the best behavior on anybody's
part" (Telsey, Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007).
When explicitly asked if all relevant interests felt included in NCMI, Telsey states
''No. I am sure there are some people who feel there perspective was not there. Different
religions, parts of the gay and lesbian community, youth, no one was going to touch that,
they were impacted in a big way bit not represented at all. And I am sure there are others"
(Telsey, Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007). Also, the press claimed (according to
Landt) to be largely unaware of these proceedings and expressed frustrations over this
perceived exclusion, resulting in reduced and at times less favorable coverage (Landt,
Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007).
There is no direct data that would readily account for perceived lack ofrespect
with the process outside the NCM, if it did exist. However, core participants expressed
that other stakeholders probably felt excluded. Core participants also felt that
stakeholders would have felt more adequately included if the NCM process had sought
more public involvement. For example, one NCMI participant feels that NCMI might
have enjoyed more success on the public had been more active follow-up to involve the
public after the substantive meetings. "There was no public awareness of it, probably
never reached 5%. So there was that, I mean it could've been done" (Interview 6).
Additionally, while not clearly demonstrated in explicit terms, previously mentioned
comments about the lack ofunderstanding with or ineffectiveness of the NCM model
may reflect a larger feeling ofperceived disrespect by the outside community. This may
also be due to actual perceived shortcomings in the process. Either way it suggests that
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greater legitimacy and effectiveness in the NeM model could be accomplished by
incorporating public and stakeholderfeedback into the NCM design, implementation,
and possibly the meeting process itself. Some ofthis could have been accomplished
without the need to sacrifice a private meeting space.
Despite the potential perceived lack of respect by the outside community in
framing and implementing the NCM projects, Telsey believes the results ofthe NCM
process did impact the larger community along respect measures:
I think it [NCMI] had a tremendous impact. One thing is it changed the nature of
the discourse because things had gotten so hideous. And because Gayle had
structured it so that there was an advisory committee and all these other people
that had bought in and we were aware ofthem, that the ripple effect was
immediately felt and immediately changed some of the conversations. I know that
a lot of us got flak from our communities for participating. And yet I think our
experience, I think a lot ofpeople listened to it. I know that was true for me. I
know that was true for John K and a guy named Rick Rencher. He was used to
being seen as a renegade in the Christian community, on the edges. John K got a
lot ofreally hideous flak. But then being on Christian radio I think a lot of people
could hear him (Telsey, Nadia. Personal Interview. 9 July 2007).
Telseyalso later states that "I don't think things ever got to that point again. And I don't
think people would tolerate the kind oflanguage that was put in that" (Telsey, Nadia.
Personal Interview. 9 July 2007).
The precise impact outside the NCMI meetings is unclear and varies across
interview subject. However, all interview subjects mentions informal effects NCMI may
have had on the larger community attributed to the increase in respect among NCMI
participants. For example, another member of the Christian perspective states:
You know the participants were called, reconvened when the Promise Keepers
came to town. Every heard about that? And there was an effort to stop them from
using Autzen Stadium, so we got together about that. And that was a bigger
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group, involved Promise Keepers, involved New Community Group meeting,
involved other members ofboth communities (Interview 6).
Telseyalso cites specific instances of community action and personal influence that was
a product of the respect that was built in NCMI.
We got together a year later, seems like something happened and we all got
together again and issue a statement. Then there were offshoots of this, there were
the Promise Keepers and there were issues involved with that. There was a series
of series ofmeetings around feminism at Mother Kali's books. There were some
of the same people in that. I remember the whole group got together around
something but I don't remember what it was. And some ofus have just stayed in
touch. I am in touch with Rick Rencher still- forever (Telsey, Nadia. Personal
Interview. 9 July 2007).
This evidence - cited to support community impact - often concerns informal
examples. These include attitudinal or cultural shifts in the style of community forum
discourse or personal examples of change on the part of the NCM participants and their
behavior post NCM. The larger community's perceived respect is not clearly
demonstrated in existing evidence such as meeting minutes, secondary sources, or
interview transcripts. If the community had been more closely and actively involved in
the formulation and evaluation of the NCM process, especially in its initial design and
implementation, there may have been more clearly measurable, formal instances of larger
community impact along measures of mutual respect. However, these examples
demonstrate transformation along respect over time that continues to impact this
community to this day.
NCMII- Interview subjects widely acknowledge a general lack ofrespect in the
community outside of and before the NCM meetings began. Meeting participants were
upset by the nature of and lack of constructive discussion or movement toward any
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meaningful resolution of sustainable development issues. Interview subjects cite
controversy over the West Eugene Parkway - which continues today- as one example
that preceded NCMII. Participants suggested that "politics as usual" was only serving to
entrench interests and exacerbate disagreement and policy stalemate in the public mind
and in the political arena. 163
Within the NCMII process, Tom Bowerman recounted feelings of frustration with
the pace ofthe meeting and a sense of inefficiency in the process. This is evidenced by
statements that maintained the NCMII process did not reserve enough time and attention
to tackling the substantive issues ofgrowth and sustainability. For example, "my opinion
is that it was rushed because Gayle did a poor job ofprojecting how quickly or how
slowly that things were going to be done and that she got started on the heavy lifting too
late" (Bowerman, Tom. Personal Interview. 5 October 2007). Liz Cawood also reiterated
some of these concerns as did Larry Schanz in NCMI.
These concerns may have partially resulted from a sense of exclusion or lack of
stakeholder ownership in the features of the NCM design and process. At times
Bowerman or Cawood suggested a different direction or frustration with the process.
Participants recall that Landt would reply by saying "you are going to have to trust me on
this. The way the system works is that we have to really get comfortable with each other
and I don't think we are there yet" (Interview 9).
163 For more information on some of the historical and current controversy over the West Eugene Parkway
(WEP) see the following sites: http://www.oregon.gov/ODOT/HWY/REGION2/wep.shtml
http://www2.eugeneweekly.com/2001l010401lcoverstory.html
http://media.www.dailyemerald.com/medialstorage/paper859/news/200 I/O 1/09INewsIWest-
Eugene.Parkway.Stopped.For.Now-1972724.shtml
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Admittedly, NCM interview subjects did not often explicitly state any direct
respect concerns associated with Landt's largely insular and closed creation and
facilitation ofthe NCM model. However, one NCMII interview subject reported that the
meeting process had little impact in the community and suggested that "I think there
might have been some better credibility ifthere had been some sampling in some way of
public comment or public sentiment" (Interview 8). As this interview subject points out,
there were no community meetings that would have afforded perceived exclusion or other
concerns or comments to be voiced whether they existed or not.
The city of Eugene and the larger Lane County area remain polarized along issue
of growth and sustainable development. 164 However, according to previous studies,
meeting minutes, and interviews with NCMII meeting participants and meeting
facilitators, levels of respect among NCMII stakeholders increased significantly over the
time period when NCMII meetings occurred. This time period for these meetings was
January 1997 to September 1998. This increase in community respect outside ofNCMII
over time is indicated through indirect larger public and community interactions as
measured by newsletter text, the resulting Statement ofAgreement, and interview
statements from NCMII participants. 165
164 This is supported in meeting minutes from October 6th, 2005 during the Eugene "Mayor's Sustainable
Business Initiative Task Force Roundtable," which met to discuss polarization over what was characterized
as "economic vs. environmental concerns." This is also regularly supported in NCM meetings and other
local publications such as Impact Weekly or The Register-Guard.
165 Specifically, newsletters reflect improved in type and tone among previously alienated individuals and
organizations in the business and environmental communities. Second, the two constituencies increasingly
referred to each other in more positive and less alienated tones ofreference over time. These findings will
be examined below.
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A study ofNCMII by Patricia Gwartney published in Negotiation Journal
demonstrates increased levels of community wide respect. This increase in respect
occurred along issues ofsustainability and growth that temporally correspond to the
NCMII meetings. As noted earlier, NCM core participants were chosen because of their
leadership roles in community organizations representing business and environmental
interests. The members of these organizations periodically distribute constituent
newsletters, which were then used by OSRL and Gwartney as data sources for NCMII for
methodological evaluation.
These studies were published in Studies in Negotiation Journal and sought to
measure changes in outside community respect over time. Specific community
newsletters were used as a proxy measure of changing levels of respect over time. In a
study by Patricia Gwartney entitled Measuring the Long-Term Impact ofa Community
Conflict Resolution Process: a Case Study Using Content Analysis ofPublic Documents,
she justifies the usefulness of this particular data set.
Newsletters are valid gauges because they capture how organization members
speak to each other about significant decisions, important events, emergent issues,
and ongoing activities. Newsletters are also public organizational records; for
example, one organization's articles of incorporation require that newsletters
announce upcoming organizational elections a certain number ofweeks in
advance. In addition, constituents ofopposing organizations sometimes read each
other's newsletters (Gwartney 2002, 58).
Thus, according to Gwartney, divergent organizations understand and may
actually produce their newsletters knowing and even intending that nonmembers oftheir
group might read it. It follows then that newsletter text is considered a form of social
interaction between competing organizations' constituents (Gwartney, 2002).
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In the research originally conducted by OSRL, four newsletters were selected for
analysis in the Eugene-Springfield area. Each publication represented a group actively
involved in the ongoing community dispute over growth and sustainable development:
the leading business newsletter, a nonaligned citizens' group newsletter, and two leading
environmental organizations' newsletters. These newsletters were examinedfor three
months before NCM'sfirst meeting to six months beyond the final meeting (21 months in
all). 166
Survey analysis by Oregon Survey Research Laboratory shows that the core
participants were more likely than community members (that did not participate in the
NCMII) to engage in activities with someone who is known to oppose their views on
development and the environment. For example,
The change in the mean response ofthe core participants was significantly greater
than that ofthe control group (Hest, p < .05) ... 'Activities' consisted of
defending the viewpoint of, asking advice from, conveying a viewpoint of,
defending the reputation of, building a friendship with, sharing a meal with, and
asking someone with opposing viewpoints to speak to their organization" (Final
Report for the NCM II, September 2000, 14).
166 The six-month post-meeting data collection is intended to capture long-term impacts of the 17
community leaders' participation in NCM's conflict resolution process and the dissemination of their
experiences to their constituents. Coded newsletters comprised: 1. Eugene Area Chamber of Commerce
monthly newsletters from January 1997 to September 1998, including a combined November/December
1997 issue. The newsletter mailing list numbers 2,200 business interests in the region. 2. City Club of
Eugene monthly newsletters from January 1997 to September 1998. The City Club has 270 members. Its
newsletter was chosen because the organization strives for informed independence and membership
includes prominent citizens in the private and public sector. 3. Citizens for Public Accountability (CPA)
occasional membership newsletters from November 1995 and February 1998. Dates are approximate, as
documents were llildated. CPA represents environmentalists and non-business interests on development and
land use issues. Its mailing list comprises 730 people. 4. Friends of Eugene (FOE) occasional membership
newsletters from January 1996, February 1997, March 1998, and May 1998. Dates are approximate, as
most documents were undated. FOE's agenda largely overlaps CPA's. FOE's mailing list of 560 overlaps
CPA's by about 200.
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Measures ofrespect over time (T1/pre, T2/during, T3/post) are established over
time. 167 OSRL (and Gwartney) analyzed the content ofmonth1y newsletters from the
Eugene Area Chamber of Commerce, City Club of Eugene, Citizens for Public
Accountability, and Friends of Eugene. Each ofthese organizations had representatives in
the NCMII. The following is paraphrased from the OSRL report found on page 12 ofThe
Final Report for the NCMII September 2000:
The results of the analysis demonstrate a notable decline in negative passages,
phrases and sentences when referencing ideas or positions ofopposing
organization around growth issues. Coded passages in organization newsletters
became steadily more positive over time. For example, 54 percent of
alienate/polarize passages and two-thirds ofdon't listen/respect passages occurred
before August 1997. Over 60 percent of all positive passages occurred in or after
March 1998 (61 percent oflisten/respect, 61 percent of cooperate, and 64 percent
of citizen participation/involvement).
The Figures below show these changes over time. Figures 3-5 are reconstructed from
Patricia Gwartney's 2002 article entitled "Measuring the Long-Term Impact of a
Community Conflict Resolution Process: A Case Study Using Content Analysis ofPublic
Documents" (Gwartney 2002, 68-69). These graphs combine all three sets of positive,
negative, and neutral tones ofreference. The patterns show that each of the three
organization's positive comments increased and negative comments decreased over time.
167 "The documents' marked passages, sentences and phrases were substantively coded in three
dimensions: tone ofreference, to whom or what text referred, and issues mentioned. See Table One for
code lists. After briefings on NCM and intensive review ofdocuments, one seasoned coder designed,
developed and tested the coding scheme and trained two additional coders. Each coder independently coded
a complete document set. After coding, they conferred and compared results. Differences between coders
were rare and were resolved in discussion." Table 1 on page 60 shows how these phrases were coded
(Gwartney 2002, 59-60).
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Figure 3: Eugene Chamber of Commerce, Phrases' Content in Percents by Month,
January 1997-September 1998
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Figure 4: City Club ofEugene, Phrases' Content in Percents by Month, January 1997
September 1998
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As Gwartney explains,
Comparing 1997 and 1998, all organizations' newsletters showed substantial
increases in the number ofpositive passages and substantial decreases in the
number ofnegative passages per month. For example, the Chamber of Commerce
averaged 7.0 positive passages per month and 5.7 negative passages per month in
1997, but 19.1 positive passages and 2.0 negative passages per month in 1998.
The City Club in 1997 averaged 1.1 positive passages per month and 0.7 negative
passages per month, but in 1998 it averaged 9.0 positive passages and 0.4
negative passages per month. Environmentalists' newsletters show similar
changes. The three publications before 1998 averaged 3.7 positive and 9.0
negative passages, while those in 1998 averaged 9.0 positive and 6.7 negative
passages. The notable decline in negative passages in the membership newsletters
of the business and environmental groups over about two years occurred at the
same time that NCM was in progress. While there is some possibility that the
change could have been attributable to events and conditions unrelated to NCM,
we have no data that would allow us to disentangle causality to explain this
observed change in civility (Gwartney 2002, 67).
Did these improvements occur because the core participants encouraged their
constituent stakeholder groups to interact in more positive, collaborative ways with
stakeholders they were previously alienated from? Gwartney (2002) believes this is
readily supported in the coding analysis. Gwartney's analysis shows a drastic shift in
respectful tone over the time period that NCMII was occurring.
The quotes from participants' constituent organization newsletters suggest an
affirmative answer. They show that two NCM core participants actively promoted
new attitudes and behaviors among their constituents. Evidence from other studies
in NCM's evaluation shows that many other core participants also exhibited such
behaviors (Gwartney 2002, 71).
The change in respect did occur during the time period ofthe NCMII. However, the both
the original study conducted for Landt's Conflict Resolution Center by The University of
Oregon Survey Research Laboratory in September of2000 and Gwartney's (2002)
analysis conclude that "It is not possible to say for certain ifNCM was the cause ofthe
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improved regard measured in the newsletters ...but the change is indisputable and
dramatic" (Gwartney 2002, 69).
Respectful perceptions and statements after and outside the NCMII meetings were
clearly occurring with increasing frequency. However, one core participant was not
satisfied with the perceived level ofrespect occurring outside of the NCMII forums. In an
interview in 2007, Cawood complained of another perceived set ofoutside interests at the
table. Cawood also expressed concerns that core participants were discussing the issues
outside the forum. For example, "You could tell from discussions that people who tended
to be more progressive, were seeing each other all the time and were at least having
related conversations" (Cawood, Liz. Personal Interview. 12 October 2007). No other
interview subject made this claim nor did they express any reservations with the request
to avoid discussions outside of and relating to the substantive discussions taking place
within the NCM forums.
The aforementioned evidence suggests that the NCMII process helped restrain
disrespectful outside public commentary (at a minimum). Despite this, stakeholders and
members of the larger public-such as those represented by this particular interview
subject-may have felt the NCM process did not always meet their perceived thresholds
ofrespect.
Is there evidence of any larger community impact that fits evidence along respect
measures (pre and post NCMII)? Interview subjects believe that NCM made a difference
due to perceived adequacy concerning respect outside ofNCMII. For eighteen months
after the formal NCM process ended, half the participants continued to meet monthly
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(Landt, Gayle. Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). Some individuals reported the
formation of and/or the continued and current existence ofnew friendships and a
willingness to attend events they had previously viewed as the domain of the "other
group" (like the country fair) with members of the "other" group. Other informal
measures included calling or contacting members of the "other" group when issues came
up that in city council meetings that did not seem to fully reflect the position ofthe
"other" interests (Fitch, Tammy. Personal Interview. 26 October 2007).
Additionally, in Evaluating the Success ofthe NCM (November 1999) page seven
lists nine joint acts of cooperation undertaken by NCM core participants. 168 While
disappointed with some of the outcomes in NCMII, Susan Ban states, ''the model of
bringing diverse opinions a common table has been used again and again since that time
[in the larger community]" (Ban, Susan. Personal Interview. 12 October 2007). A former
elected city councilor and NCMII participant states believes that there were other
informal but direct community impacts ofNCMII as well.
It gave us a good idea, for example, when I got on city council, how to really
scope out what we were really asking ofspecial groups. Whether it was a blue
ribbon panel or whether it was a short term committee we wanted something
from. Ofhow to better sculpt their task and how to make sure we filled the
committee with a whole range of ideas, not just similar to us (Interview 10).
168 These acts are presented by Landt in Evaluating the Success ofNCMII (September 2000) as evidence of
increased levels ofcommunity respect that emerged after the NCMII meetings. These acts are: 1) Request
for extension of the Land Use Code Update Public Input Deadline; 2) Response to the Mayor's request for
joint input to the Land Use Code Update; 3) Jointly sponsored public Information hearings; 4) Reactivation
of city's Service Development Charges Committee; 5) Joint cooperation on selection of new Planning and
Development Director; 6) Introduction of new Organization Officers to one another; 7) Joint meetings on
nodal development to give input to city; 8) Joint information meetings with elected officials; 9) Continued
monthly meetings ofNCM Core Participants. This list of joint acts of cooperation outside NCMII and a
brief discussion of these acts can be found in "Evaluating the Success of the NCM" (November 1999,7-8).
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This same respondent states that the larger community also learned from the failures of
NCMII and not just its successes.
But also on ofthe things we learned from the group was how to make sure we
spelled out clearly enough the question we were asking of them so that they
would have an idea that, so when we reach a decision, or get enough information
on this we can come to a conclusion and bring back our recommendation. [We
also learned to] put a sunset on things. Give it a timeline (Interview 10).
Gwartney also claims ''NCM core participants and their previously alienated
constituencies increasingly collaborated to benefit the entire community" (Gwartney
2002, 70). Another core participant echoes this sentiment. Elected as the Commerce
President during the NCMII meeting, this participant states that "it was the year we
joined forces with members of the Friends ofEugene, the Neighborhood Leaders Council
and yes, even the Citizens for Public Accountability, where we worked together on the
land use code update. Who would have thought that possible a year ago?" (City Club of
Eugene, 12/98, 3).
After NCMII, one interview subject believes it may not have "solved" the
problem of defming a community consensus on sustainability and growth or even in
tangibly moving toward implementation. Nevertheless, they believe the meetings had a
larger community impact in facilitating respectful dialogue. This was observed first-hand
in local governance issues.
I saw it occurring not only on city council in Springfield but I saw it occurring
somewhat in Eugene on the city council. Saw it in different venues where people
were on different boards and going through different activities that were pretty
tough over the next couple of years and thought wow, maybe that little bit of
influence :fl.-om Gayle and the activities may have changed an outcome on how a
non-profit board handles something just because they were able to engage each
other rather than just step away (Interview 10).
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This participant felt that city government and individuals and organizations in the
community learned to how to draw from the success ofNCMII such as how to design and
conduct a deliberative meeting process to facilitate respectful dialogue.
One interview subject felt that NCMII presented a mechanism ofdiscourse to
transcend the larger politics as usual that surround issues ofsustainable development in
Lane County. The following quote supports the perceived informal, powerful impact of
NCM on the larger community in conducting community policy-making, especially
around controversial and complex issues.
It (NCMII) was successful in showing that there are other ways to accomplish
things, that given some parameters you can get opposing views in a room. And
not necessarily winning either side or having, but try to have a win-win. Try to
[md some things that you can agree to agree upon. And not lose your core values
and for the betterment ofthe community (Interview 10).
This interview and others clearly suggest a larger community. This impact appears to
have shifted public commentary and action to more respectful behavior. This indicates
that NCMII mattered and was successful along deliberative criteria ofperceived
adequacy.
However, outside ofthe NCMI and II, previous research suggests a shift in
outside respect that corresponds to NCMII forums. Stakeholders also report perceived
inadequate minimum conditions ofdeliberative respect within NCMI and II. Participants
did not feel all positions were adequately included, genuinely listened to or taken
seriously by Landt outside the NCM meeting process. This is illustrated in Table 17
below.
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Table 17: Perceived Respect outside the NCM
Min. Ideal Inclusion Heard Taken Seriously
Del.
Conditions
DV: No: participants and No: participants and No: a few participants report
Perceived outside stakeholders outside stakeholders poor or biased representation,
Adequacy report feeling excluded report not feeling heard implying some stakeholdersfrom forums due to meeting exclusion were not taken seriously
IV. Discussion: Representative Deliberation, Institutions, Respect, Issues Area, and
Openness
The NCM model was not explicitly designed as a deliberative institution it was
referred to in extensively deliberative terms. Both NCMI and II failed to meet a number
of ideal and perceived deliberative standards. However, after a review 0 fthe evidence, it
appears that NCMI and II met ideal and perceived deliberative standards during the
meeting process within both NCMI and II. This finding, by itself partially disconfirms
numerous ideal deliberative hypotheses. That is, respect, issue area, and openness
findings in NCMI and II illustrates numerous instances where non-ideal deliberative
scholarship refutes ideal deliberative assertions. Specifically, the NCM case comparison
supports previous case study fmdings (OHCR and OWEB) that suggest the adequacy of
representative deliberation and the importance ofadequate centralization standards. Also,
less respect does not appear to necessarily indicate reduced deliberation. Next,
deliberation appears to be more likely in issue areas that concern values while less likely
in issue areas that concern implementation. Finally, a closed process does not preclude
deliberation. That is, less openness does not necessarily result in less deliberation. I will
examine these fmdings in the fo llowing discussion.
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1. The Role of Representative Deliberation
Simply because a representative demographic sample exists in a given
deliberative forum does not mean these positions are any more likely to deliberate. In fact
respondents in this case support the satisfaction with representative deliberation in
policy-making, regardless of their ideal preference for a more robust participatory
process. NCM participants insisted that forums that consist ofparticipants that are more
open-minded, have a larger community audience and influence, and can fully articulate
their respective constituent group (whether through direct or indirect representation) are
more likely to be successful in terms ofmeasures like participant satisfaction along
respect than those that have participants with fewer ofthese traits.
The evidence in NCMIIII supports this position. Gayle intentionally recruited
high profile, influential, and concerned yet capable subjects - not just taking any willing
or eager recruit simply because they represented a diverse category of interest or
demographic trait (e.g. poor and non-white). Landt affirms the belief that core meeting
participants were voluntarily recruited according to their capacity to deliberate, articulate
a particular position, and to impact the larger community. "[Participants were chosen
according to] their ability to articulate their constituent group/s, to ensure that all major
perspectives were included in the meetings, and their perceived ability to act as viable
leaders whose resulting decisions their constituent groups would follow" (Landt, Gayle.
Personal Interview. 27 June 2007). Other core participants in NCM support this position.
"I think really that the criteria based on, was not on race, was not on male or female, it
was your position on economic growth and sustainability" (Interview 10).
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While ideal deliberativists often disagree, Landt and core participants in NCMI
and II recognize what some policymakers take for granted: the need to have practical,
institutional mechanisms to adequately (while not ideally) cope with problems of
representation and participation. In the absence of evidence that ideal deliberative
standards actually exist in practice or can be achieved in complex and controversial
issues with entrenched and influential stakeholders, the findings in NCMI and II suggest
the deliberative literature could more fully appreciate the need for practical standards and
evaluative deliberative mechanisms.
2. Non-ideal Deliberative Institutions Matter
The NCM process suggests that non-ideal institutionalized deliberative standards
can work to break policy stalemate by generating some levels ofagreement through
adequate parity and respect among stakeholders, even in the most controversial issues
such as gay rights. Examples in this case directly violate ideal deliberative standards and
include: a) limited group size; b) new representative standards such as discourse
representation (Dryzek 2008); c) a very selection intensive deliberative process (that
seeks traits such as openness and community influence) and; d) an institutional process
that initially institutionalizes a private deliberative space.
While not ideally deliberative, these institutional standards appear capable of
generating perceived adequacy in terms ofparity and respect. These standards can be
readily institutionalized, implemented, and evaluated. Non-ideal deliberative institutional
standards are replicable and generalizable. Conversely, ideal deliberative measures that
hold deliberation to standards of extensive type and numbers of inclusion without
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indicating when policymakers have crossed a minimum deliberative threshold, or have
gone "far enough" do not appear in and are therefore impossible to evaluate in existing
empirical research. As a result, ideal deliberative participatory standards alone appear
impractical and often unhelpful to formulating applied deliberative policy procedure.
3. Less Respect f:. Less Deliberation
Deliberative theorists like Jane Mansbridge or Fung and Wright (2003) often
insist that less respectful attitudes and treatment toward other relevant stakeholders in a
given issue area will result in less genuinely deliberative behavior. That is, ifwe
demonize or write off another group ofpeople representing a position we are
uncomfortable with, other divergent stakeholders are unlikely to see our perspective and
may even seek to avoid us entirely - like Nadia Telsey and the gas station attendants - or
refuse to work with them at all. Initially in NCMI, many participants were not willing to
sit down with those "other people" and thought that Landt was "crazy," or "out ofher
mind" to expect these people to listen to each other and to engage in anything resembling
deliberative behavior.
But that is exactly what happened in the NCMI case. At the end, core NCMI
participants universally spoke highly of Gayle, reported high levels of respect for the
"other position," and agreed to a third option that none of the stakeholders had originally
endorsed entering the community forums. 169
169 In the Statement of Agreements, participants expressed that we all live together and are willing to
tolerate our respective decisions concerning sexuality, whether we agree with it or not (Statement of
Agreements, 1994). NCMI interview subjects recall the transformative effect along respect measures that
occurred in NCMI and attribute this to the level ofemotion and the manner in which the issue was handled.
"Gayle mentioned this didn't happen in NCMII. I mean we got down to the guts of it and I think part of it
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Additionally, both NCM exhibited changes in respect, though the changes were
clearly more dramatic in NCMI. When speaking about this transformative behavior,
NCMI participants no longer used terms like them or other. Instead participant
stakeholders spoke about us, and used terms like we and our community. In addition,
there were lasting relationships formed between previously oppositional groups. For
eighteen months after the formal NCMII process ended, half the participants continued to
meet monthly (Gwartney 2002; Patricia, 2007). Land and other NCMI core participants
have publicly stated that the NCMI participants were more committed 2 years later
(Landt, 1996). Some NCMI core participants feel the experience was one of their most
profound experiences and forever changed their lives.
These statements represent a profound alteration of the previous status quo in
NCMI. Furthermore, these findings challenge the ideal deliberative hypothesis that lower
levels of respect decrease the likelihood that relevant stakeholders will engage in genuine
deliberation. In fact, Gayle Landt believes, and the NCMI and II cases support that lower
levels ofrespect can actually make deliberation a more attractive option when compared
to normal politics than draw on a competitive model ofpolitical conflict resolution. This
community divisiveness in NCMI may have actually helped contribute the energy
necessary to sustain a protracted and conflictual process. More clearly polarized camps
with fewer positions makes an issue less complex. It also makes people passionate.
According to Landt, this passion provides exactly the energy needed to sustain the slow
paced and often onerous task of deliberative conflict resolution (Landt, Gayle. Personal
was because it was such a personal issue and so it became very emotional, and just very real" (Telsey,
Nadia. Personal hlterview. 9 July 2007).
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Interview. 27 June 2007). The NCMI fmdings suggest a needed reconciliation between
ideal deliberative theory and the findings in NCMI .170
4. Issue Area Matters: Values or Implementation?
In NCMI and II all major identified independent variables in both cases were held
roughly constant. Despite this, the examined evidence suggests different levels of
satisfaction with and impact on the involved core participants and the wider local
community. How can this be explained?
Issue area was the only major variable that varied. That is, NCMI concerned the
issue ofgay rights while NCMII broadly concerned the notion of sustainable
development. In NCMI the issue ofgay rights was clearly defmed. The gay rights issue
generally situates stakeholders into two major positions. While there were clearly variant
positions within these camps they were respectively generally defmed as for or against a
full constitutional expression ofgay rights.
Conversely, in NCMII, all parties agreed that sustainable development was
desirable and recognized the potential long-term economic and consensus building
potential ofdivergent community interests around a shared conception ofsustainable
development. Therefore NCMII seemingly began with some consensus. To some core
participants, the initial appearance of agreement itself suggested greater issue tractability.
170 The statements from core participants in NCMI represent a profound alteration from the previous status
quo. Furthermore, these findings challenge the deliberative hypothesis that lower levels of respect decrease
the likelihood that stakeholders will engage in genuine deliberation. More recent and applied, policy-based
deliberativists have begun to assert that deep disagreement may not be correctly associated with less
deliberation. For example, deliberative scholars like (Gutman & Thompson, 1996) support this idea and
Beierle and Cayford argue that "while good preexisting relationships are conducive to public participation
success... a history ofconflict is not itself a barrier to the prospects of [deliberative] success" (Democracy
in Practice 2002, page 39).
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In fact, in NCMII positions over sustainability and growth were less clearly
defined. While stakeholders often attempted to or conceptually reduced the positions
within the sustainability debate when they described other outsiders as either corporate
pro-growth or anti-development factions, respectively the issue was not that simple.
There was intense disagreement over not only the proper implementation of "sustainable
development" practices but disagreement also persisted even in defming the term itself
What exactly did sustainable development mean? What were its boundaries? If a
definition could be approximated, what were its specific priorities and how are they to be
arranged?
Constructing a shared notion of what sustainable development would mean in
practice-as opposed to a more clearly defmed position ofopposed to or for a full
expression ofgay rights-involved real yet undefined stakeholder costs Gobs, resource
allocation) and arguably would be significantly enhanced through policy expertise.
Further complicating the issues, relevant stakeholders might oppose development type X
(industrial park) in their backyard but advocate for it if they were not directly affected.
Conversely, participants in the gay rights issue exhibited more stable preferences that did
not shift in this way. Gays and lesbians already lived in the community. They already
lived next door or attended local schools and churches. The "problem" was there and it
was not going away. However, in NMCII, due to the lack of a defined issue over defining
a future course of action, the number ofstakeholders and stakeholder positions
themselves remained unclear.
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Rather than simply agreeing to cease and desist-in NCMI this meant no longer
seeking to impose legal limitations or "costs" onto another stakeholder (taking away or
refusing to grant legal rights to)-NCMII potentially entailed substantial resource
investment as well as livelihood issues. This process ofimplementation is substantially
different than a deliberative process (as in NCMI) that seeks consensus over values. This
is reflected in the disappointment many core participants felt relative to generating any
consensus among divergent stakeholders as far as agreement over actual implementation
in the NCMII process. As one NCM core participant recalls in an interview,
I went home and opened and read the file and I read the document and I thought
this really is not what I thought it was. This is not as nice a product, even though I
had my reservations and I thought there were some rough areas I had given it
more credit in my memory than it really deserved and I went back and read it
fresh for the first time in like 6 or 7 years and I thought you know this is not a
very good product (Interview 9).
These fmdings suggest the difference in deliberative success, to the extent that it
existed in NCMI and II, may be attributed to the tractability of the NCMI issue itself If
an issue concerns implementation rather than values a deliberative process is less likely
to succeed in important ways. By important ways I mean generate higher levels of respect
and perceived adequacy for defining and implementing policy, as evidenced by the
NCMIIII comparison.
The participants in NCMII did exhibit higher levels ofrespect over time (TI-T3).
NCMII participants perceived relative parity was achieved in these meetings. Ultimately
however, the NCMII process did not generate concrete, measurable agreements in
defining the problem and its solutions. NCMII did not generate specific agreement
among the core participants on problem definition and solution. Many interview subjects
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believe there were many significant informal and incremental aspects to the influence of
the NCMII process. Ultimately, according to the same interview subjects, NCMII did not
clearly impact the community in terms ofdirect or formal impact. Often pointing to the
Statement ofAgreements that was ultimately produced, this document was the most
direct embodiment of an NCMII process that failed to forge a sense of agreement on how
to defme, set goals for, and implement ideas on sustainable growth and development in
Eugene and Lane County. This same frustration was not expressed among NCMI
interview subjects. Instead, NCMI was spoken ofin adequate if not transformative terms.
Even if participants are carefully selected, even ifidea11eve1s ofre1ative parity
and respect are achieved, in a contentious and complex issue with poorly defined issue
area parameters and priorities, specific policy and or transformative agreement utilizing a
purely deliberative model ofdecision-making may be less inappropriate or viab1e. l7l The
NCM findings suggest a more robust examination of the role of issue area in
institutionalizing a deliberative process. By more clearly understanding the issue area
conditions under which deliberation might be ripe for implementation, de1iberativists
might begin to form a more cogent response to critics that dismiss deliberative
governance as utopian, overly abstract, and impractical.
17l While not commonly articulated among deliberative scholars, institutional or policy based deliberativists
like Fung and Wright (2003) or Beierle and Cayford (2002) tentatively suggest that deliberative democracy
may be more appropriate in different issue areas. Some non-ideal deliberativists have begun to
acknowledge this. For example, "We thus begin, tentatively and abstractly, to sketch Empowered
Participatory Governance by laying out three general principles that are fundamental to all these
experiments: First, a focus on specific, tangible problems... " (Fung and Wright 2003, 15) Or, "Certain
kinds of environmental issues may [emphasis added] be less conductive to public participation than others"
(Beierle and Cayford in Democracy in Practice, page 36).
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5. Openness: Inclusion, Publicity, and Transparency
The NCM findings also contradict deliberative hypotheses concerning standards
ofopenness. Deliberative theory hypothesizes that less openness allows and therefore is
associated with reduced civility and therefore deliberation (Gutman and Thomposon,
1996; 2004). In Democracy and Disagreement, Gutman and Thompson (2004, chapter 3)
devote an entire chapter to the cause ofpublicity and the many reasons it should be
valued over "secrecy."
For example, "even in the face of some secrets that would promote better
deliberation, [in the short term] the publicity principle should prevail" (Gutman and
Thompson 1996, 126). Gutman and Thompson believe that uncompromising standards of
publicity will lead to more deliberation over time. Publicity provides a mechanism for
citizens to "decide together what kind ofpolitics they want ...The hope is that as they
offer [publicly] reasons for what they want, we will fmd a common moral ground.. .In
this way publicity provides the necessary means for transcending its own limits" (Gutman
and Thompson 1996, 127). Gutman and Thompson concede there are exceptions to the
rule that publicity will always lead to greater deliberation but overall they believe
publicity will produce more deliberation. This justifies their ideal position for unfettered
bl" 172pu lClty.
Deliberative scholars never attempt to question the need for public deliberation as
fully as possible. However, other less idealized conceptions ofdeliberative theory have
172 Other deliberative theorists like John Elster (1986) and Jiirgen Habermas (1975), also suggest that
unconstrained (or public) discourse will produce a common interest. Among others, Iris Young (2000), and
Shawn Rosenberg (2007) believe that secrecy over publicity would often lead to reduced deliberative
claims along multiple indicators such as power, centralization, and especially inclusion.
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more relaxed assumptions about the need for openness and inclusion under any and all
circumstances. The evidence in NCMI and II supports this position. In practice however,
every interview respondent in the NCM cases confIrmed-at a minimum-perceived
adequacy regarding institutionalized conditions of relative parity and respect.
Some deliberativists are willing to concede the need for privacy if the issue is
particularly contentious or threatening to major stakeholders. This is important in order to
better facilitate "genuine buy in." To facilitate deliberative behavior, there must be
institutional space where these stakeholders can state their real concerns and have them
acknowledged, no matter how unpopular to some, in order to proceed to deliberative
engagement. This may necessitate a safe, private space where these opinions will not be
demonized and alienate these stakeholders, as in NCMI (Landt, Gayle. Personal
Interview. 27 June 2007).173
A private safe space for the major stakeholders also implies a particular order for
building deliberative institutions to better facilitate deliberative strategies by relevant
stakeholders. That is, these private spaces are needed early in the process or at least
before public deliberation. This means that in particularly contentious issues, these initial
deliberative forums must still be as deliberative (open) or unconstrained as possible. They
should also be limited in size but work hard to identify and include all relevant
173 Deliberativists like Jane Mansbridge are willing to partially relax or qualify openness and inclusion
standards. The evidence of success in NCMI and II, at least along core participant satisfaction along
deliberative parity sand respect criteria, supports this position. Mansbridge acknowledges the need to
consider the nature of the issue and the phase in the deliberative process when making decisions about
openness. For example, Jane Mansbridge states that "Transparency is not always good. When complex
bargains must be struck, closed doors let negotiators speak freely, tryout potential solutions that on
reflection they may not want to stick with, and forge relationships out of the spotlight ofpublicity"
(Mansbridge in Deepening Democracy 2003, 194).
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stakeholder representatives. Finally, within these practical considerations, deliberations
must always work toward moving the forum to public deliberation as soon as possible
(Mansbridge in Fung and Wright, 2003).
Deliberativists generally have yet to adequately cope with deliberative institutions
in sequential terms along parity and respect criteria. Doing so implies a need to consider
ideal standards such as Gutman and Thompson's full publicity (1996). At a minimum, the
[mdings in NCMI and II suggest a needed reconciliation between the ideal deliberative
demands of full publicity and the practical reality ofbroad deliberative stakeholder
satisfaction and larger community impact associated with NCMI and II. To reconcile
these divergent perspectives, deliberativists might continue to explore mechanisms that
satisfY yet seek to continually improve robust standards ofpublicity within practical
institutional constraints. 174
174 More pragmatic deliberative research suggests a movement in this direction. Mansbridge's normative
proposition acknowledges a practical space for deliberation that can be temporarily "good enough" yet it
also carries normative expectations as well. That is, policymakers are expected to take all reasonable steps -
using existing standards arrived at with public and stakeholder involvement - to refine and improve their
methods. This justifies a higher threshold and rejects fixed deliberative standards as sufficient. Institutional
deliberative forums must continue to find ways to increase all measurable participation. The deliberative
process must be open as early and fully as possible. Notions of deliberative adequacy then become moving
targets, subject to subjective and higher standards as deliberative innovation continues and diffusion occurs.
Further research in this direction would serve to challenge deliberative critiques that question the
practicality and appropriateness of deliberative governance.
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CHAPTER V
CASE COMPARISON CHAPTER: HSC, OWEB, AND NCMI/II
I. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to broadly summarize and then assess the HSC,
OWEB, and NCMI/II along comparative measures of inside and outside ideal (theoretical
deliberative standards) and perceived parity and mutual respect (actual participant
perceptions). A summary descriptive account of the empirical findings in HSC, OWEB,
and NCMI and II illustrates a few comparative fmdings which I will discuss in the
following order:
I) Ideal deliberative parity is not associated with perceived parity.
2) Parity and respect are more closely associated outside ofdeliberative forums
than within.
3) Variance in outside relative parity does not influence the perceived adequacy of
inside relative parity.
4) Varying levels of relative parity do not result in variation ofintemal perceived
respect.
5) Increased deliberative satisfaction within participatory forums does not result
in increased perceived ideal outside parity.
At the end of each fmding discussion I will relate these comparative findings back to the
deliberative literature and discuss their significance for the policy-making process in a
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concluding section entitled deliberative significance. The following is a brief summary of
the deliberative significance section discussion that will follow in order:
First, what ideal deliberativists consider necessary to ensure deliberation within
participatory forums may not be that important (on deliberative terms) to actual
deliberative participant stakeholders. This fmding suggests, for example, a new
participatory standard (Dryzek 2008) or at minimum a disjuncture and needed
reconciliation between theoretical (ideal) parity standards and perceived parity
(participant criteria and thresho Ids) overall (non-ideal).
Next, a participatory forum designed to manage issues like parity and respect
appears to be more successful on these terms than an environment that does not attempt
to manage these issues. This fmding illustrates the design and implementation of
deliberative institutions needs to focus more deliberative attention to the outside process
before and during participatory forums and how it may contribute to viewing
participatory forums themselves in less legitimate terms.
Third, participant stakeholders can be satisfied with a deliberative forum and the
process within it despite the various outside deliberative transgressions that may occur
outside of the participatory forum. Participant stakeholders can independently assess and
by satisfied with the deliberative forum itself even according to non-ideal or alternate
deliberative criteria and thresho ids such as an initially closed process as leading to
increased levels of respect.
Fourth, respect and power do not seem clearly associated or dependent on one
another, as suggested in the deliberative literature. Even when parity varies inside and
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outside ofHSC, OWEB, and NCM these cases do not result in a variation of inside
perceived respect. This suggests that high levels of respect can be build without high
levels ofparity.
Last, deliberative forums appear to be affected by the process that occurs outside
of (prior to and during) the participatory forums themselves. No matter how deliberative
the forums, outside imbalances in power appear to affect participant perceptions about
the quality and extent ofparticipation in deliberative forums themselves. This finding
suggests that both deliberative theorists and policymakers need to more carefully account
for or shift their analytic gaze toward outside conditions ofparity and respect utilizing the
same criteria and when possible measures or thresholds in order to implement more
robust deliberative forums. Figure 6 below summarizes the overall [mdings in HSC,
OWEB, and NCMIIII by these theoretical deliberative variables and their overall
associated values. 175 Figure 7 offers a comparison of each case by variable.
175 The overall measures and values associated with each variable are rough approximations drawn from
evidence in each case to form conclusions. The measures themselves consist of a range of approximate
ordinal values which were generated subjectively and to help order and categorize the existing case data in
aggregate terms. These values consist of: very low, low, medium, high, and very high. The process of
ordinal data classification was originally developed by psychologist Stanley Stevens Smith (1946). His
article is entitled "On the theory of scales of measurement." This article was first published in Science 103:
677-680.
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Parity Parity Perceived Perceived Perceived Perceived
Inside Outside Parity Parity Respect Respect
Inside Outside Inside Outside
HSC High Low Medium Low High Medium
Low
OWEB Medium Medium High Medium High High
High
NCM Low Very High Very Low High Low
Low
Figure 7: Case Comparison (HSC, OWEB, NCM) by Variable
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II. Comparative Chapter Findings
Figure 6 and 7 illustrate several comparative findings which will be discussed in
the following section" These aggregate figures roughly capture the overall values for each
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independent and dependent variable by case. The following section discusses each of
these comparative findings separately and in more detail within and across each case.
Among the comparative findings in Figure 6 and Figure 7, the following observations
emerge:
1. Finding 1- Ideal deliberative parity is not associated with perceived parity.
The values for ideal deliberative standards of relative parity within HSC, OWEB,
and NCM do not match values for perceived adequacy ofrelative parity within the cases
examined. That is, participants within each participatory forum reported either higher or
lower perceived parity relative to ideal deliberative parity scores in each participatory
forum. Restated, no matter how hard forum organizers tried to create parity in each case,
those efforts had no effect on perceptions of equality and representation by the
participants themselves
Each case failed to meet ideal deliberative participatory requirements. Neither
extensive and (at a minimum) proportional stakeholder participation or actual
institutional goals of extensive participation among the most marginalized populations (as
in OHCR) were achieved in the cases examined. For example, both NCM cases failed to
meet ideal participatory deliberative standards. Group membership was carefully
controlled and screened. Despite this, high levels ofrelative parity and respect were
reported among core participants. This result was found within each deliberative forum
examined.
However, the HSC set extremely high participatory thresholds and worked
extremely hard to achieve them. The HSC was open to and incorporated public
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participation. 4 of 11 HS Commissioners were lay public representatives. This arguably
granted the public a substantive stake in HSC decision-making. Despite these high
scoring indicators of ideal deliberative parity within the HSC, the participatory health
care forums were perceived in the lowest adequate parity terms of the cases examined.
Within the HSC, high levels of ideal parity were actually perceived in adequate or
medium terms.
Within NCM and OWEB, significantly lower ideal deliberative parity efforts and
scores were perceived in highly adequate terms along parity criteria. OWEB did not and
does not necessarily set participatory thresholds comparably high (to HSC). While
OWEB meetings are open and decisions are comparably transparent, OWEB does not
necessarily actively solicit the participation ofall relevant stakeholders in its decisions.
Not only was the public not actively encouraged to participate in NCMIIII, the entire
substantive NCMI/II forums and their decision-making processes were closed entirely to
the public. Participants were carefully screened and severely limited. Despite failing to
set or adhere to ideal deliberative conditions of institutional parity, the practices within
OWEB and NCMI/ll were perceived in highly adequate terms while the HSC was not.
Finding 1: Deliberative Significance
Why do stakeholders perceive OWEB and NCMI and II in highly adequate terms
when the HSC tried much harder to meet ideal deliberative standards such as more
openness and actively seeking extensive participation? The criteria for and amount of
deliberative parity that stakeholder participants perceive may be very different that what
deliberativist would argue is actually necessary. After all, NCM was almost entirely
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closed and extensive participation was severely limited in standards (l\fCM) or in results
in all cases examined (OHCR, OWEB, NCM) yet participants perceived participation in
adequate terms and parity in exemplar deliberative terms, especially in NCMI/II where
the least amount ofopenness was displayed.
What ideal deliberativists consider necessary to ensure deliberation within
participatory forums may not be that important (on deliberative terms) to actual
deliberative participant stakeholders. For example, participant accounts across case
suggest that ifparticipation is "good enough" - access to decision forums, reasonable
information and decision-making transparency, and some measure of formal influence by
the major stakeholder interests is articulated and incorporated - then the actual process of
balancing competing interests and discourses within the participatory forums is much
more important to participants than whether participants are actively solicited and show
up in large numbers and aggressively participate. 176
This supports empirical chapter findings that dispute Cohen's (1989) notion of
extensive participation for a non-ideal participatory standard that Dryzek recently refers
to (2008) as discursive representation. That is, having different directly representative
types at numbers proportionate to the population (at a minimum) or extensive or
disproportionate numbers ofparticipants (relative to their position ofdisadvantage) may
be not be a necessary minimum condition for deliberation. Extensive deliberative
participation may not only be largely unachievable in practice but also possibly
176 Again, NCMVII offers an example for support. NCM was almost entirely closed and extensive
participation was severely limited in standards (NCM) or in results in all cases examined (OHCR OWEB,
NCM) yet participant's perceived participation in adequate terms and parity in exemplar deliberative terms,
especially in NCMVII where the least amount of openness was displayed.
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unnecessary for deliberation. Across case, meeting participants repeatedly suggested that
careful selection of meeting participants that could and would articulate the major
relevant stakeholder interests, were able and willing to respect one another, and were able
and willing to move from their polarized position was strongly linked to perceived
relative parity and respect among relevant stakeholders. 177
Perhaps careful participant selection to ensure minimum participatory
representation is more important than extensive participation. Whether participant
selection standards should stress attention to personality type (Landt, 2007)178, ability to
represent a particular discourse (Dryzek, 2008), or the institutional process (Dorf and
Sabel, 1998)-such as the OWEB Board selection or meeting process-discursive
representation appears able to engender a process where other interests can and are
genuinely considered among stakeholder participants within a participatory forum. 179
Each case examined supports the finding that deliberative success can be engendered
177 My interviews with Dave Powers, Gayle Landt, Paul Kirk, John K, and many others support the
principle of discursive representation, which is just beginning to be acknowledged in the deliberative
literature by theorists like John Dryzek (2008).
178 To resolve this apparent contradiction between ideal minimum standards which require extensive
participation and actual successful deliberative practice, the research in NCMVII suggests (and Landt
maintains as the NCM model is predicated on this assumption) that the type of individuals selected to
participate may be just as or more important than the demographic they represent. For example, power
concerns among relevant stakeholders over lack ofdiversity and disproportionate representation of certain
demographic groups were assuaged in these cases if individuals actively demonstrated other characteristics.
These characteristics generally consisted of the ability of individuals to articulate and represent their
constituent groups and a willingness to move from their position and respect the "other" perspectives.
These traits may be more powerful indicators of deliberation than the actual diversity and total numbers
that participate, as suggested by these case studies.
179 This finding is ofcourse tentative and largely outside the scope of this project as far as testability.
However, the idea that selection is more important than extensive participation oflarge numbers of
individuals affected proportional the total population or issue area impact is certainly an interesting finding
and important as a potential finding to more carefully explore to determine if this is true and what kind of
selection would lead to more deliberation seeking and emergence.
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without meeting onerous ideal deliberative participatory standards which are arguably
unachievable anyway.
The implications of the discrepancy between stakeholder participant standards
and ideal deliberative standards suggest a needed reconciliation of ideal and non-ideal
deliberative theory along standards ofparity. One viable example of this needed
reconciliation includes a reassessment ofparticipatory criteria. At a minimum, greater
attention should be paid to the criteria and criteria measurements and thresholds of
participants than a focus merely on idealized deliberative standards, such as those
surrounding participation.
2. Finding 2- Parity and respect are more closely associated outside of deliberative
forums than within.
Power is more closely linked to respect outside of deliberative forums.
Specifically, less balance ofpower and lower levels ofrespect were exhibited outside of
each participatory forum compared to within. Within participatory forums, respect
remains constant and high while parity varies considerably over case. However, outside
of these forums as power becomes more balanced perceived outside respect only
increases slightly and is not necessarily adequate. Figure 1 illustrates that the values for
ideal deliberative standards ofrelative parity are higher inside the HSC, OWEB, and
NCM relative to deliberative standards ofrelative parity outside the cases examined.
Ideal standards and perceived outside deliberative parity and respect measures are lower
in each case when compared by variable within each case.
Outside of the HSC, medical health professionals and health care industry
stakeholders were given special access to policymakers and politicians when considering
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OHCR and the HSC while other stakeholders are excluded from these discussions. This
exclusion and marginalization leads OHCR stakeholders to perceive conditions of outside
(and even inside) respect in inadequate terms. Or, in NCMIIII, relevant stakeholders were
almost entirely excluded from NCM design, conceptualization, and to a lesser extent
implementation. This appears to also have generated issues ofoutside respect as
community stakeholders complained of feeling excluded from participating and accessing
both NCMI and II.
In sum, along ideal parity criteria within the HSC, OWEB, and NCM the values
are high, medium-high, and low respectively. Along ideal parity criteria outside the
participatory forums, the values for the HSC, OWEB, and NCM are low, medium, and
very low. Perceived parity within and outside these participatory forums follow this
pattern as well. That is, outside perceived parity is lower than perceived parity within
HSC, OWEB, and NCM. Excepting OWEB (where perceived in and outside respect are
equivalent), values along perceived mutual respect are also lower outside than inside
participatory forums.
Finding 2: Deliberative Significance
These fmdings suggest that deliberative forums matter. These forums appear
capable oftransforming participant capacity to view interaction in highly respectful
terms even when parity is highly unequal. Outside of these forums an increase in parity
does not result in large increases or even necessarily adequate levels ofperceived respect.
This means a participatory forum designed to manage issues like parity and respect is
more successful than an environment that does not attempt to manage these issues.
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This is not surprising. When the playing field is made or attempts are
simultaneously made to balance stakeholder parity and generate increased level of
respect, stakeholders are generally more satisfied with these participatory forums that
grant attention to these issues than those that do not. Interestingly, however, a lack of
deliberative concern or careful attention to the outside process before and during
participatory forums may contribute to viewing participatory forums themselves in less
legitimate terms. Deliberativists generally have not fully appreciated the need to deal
with outside parity and respect with the same tools and standards exacted upon
participatory forums. This is evidenced by the lack of similar or careful attention to
managing outside issues of parity and respect and will be discussed in more detail in
Finding 5 below.
3. Finding 3- Variance in outside relative parity does not influence the perceived
adequacy of inside relative parity.
Stakeholders can be satisfied with a deliberative forum and the process within it
despite the various outside ideal deliberative transgressions that may occur prior to the
formation of and even during the participatory forum itself (e.g. when ideal outside parity
is low). This suggests that appropriate institutional structures and proper participatory
facilitation within these institutions can satisfy criteria of perceived adequate parity
within participatory forums despite the lack of ideal outside deliberative parity. 180 This is
evidenced though an examination of the findings in each case examined.
180 Importantly, it should be noted that this does not mean that participants are satisfied with outside
conditions (along parity and respect) or are unaware or unconcerned that outside factors may influence the
participatory forums themselves. This concern will be directly addressed in Finding #2 and 5 below.
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Figures 3-5: The HSC, OWEB, and NCM do not meet ideal specific and overall
deliberative parity standards according to ideal deliberative parity measures examined
outside each participatory forum. Despite this, participatory forums may be perceived in
adequate terms despite the considerable variation in parity outside ofHSC, OWEB, and
NCM. The following discussion illustrates the considerable variance in parity across case
through a summary account of the evidence examined in each case.
The inception, framing, and composition of the HSC were closed to the public
and a full range of interested stakeholders. Former governor Kitzhaber (then a state
legislator) convened a small group ofkey interest groups to conceptualize and frame the
nature of Oregon health care reform. This process led to legislation which created the
HSC and endowed the governor -Neil Goldschmidt at the time - with the authority to
compose the HSC. Former governor Goldschmidt constituted the HSC largely according
to the recommendations of Kitzhaber and Friends ofSB 27 (Pinkerson, 1992).
This process - which preceded the HSC itself - violates a number of ideal
deliberative criteria. 181 There was no formal meeting access in the process of creating the
HSC. No formal input such as a vote was given to a full range ofstakeholders. The initial
meetings that discussed the nature of health care reform and the creation and composition
of the HSC not only failed to actively recruit the public, they were closed entirely. They
were also non-transparent. This led numerous relevant stakeholders to view the HSC and
its decisions in skeptical terms.
181 See previous methodology section discussion for a review of the theoretical deliberative criteria used to
measure parity. These theoretical measures are independent variables that predict deliberation.
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In OWEB, Kitzhaber - who had then become governor - was careful to consult
and work with key governmental agencies and other important stakeholders early in the
process of conceptualizing the Oregon Plan, which later led to the formation ofOWEB.
However, the formation of OWEB itself consisted of a legislative process. Formal access
to the legislative sessions that considered the formation of OWEB was granted. However,
relevant stakeholders did not receive a vote. Public involvement was not actively
solicited. 182 In the end, the legislation that created OWEB also vested authority for Board
composition in the hands of the governor rather than a public process with any formal
public transparency or input. Additionally, the legislation that created OWEB did not
devolve significant authority over budgetary control. Additionally, the legislation that
created OWEB was driven by a concern for voluntary support oflocal watershed activity.
Accordingly, OWEB was not vested with the authority to mandate basic deliberative
standards among local watersheds.
Finally, the NCM was not a product of any formal state level activity. The NCM
model was conceptualized, implemented, constituted, and facilitated entirely by Gayle
Landt without formal public transparency or input. Landt sought extensive community
feedback in generating an initial list ofpotential core participants. However, participant
selection was driven by Landt without any formal public transparency or input.
Overall, ideal deliberative conditions varied considerably in each case examined.
Overall, outside ideal deliberative parity scored low in HSC, medium in OWEB, and very
low in NCM. These fmdings indicate that stakeholders can be satisfied with a deliberative
182 This information was acquired from an interview with an OWEB staff member in June of2009.
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forum despite a lack ofparity that may occur prior to the formation of and even during
the participatory forum itself. This is illustrated in the following set offigures (8-10)
below:
A. IV: Power OUTSIDE Deliberative Forums
Figure 8: OHCR: OUTSIDE HSC
Power Measures Level of Outside Parity
Type ofDevolution No control over inception, framing, and
composition
Formal meeting access No
Stakeholders receive formal vote No
Actively solicit feedback Low: Stakeholders excluded at times
Transparency Low: Meeting proceedings were closed
Figure 9: OWEB: OUTSIDE BOARD
Power Measures Level of Outside Parity
Type ofDevolution No control over inception, framing, or
composition
Formal meeting access Yes
Stakeholders receive formal vote No
Actively solicit feedback Low: Public feedback not actively sought
Transparency Medium: Formal proceedings were public
Figure 10: NCM: OUTSIDE NCMI and II
Power Measures Level of Outside Parity
Type of Devolution Control over all institutional decisions
Formal meeting access No
Stakeholders receive formal vote No
Actively solicit feedback Low: Public involved only in initial pool
Transparency Low: All parts ofNCM driven by Landt
Figures 11-13: Despite this considerable variation in ideal deliberative parity
measures, participant stakeholders reported-at a minimum-satisfaction along criteria
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ofrelative parity within each participatory forum. HSC stakeholders reported medium (or
adequate) levels of satisfaction along relative parity. OWEB stakeholders reported high
levels of satisfaction along relative parity. In NCM-where ideal deliberative parity
scores were very low-stakeholders also reported high levels of satisfaction along parity
criteria.
The HSC, OWEB, and NCM are perceived in adequate terms according to parity
measures within each participatory forum. This supports the fmding that participatory
forums may be perceived in adequate terms despite the considerable variation in parity
outside ofHSC, OWEB, and NCM. The following discussion illustrates this fmding
through a summary account of the evidence examined in each case.
The HSC-as a deliberative body-institutionalized and practiced a uniquely
public process in Oregon health reform. The HSC is exceptional in its aggressive and
creative attempts to involve the public and traditionally marginalized populations such as
the medically poor. Despite the excellent work of the various Commissioners and their
efforts to involve and incorporate public values into prioritization decisions, stakeholder
participants also felt the HSC itself and community forums were overly represented by
physicians and the health industry rather than lay members of the public or
representatives of the poor. Additionally, participant stakeholders that represented the
medically poor felt that the list rankings were ultimately driven in an opaque, closed
process.
Conversely, stakeholder participants expressed satisfaction with OWEB
representation in Board constitution and behavior. The perceived balance in stakeholder
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representation coupled with the voluntary nature ofOWEB generates high levels of
satisfaction, enhancing the credibility ofOWEB's process and decisions. While OWEB
may not always actively reach out to solicit stakeholder feedback, local watershed
representatives expressed satisfaction with OWEB's efforts due to the voluntary nature of
the program, the respect and assistance granted when local watershed representatives do
ask OWEB for assistance, and the tendency for OWEB to reach out to relevant
stakeholders at appropriate moments (such as when attempting change or implement new
policies).
The NCM do not initially appear to meet most ideal deliberative conditions of
parity. Formal meeting access was not granted. The meetings themselves were not open
to the public and meetings deliberations were not reported or discussed while the NCM
was in progress. Landt did not actively solicit community feedback and tightly controlled
participant selection. However, the high levels of satisfaction along parity within the
NCM forums are exceptional and far exceed perceived parity in either the HSC or OWEB
forums. Despite failure to meet these ideal deliberative parity criteria, NCM core
participants expressed extremely high levels of satisfaction with the NCM's non-ideal
deliberative mechanisms of establishing parity within NCM forums. This was particularly
evident in NCMI. Without exception and at a minimum, core participants expressed high
levels ofsatisfaction with and attributed the institutional process and Landt herself in
adequately balancing power within the NCM forums. IS3 In NCMI, overall participants
183 It should be noted that these statements assumed non-ideal evaluative criteria. At least one core
participant is on record as stating that power imbalances did exist in NCMII but that power imbalances
would always exist and that Landt took a number of adequate steps to ameliorate power imbalances
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expressed very high levels of satisfaction with the representatives that were chosen by
Landt and their behavior in meetings. In NCMII the representation was also expressed in
adequate terms while multiple interview subjects also expressed high levels of
satisfaction with participant selection and behavior. 184 This is illustrated in the following
Figures (11-13) below.
B, DV: Parity and Perceived Adequacy INSIDE Participatory Forums
INSIDE HSCdAddP11 P 'tF'Igure amy an ercelve equacy
Parity Measures Perceived Adequacy
Formal meeting access Yes
Stakeholders receive formal vote Medium: HSC inc. multiple interests
Actively solicit feedback Very High: HSC tries "everything"
Transparency Medium: rankings process "opaque"
Overall meeting process Medium: Good efforts, dominated by elite
Figure 12: OWEB: Parity and Perceived Adequacy INSIDE BOARD
Parity Measures Perceived Adequacy
Formal meeting access Yes
Stakeholders receive formal vote High: Board perceived as highly rep.
Actively solicit feedback Medium: Locals report often not solicited
Transparency Medium High: grant decisions opaque
Overall meeting process High: representative, open, responsive
including the selection process, rules ofcommunication, and facilitating mediative steps when power
imbalances did emerge.
184 Again, the evaluative criteria for these statements were generally based in non-ideal terms. That is, a few
core participants are on record as feeling that the core participant did not meet ideal demographic or socio-
economic representative standards. One NCMII core participant goes on record, stating that the ideological
representation seemed slightly skewed to the left. However, even in this statement the subject qualifies this
critique, noting the potential difficulty enlisting adequate discourse representation. In this case,
representation was adequate at worst. As a whole core participants generally considered representation
more than adequate along standards such as discourse representation.
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INSIDE NCMI d II, dAddP13 NCM P 'tIgure , . anyan ercelVe equacy an
Parity Measures Perceived Adequacy
Fonnal meeting access No
Stakeholders receive formal vote Medium: All participants incorporated
Actively solicit feedback Low: At times public felt left out
Transparency Very Low: Public upset wi closed process
Overall meeting process Very High: Participants felt inc" parity
Finding 3: Deliberative Significance
At a minimum, each participatory forum exhibited significant shortcomings along
ideal parity criteria. Despite this, participant stakeholders reported, also at a minimum,
adequate perceived levels of parity within HSC, OWEB, and NCMI and II. As
mentioned, this finding suggests that appropriate institutional structures and proper
participatory facilitation within these institutions appears capable ofsatisfying criteria of
perceived adequate parity within participatory forums despite the lack of ideal outside
deliberative parity.
Ultimately, policymakers are usually limited to and therefore more concerned
with and a deliberative forum that meets non-ideal or alternate deliberative criteria and
threshoIds, This fmding suggests that institutional limitations may not be an
insurmountable obstacle for designing and achieving deliberative institutional processes
even when outside parity among stakeholders is substantially unequal. That is,
institutions are capable ofgenerating deliberative outcomes that are perceived by
stakeholders as adequate along central deliberative measures like parity and respect.
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For example, consider openness, a bedrock principle and measure for most
de1iberativists to begin to establish any minimum claims ofde1iberation. 18s Multiple ideal
deliberative scholars hypothesize that the more public and open a participatory process,
the more deliberative the forum is likely to be. These fmdings do not fully support this
conclusion. Ifperceived adequacy along criteria ofre1ative parity and respect among core
participants within the NCMVII are viewed as valid measures ofdeliberation, the
evidence examined suggests that more openness does not necessarily increase the
likelihood ofdeliberation within a participatory forum. Less outside openness does not
necessarily result in less deliberation. The cases examined suggest this basic openness
hypothesis should be refined and further tested.
Some non-ideal deliberative scholars concede the practical shortcomings of ideal
deliberative theory and suggest further refmement ofhypotheses which link increased
transparency and openness to enhanced deliberation. For example, Jane Mansbridge
states that a good criterion for deliberation would not mandate full accountability in the
creative stages ofthe process but only in the later most public stages (Macedo 1999,
222), or in Deepening Democracy states that transparency is not always appropriate for
deliberation when problems are particularly complex (Fung and Wright 2003, 194).
However, the deliberative literature, to the extent that it acknowledges the need to qualify
the ideal deliberative demands ofcomplete openness and transparency still generally
avoid framing these propositions as testable hypotheses.
l85 This is perhaps most notably established by Iris Young in her 2000 work entitled Inclusion and
Democracy.
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The implications ofthis discrepancy between ideal standards ofopenness and
perceived parity within participatory forums further suggest a needed reconciliation of
ideal and non-ideal deliberative theory along standards ofparity such as participatory
measures and openness. At a minimum, greater attention should be paid to the criteria
and criteria thresholds ofparticipants than a focus merely on idealized deliberative
standards, such as those surrounding openness.
4. Finding 4- Varying levels of relative parity do not result in variation of internal
perceived respect.
These fmdings indicate that participatory forums can facilitate and build adequate
perceived internal respect, even if ideal deliberative parity remains unbalanced within or
outside 0 f participatory forums.
Figures 14-16: Along ideal deliberative parity criteria within the HSC, the HSC
enjoyed considerable devolved authority. The HSC was open to the public. The HSC
very actively solicited public and stakeholder involvement. HSC proceeding and
decisions were made publicly with formal and significant authority granted to relevant
stakeholder interests. OWEB enjoyed authority over grant criteria and awards while
being severely constrained along budgetary and centralization standards. However,
OWEB is open to the public and transparent in its proceedings and decisions. At times
OWEB attempts to solicit relevant stakeholders in its participatory forums. In practice,
OWEB also grants numerous relevant stakeholders a formal stake in OWEB decision
making in its composition. NCM was not granted with any formal state authority. NCM
was not open to the public and was not transparent. NCM did not actively solicit or grant
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formal access or influence to the public or relevant stakeholders in the proceedings or
decision-making.
Levels ofperceived mutual respect remained measurably high within the HSC,
OWEB, and NCM despite significant variation along ideal deliberative parity within and
outside the HSC, OWEB, and the NCM. Along criteria ofrelative parity both within and
outside each participatory forum respectively, the cases exhibited the following: the HSC
met high levels within and low levels ofrelative parity outside; OWEB met medium high
levels ofparity inside and outside of its participatory forums; and the NCM exhibited low
and very low parity scores inside and outside the participatory forums respectively.
Despite this considerable variation, perceived mutual respect within HSC, OWEB, and
NCM all remained high in each case. This is illustrated in the following Figures 14-16
below:
A. IV Ideal Parity Measures INSIDE Participatory Forums
Figure 14: OHCR: Ideal parity INSIDE HSC
Parity Measures Level of Inside Parity
Type ofDevolution HSC list control; no HSC composition
control; no total funding control
Formal meeting access Yes
Stakeholders receive formal vote Most: Multiple interests receive HSC vote
Actively solicit feedback High: Surveys, meetings, informal efforts
Transparency High: Decisions justified, made publicly
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Figure 15: OWEB: Ideal parity INSIDE BOARD
Parity Measures Level of Inside Parity
Type ofDevolution Local grant control; no Board composition
control; no total budget appropriation
control; partial budget control
Formal meeting access Yes
Stakeholders receive formal vote Most: Multiple interests receive OWEB
vote
Actively solicit feedback Medium: Solicits at but not to meetings
Transparency High: Decisions justified, made publicly
F' 16 NCM Id 1P 't INSIDE NCMI d IIIgure ea arny an
Parity Measures Level of Inside Parity
Type ofDevolution Control over all institutional decisions
Formal meeting access No
Stakeholders receive formal vote No
Actively solicit feedback Low: Only core participants are solicited
Transparency Low: Meetings are not discussed publicly
Figures 17-19: In each case, within the participatory forums, participant
stakeholders reported high levels of adequate mutual respect. Interview subjects and
meeting minutes repeatedly mention feeling included in the meetings (even ifnot always
actively recruited), feeling heard, and report feeling that their perspective/s were taken
into account by the Commission, Board, or other core participants (even if their
perspective did not alter existing or subsequent decisions),
The HSC took-and HSC participants confirm-extensive and exemplary steps to
make sure all participants got a chance to speak at the meetings, Testimony was not
censored and extra time was given ifneeded to incorporate all manner of testimony and
participants, HS Commissioners also reported-and HSC participants confirmed-that
the public and stakeholder values were clearly incorporated into the general
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ranking/prioritization scheme ofthe HSC. OWEB staff and Board members report-and
OWEB meeting participants confIrm-the Board works hard to make decisions and
distribute information in a very public manner. The Board and staff also report-and
participants confIrm-that OWEB works hard to incorporate public and stakeho Ider
feedback, even when highly critical.
Finally, Landt reports-and NCM core participants confIrm-the NCM was
designed and Landt actively practiced mechanisms to grant space for and actively solicit
extensive participant feedback through extensive rapport and communication exercises
and practices given to, expected of, and actively practiced by all NCM participants.
Additionally, Landt granted control of the substantive content-as evidenced by the
Statement of Agreements and supported in participant interview responses-to the
meeting participants themselves rather than dictated by or through any institutional
mechanism or standard. This is illustrated in the following Figures 17-19 below:
B. DV: Mutual Respect and Perceived Adequacy INSIDE Participatory Forum
Figure 17: OHCR and Mutual Respect
Respect Measures Perceived Adequacy
Stakeholders feel included High: Interviewed participants felt included
Stakeholders heard High: Interviewed participants felt heard
Stakeholders feel incorporated High: Interviewed participants felt
I incorporated
Figure 18: OWEB and Mutual Respect
Respect Measures Perceived Adequacy
Stakeholders feel included High: Interviewed participants felt included
Stakeholders heard High: Interviewed participants felt heard
Stakeholders feel incorporated High: Interviewed participants felt
incorporated
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Figure 19: NCMI/II and Mutual Respect
Respect Measures Perceived Adequacy
Stakeholders feel included High: Interviewed participants felt included
Stakeholders heard High: Interviewed participants felt heard
Stakeholders feel incorporated High: Interviewed participants felt
incorporated
Finding 4: Deliberative Significance
Deliberativists agree that parity and respect are essential criteria to consider when
implementing a deliberative process. Despite uncertainty or disagreement as to measures
and thresholds, deliberativists would also agree that some minimum level ofbasic parity
and respect are also essential to facilitating genuine deliberation. Implied in this
discussion is the notion that parity and respect are also closely related if not dependent on
one another. That is, without some level ofparity you cannot have real respect or that
without some minimum level ofrespect you cannot claim sufficient parity. These
comparative fmdings partially refute this assertion. Perceived mutual respect within
participatory forums is not neatly associated or even clearly associated with ideal
measures ofparity. Stakeholders within various participatory forums can build and
actively perceive high levels ofrespect regardless oflevels ofactual parity - according to
ideal deliberative criteria - within or outside these forums. Appropriate institutional
structures and facilitation can build mutual perceived respect inside participatory forums
without fully meeting criteria of ideal outside or inside parity.
However, this does not necessarily mean that respect and parity are not closely
related or that parity does not affect participant behavior within participatory forums.
Instead, this fmding indicates, at a minimum, that ideal parity and perceived respect
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appear to be measures that are distinguishable or somewhat independent of one another.
This may be because stakeholders can be and feel respected even under conditions oflow
relative ideal parity, as suggested by these comparative fmdings. Alternately, ideal parity
measures may not accurately capture stakeholder criteria ofparity and respect, when in
fact these concepts may be similar or closely related (e.g. mutually dependent) on one
another. Perhaps high levels of inside perceived respect can be explained due to adequate
minimum perceived conditions ofparity within allparticipatory forums (See Figure 6).
That is, parity does not have to be relatively balanced to foster respectful dialogue. If
parity is "good enough" then participants may be willing to engage relevant stakeholders
and feel listened to, taken seriously, and incorporated into policy considerations.
5. Finding 5- Increased deliberative satisfaction within participatory forums does
not result in increased perceived ideal outside parity.
No matter how respectful or equal a participatory forum-along criteria of ideal
deliberative parity or perceived parity or respect within the HSC, OWEB, or NCM-
participant stakeholders will continue to perceive inadequate levels ofparity outside of
the participatory forums to the extent that they exist along ideal deliberative parity
criteria. That is, ideal outside deliberative parity criteria scores match levels ofperceived
outside parity regardless of the variance in ideal deliberative parity, perceived parity, or
perceived respect within the HSC, OWEB, or NCM. Restated, forum participants appear
to be clearly aware of and sensitive to the level of outside parity no matter how
deliberative (in terms ofboth ideal and perceived deliberative parity and respect) the
participatory process within these forums.
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Figure 20-22: Neither the HSC nor any other public forum was endowed to
provide public information about, access to, or formal stake in the conceptualization,
framing, or composition of the HSC. HSC Participant stakeholders expressed frustration
and uncertainty about this process and the influence it had on the HSC and its
composition, its procedures, and decisions that reflects ideal deliberative measures of
outside parity.
The conceptualization, framing, and composition of OWEB conform most closely
to orthodox pluralist political process, namely interest group liberalism. This process took
place in Salem through a traditional legislative process rather than through extensive
deliberative statewide community forums. The hearings on OWEB were open to the
public but public participation was not actively solicited. Information about legislative
hearings could be obtained but the public was not actively educated about these
proceedings. Relevant stakeholders could testify in Salem but had exercised no formal
influence over any decisions.
Finally, NCM had no formal state authority. NCM did not actively solicit public
involvement in or grant formal meeting access to or stake in NCM conceptualization,
framing, or composition of the NCM. This process was closed to the public and relevant
stakeholders and was intentionally non-transparent.
Ideal deliberative parity scores within the HSC were high, OWEB parity was
medium high, and low within NCM. 186 As discussed, the HSC enjoyed considerable
devolved authority, was open to the public, and actively solicited public and stakeholder
186 For ideal deliberative parity scores within HSC, OWEB, and NCM see figures 14-16.
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involvement. HSC proceeding and decisions were public and granted significant
authority to relevant stakeholder interests. OWEB exercised authority over grant criteria
and awards but was constrained along budgetary and centralization standards. OWEB is
also open to the public and transparent in its proceedings and decisions. At times OWEB
solicit relevant stakeholder involvement in decisions and grants numerous relevant
stakeholders a formal stake in OWEB decision making. Finally, NCM was not granted
formal state authority, was not open to the public, and was not transparent. NCM did not
actively solicit or grant formal access or influence to the public or relevant stakeholders
in the proceedings or decision-making.
Perceived parity scores were medium within HSC, high in OWEB, and high in
NCM. 187 The HSC was a uniquely public process. The HSC aggressively attempted to
involve the public and traditionally marginalized populations. Despite this, stakeholder
participants also felt the HSC itself and community forums were overly represented by
physicians and the health industry. Additionally, participant stakeholders at times felt that
the list rankings were ultimately driven by elites in a closed process.
Stakeholder participants expressed satisfaction with OWEB representation and
behavior due to a perceived balance in stakeholder representation coupled with the
voluntary nature of OWEB. While OWEB may not always actively solicit stakeholder
feedback, local watershed representatives expressed satisfaction with OWEB's efforts.
Finally, the NCM do no meet ideal deliberative conditions ofparity. Formal meeting
187 For perceived parity scores within the HSC, OWEB, and NCM, see figures 11-13 above and review the
discussion that follows.
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access was not granted, meetings were not open to the public and deliberations were not
reported or discussed publicly. Landt did not actively solicit community feedback and
tightly controlled participant selection. However, participant stakeholders expressed
satisfaction along parity within the NCM forums despite failure to meet these ideal
deliberative parity criteria. For example, in NCMI and II, participants generally expressed
high levels ofsatisfaction with the representatives that were chosen by Landt and their
behavior in meetings.
Additionally, along perceived respect criteria within the HSC, OWEB, and NCM,
all cases exhibited high levels 0 f perceived adequacy. 188 As previously mentioned, in
each participatory forum, participant stakeholders reported high levels of adequate
mutual respect. Interview subjects and meeting minutes repeatedly mention feeling
included in the meetings (even if not always actively recruited), feeling heard, and report
feeling that their perspective/s were taken into account by the Commission, Board, or
other core participants (even iftheir perspective did not alter existing or subsequent
decisions).
Despite this variation and high scores along these parity and respect criteria
within each participatory forum, outside ideal deliberative parity and perceived outside
parity respectively remained constant. That is, the HSC scored low along in and outside
parity measures, OWEB scored medium along in and outside parity measures; and NCM
d 1 1 . d 'd' 189score very ow a ong ill an outS! e panty measures.
188 For perceived respect criteria and scores within HSC, OWEB, and NCM see figures 17-19 and review
the previous discussion of finding 4.
189 For ideal deliberative outside parity scores see figures 8-10 above and the discussion in finding 3.
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As mentioned, the inception, framing, and composition of the HSC were closed to
the public and a full range of interested stakeholders. There was no formal meeting
access in the process of creating the HSC. No formal input such as a vote was given to a
full range of stakeholders. The initial meetings that discussed the nature of health care
reform and the creation and composition of the HSC not only failed to actively recruit the
public, they were closed entirely. They were also non-transparent. This led numerous
relevant stakeholders to view the HSC and its decisions in skeptical terms.
In OWEB, Kitzhaber consulted key governmental agencies and other important
stakeholders early in the process of conceptualizing the Oregon Plan, which later led to
OWER However, the formation of OWEB itself consisted of a normal legislative rather
than deliberative process. Also, the legislation that created OWEB also vested authority
for Board composition in the hands of the governor rather than a public process with any
formal public transparency or input. Additionally, the legislation that created OWEB did
not devolve significant authority over budgetary control and mandated that OWEB was to
be driven by vo luntary support 0 flo cal watershed activity.
Finally, the NCM was not a product of any formal state level activity. The NCM
model was conceptualized, implemented, constituted, and facilitated entirely by Gayle
Landt without formal public transparency or input. Landt sought extensive community
feedback in generating an initial list ofpotential core participants. However, participant
selection was driven by Landt without any formal public transparency or input. Figures
20-22 will be discussed below. These figures illustrate perceived outside parity scores for
HSC, OWEB, and NCM.
A. DV: Power and Perceived Adequacy OUTSIDE Participatory Forums
Figure 20: OHCR: OUTSIDE HSC
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IV: Parity and Xs 1-5 DV1: Perceived Adequacy
Xl: Type ofDevolution Low: Stakeholders expressed frustration
with inception, framing, and composition
X2: Formal meeting access No
X3: Stakeholders receive formal vote No
X4: Actively solicit feedback Low: Stakeholders felt excluded at times
X5: Transparency Low: Stakeholders report frustration with
closed meetings
Figure 21: OWEB: OUTSIDE BOARD
IV: Parity and Xs 1-5 DV1: Perceived Adequacy
Xl: Type ofDevolution Medium: Future concern expressed with
inception, framing, or composition
X2: Formal meeting access Yes
X3: Stakeholders receive formal vote No
X4: Actively solicit feedback Medium: Stakeholders do not report active
solicitation
X5: Transparency Medium: Stakeholders do not report
extensive transparency
Figure 22: NCM: OUTSIDE NCMI and II
IV: Parity and Xs 1-5 DV1: Perceived Adequacy
Xl: Type ofDevolution No formal devolution
X2: Formal meeting access No
X3: Stakeholders receive formal vote No
X4: Actively solicit feedback Very Low: Stakeholders felt excluded
X5: Transparency Very Low: Stakeholders report frustration
with closed meetings
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Finding 5: Deliberative Significance
Even the most ideal deliberative forum structure and facilitation cannot overcome
awareness of and concerns over outside parity issues such as low relative parity. Outside
imbalances in power matter. Outside imbalances ofpower affect perceptions about the
fairness, legitimacy, and appear to influence the actual quality and extent ofparticipation
in deliberative forums themselves. To ameliorate the influence ofoutside parity on the
quality and extent ofparticipation within participatory forums and the organizations that
conduct them, more deliberative attention to the process of policy and participatory
forum conceptualization, framing, and composition ofparticipatory boards - immediately
preceding and outside these participatory forums - is likely to enhance deliberative
behavior within them.
The findings in NCMI/II support the need to focus on appropriate deliberative
measures and thresholds applied outside of participatory forums. For example, the
fortuitous ability to study NCMI/II under similar or controlled conditions - excepting
issue area - suggests that outside conditions like issue area itself matter. That is, issue
area influences participatory forums along criteria ofparity and respect. 190 When
comparing NCMI and II, the evidence examined suggests different levels of satisfaction
with and impact on the involved core participants within each NCM forum and among
the wider local community. This variance can be at least partially explained through
attention to the role of outside parity and respect along issue area itself The different
190 In both NCM I and II important independent variable were controlled: institutionalized rules, meeting
facilitator, geography, political culture, group size, time period, and so forth.
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issue areas in NCMI and II appear important to resolving the different outcomes and
perceptions when comparing NCMI and II.
Again, issue area was the only major variable that varied considerably. That is,
NCMI concerned the issue of gay rights while NCMII broadly concerned the notion of
sustainable development. In NCMI the issue ofgay rights was clearly defmed, had fewer
but more clearly divergent stakeholder, and exhibited lower levels ofrespect (than
NCMII). That is, to the general community and core participants, the issue was largely
dichotomous. The gay rights issue generally situates stakeholders into two major
positions. While there were clearly variant positions within these camps they were
respectively generally defmed as for or against a full constitutional expression ofgay
rights.
Conversely, in NCMII, all parties agreed that sustainable development was
desirable and recognized the potential long-term economic and consensus building
potential ofdivergent community interests around a shared conception ofsustainable
development. Therefore NCMII seemingly began with some consensus. To some core
participants, the initial appearance of agreement itself suggested greater issue tractability.
In fact, in NCMII positions over sustainability and growth were less clearly
defmed. While stakeholders often attempted to or conceptually reduced the positions
within the sustainability debate when they described other outsiders as either corporate
pro-growth or anti-development factions, respectively the issue was not that simple.
There was intense disagreement over not only the proper implementation of "sustainable
development" practices but disagreement also persisted even in defining the term itself
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What exactly did sustainable development mean? What were its boundaries? Ifa
definition could be approximated, what were its specific priorities and how are they to be
arranged?
Conversely, participants in the gay rights issue exhibited more stable preferences
that did not shift in this way. Gays and lesbians already lived in the conununity. They
already lived next door or attended local schools and churches. The "problem" is there
and it is not going away. However, in NMCII, due to the lack of a defmed issue over
defining a future course of action, the number ofstakeholders and stakeholder positions
themselves remained unclear.
As previously mentioned, the process of implementation is substantially different
than a deliberative process (as in NCMI) that seeks consensus over values. This is
reflected by the lower change in and overall levels of respect as well as the
disappointment many core participants felt about failing to generating any consensus
among divergent stakeholders as far as agreement over actual implementation in the
NCMII process. 191
These findings suggest the difference in deliberative success, to the extent that it
existed in NCMI and II, may be attributed to the tractability of the NCMI issue itself If
an issue concerns implementation rather than values a deliberative process is less likely
to succeed in important ways. By important ways I mean generate higher levels ofrespect
191 As one NCM core participant recalls in an interview "I went home and opened and read the file and I
read the document and I thought this really is not what I thought it was. This is not as nice a product, even
though I had my reservations and I thought there were some rough areas I had given it more credit in my
memory than it really deserved and I went back and read it fresh for the first time in like 6 or 7 years and I
thought you know this is not a very good product" (Interview 9).
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and perceived adequacy for defming and implementing policy, as evidenced by the
NCMIIII comparison.
The participants in NCMII did exhibit higher levels ofrespect over time (TI-T3)
within this case. NCMII participants perceived relative parity was achieved in these
meetings. Ultimately however, the NCMII process did not generate concrete, measurable
agreements in defming the problem and its solutions. However, more success was felt
among NCMI interview subjects. NCMI was spoken ofin adequate ifnot transformative
terms, as NCMI participants experienced higher levels ofintemal perceived adequacy
than in NCMII. Additionally, the Statement ofAgreements, while not generating concrete
and specific agreement, is perceived as having substantially altered the antagonistic
discourse surrounding gay rights issues in Lane County.
Even ifparticipants are carefully selected, even if ideal levels 0 f relative parity
and respect are achieved, in a contentious and complex issue with poorly defmed issue
area parameters and priorities, specific policy agreement utilizing a purely deliberative
model ofdecision-making may remain unlikely. While not commonly articulated among
deliberative scholars, institutional or policy based deliberativists like Fung and Wright
(2003) or Beierle and Cayford (2002) tentatively suggest that deliberative democracy
may be more appropriate in different issue areas. In The findings in NCMI and II suggest
a more robust examination ofthe role of issue area in institutionalizing a deliberative
process. By more clearly understanding the conditions under which deliberation might be
192 Some non-ideal deliberativists have begun to acknowledge this. For example, "We thus begin,
tentatively and abstractly, to sketch Empowered Participatory Governance by laying out three general
principles that are fundamental to all these experiments: First, a focus on specific, tangible problems... "
(Fung and Wright 2003, 15) Or, "Certain kinds of environmental issues may [emphasis added] be less
conductive to public participation than others" (Beierle and Cayford in Democracy in Practice, page 36).
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ripe for implementation, deliberativists might begin to form a more cogent response to
critics that dismiss deliberative governance as utopian, overly abstract, and impractical.
Restated relative to the comparative empirical fmdings, without focusing on ideal
and perceived parity and respect both within and outside participatory forums, it would
be difficult to resolve the disjuncture between ideal and non-ideal deliberative theory by
accurately testing deliberative propositions. With a focus on outside parity and respect it
is possible to assess the influence the outside environment may have on what happens
inside these participatory forums, i.e. that the outside issue area influences ideal and
perceived levels ofparity as well as perceived respect. Recognizing the role of issue area
as an independent, outside explanatory variable may in tum limit or enhance the potential
efficacy of institutionalizing a deliberative process. Regardless of the findings, an
acknowledgement of the need to partially broaden deliberative analytic focus would
likely shed some light on the role of outside variables on participatory forums along
criteria ofparity and respect.
300
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agreement brought rationality to debate. (June 18, 1994). Springfield News, Editorial.
Analysis of the Oregon Health Care Plan. (1994). Issues in Law & Medicine, 9 (4),
28.
Aronowitz, Stanley. (1993). Is a Democracy Possible? The Decline of the Public in the
American Debate. In Bruce Robins (ed.), The Phantom Public Sphere.
Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press.
Arrow, Kenneth. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: John Wiley
and Sons.
Barber, Benjamin B. (1984). Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age.
Berkeley: University of Califomia Press.
Bascom, Ruth. (June 30, 1994). Testimony Respectful. The Register-Guard, A14.
Bauer, Michael, Wang, Julie, Fitzgerald, John. (1996). Insurance Rationing versus Public
Political Rationing: The Case of the Oregon Health Plan. Public Budgeting and
Finance, Spring, 60-74.
Beierle, Thomas and Cayford, Jerry. (2002). Democracy in Practice: Public
Participation in Environmental Decisions. Washington D.C.: Resources for the
Future.
Benhabib, Seyla. (1991). Situating the Self. New York: Routledge.
-----. (1996). Democracy and Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
-----. (2003). The Claims ofCulture. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Berry, F. S. & Berry, W. D. (1999). Innovation and diffusion models in policy research.
In P. A. Sabatier (ed.), Theories ofthe policy process (pp. 169-200). Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Bickford, Susan. (1996). The Dissonance Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
301
Bidewell, R. D. and C. M. Ryan. (2006). Collaborative Partnership Design: The
Implications of Organizational Affiliation for Watershed Partnerships. Society &
Natural Resources, 19 (9),827-843.
Bonham, 1. and Rehg, W. (1997). Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Business News Staff (October 1998). The Business News. Eugene-Springfield, Oregon.
Button, Mark and Mattson. (1999). Deliberative Democracy in Practice: Challenges and
Prospects for Civic Deliberation. Polity, 31 (4), 610-637.
Carter, Larry Eugene. (1997). Health Care Reform at the Subnational Level: An Analysis
ofthe Diffusion ofHealth Policy Innovation Among American States.
Dissertation, University of Oklahoma.
Cigler, Allan and Burdett, Loomis. (1983). Interest Group Politics. Washington D.C.: CQ
Press.
Chambers, Simone. (2003). Deliberative Democratic Theory. Annual Review ofPolitical
Science, 6, 307- 26.
Clukas, Richard. (2005). Oregon politics and government: progressives versus
conservative populists. University ofNebraska: Edwards Bothers.
Cohen, 1., & Rogers, 1. (1983). On Democracy. New York: Penguin Books.
Cohen, Jean L. and Arato, Andrew. (1992). Civil Society and Political Theory.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Cohen, Joshua. (1989). Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy. In Alan Hamlin and
Philip Pettit (Eds.), The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
----. (1996). Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy. In S. Benhabib (ed.),
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries ofthe Political. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press.
-----. (1997). Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy. In 1. Bonham and W. Rehg
(eds.), Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Common ground exists. (June 17, 1994). The Register-Guard, A18.
Conviser, Richard. (1995). Universal Health Coverage, Rationing, and HIV care. AIDS &
Public Policy, Summer.
302
Cooling the Fires. (March 15, 1995). Clackamas County News Weekly, C2.
Dorf, Michael and Sabel, Charles. (1998). A Constitution ofDemocratic
Experimentalism. Columbia Law Review, (98), 267.
Dougherty, C.l (1991). Setting Health Care Priorities. Hastings Center Report, 21 (3).
Dryzek, John S. (1990). Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
-----. (2000). Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Duncan, Patty. (May 25, 1994). Dangerous Ordinance. The Register-Guard, Editorial
Section.
Dunn, William N. (1993). Policy Reforms as Arguments. In Fischer, Frank and Forester,
John, (Eds.), The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. Durham:
Duke University Press.
Duram, Leslie A. and Katharin G. Brown. (1999). Assessing Public Participation in U.S.
Watershed Planning Initiatives. Society & Natural Resources, 12,455-467.
Elazar, Daniel. (1984). American Federalism. New York: Harper and Row.
Elster, Jon. (1986). The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties ofPolitical Theory.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 112-113.
-----. (1998). Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Enthoven, Alain, and Singer, Sara. (1999). Unrealistic Expectations Born of Defective
Institutions. Journal ofHealth Politics, Policy and Law, 24 (5).
Eugene Weekly Staff (March 19,1998). What's Not Said. The Eugene Weekly.
Evaluation of the Oregon Medicaid Proposal. (1992). ADA Office ofTechnology
Assessment Congressional Board of the 102d Congress. U.S. Government
Printing Office.
Fessenden, Lynne (November, 1999). Evaluating the Success of the NCMII On Issues of
Growth and Sustainable Development in Central Lane County, Oregon (1997-
1998). The Conflict Resolution Center. Eugene Oregon, 97403-2111.
Few, Roger. (2001). Containment and Counter-Containment: Planner/Community
Relations in Conservation Planning. The Geographical Journal, 167 (2), 111-124.
303
Fi1ips, Janet. (March 19, 1998). State Group Formulates Solutions For Oregon. The
Oregonian.
Fischer, Frank and John Forester. (1993). The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and
Planning. Durham: Duke University Press.
Fischer, Frank. (1995). Evaluating Public Policy. Chicago: Nelson Hall Publishers.
-----. (2003). Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative
Practices. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fishkin, 1. S. (1991). Democracy and deliberation: New directions for democratic
reform. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Forester, 1. (1999). The Deliberative Practitioner: Encouraging Participatory Planning
Processes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fox, Daniel. (1999). Strengthening State Government through Oversight. Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and Law, 24 (5), 1185-1190.
Fox, Samuel Hugh. (2007). Collaborative Structure, Power and Place: a Case Study of
Four Western Oregon Watershed Councils. University of Oregon.
Fraser, Nancy. (1992). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to Actually Existing
Democracy. In Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fung, Archon and Wright, Olin. (2003). Deepening Democracy. London: Verso.
Greenburg, Warren. (1991). Competition, Regulation, and Rationing in Health Care. Ann
Arbor: Health Administration Press.
Gutman, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. (1996). Democracy and Disagreement.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
-----. (2004). Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gwartney, Patricia, Lynne Fessenden, and Gayle Landt. (January 2002). Measuring the
Long-Term Impact of a Community Conflict Resolution Process: A Case Study
Using Content Analysis ofPublic Documents. Negotiation Journal, 50-78.
304
Gwartney, Partricia. (October 1998). Coriflict Resolution Center: Document Coding and
Content Analysis, Methodology and Results. Oregon Survey Research Laboratory:
Eugene, Oregon.
Habermas, Jiirgen. (1984). The Theory ofCommunicative Action. Boston: Beacon Press.
-----. (1975). Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press, 108.
-----. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory ofLaw and
Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hajer, Maarten A; Hendrick Wagenaar. (2003). Deliberative Policy Analysis:
Understanding Governance in the Network Society. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Hamlin, Christopher and Shepard, Philip T. (1993). Deep Disagreement in Us.
Agriculture: Making Sense ofPolicy Coriflict. Boulder: Westview Press.
Hobbled. (1992). The Economist, 324 (7771),20.
Hudson, William. (2006). Democracy in Peril. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.
Innes, Judith E. and Booher, David E. (1999). Consensus Building and Complex
Adaptive Systems: A Framework for Evaluating Collaborative Planning.
American Planning Association, 65 (4),412-423.
Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Shapiro, Robert Y. (1999). The American Public's Liberalism
Meets its Philosophical Conservatism. Journal ofHealth Politics, Policy and
Law, 24 (5),1021-1031.
Keefer, Bob. (Apri17, 1996). Reconciliation. The Register-Guard, F1.
Kenney, Douglas S. et al. (2000). The New Watershed Book: A Directory of Watershed
Initiatives in the Unites States. Boulder: Natural Resources Law Center.
King, Gary, Keohane, Robert, and Verba, Sidney. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Koontz, Thomas M. and Elizabeth Moore Johnson. (2004). One Size Does Not Fit All:
Matching Breadth of Stakeholder Participation to Watershed Accomplishments.
Policy Sciences, 37, 185-204.
Kronenfe1d, Jacobs and Jacobs, Jennie. (1997). The Changing Federal Role in Us.
Health Care Policy. Westport: Praeger Publishers.
305
Landt, Gayle. (1994). What is a New Community Meeting? Eugene, Oregon.
-----. (November 1994). New Community Meeting 1. Statement ojAgreements. Eugene,
Oregon.
-----. (1994). Categories ojPeople Who Participate in the New Community Meeting
Model. Eugene, Oregon.
-----. (1994). Steps in the New Community Meeting Conflict Resolution Model. Eugene,
Oregon.
-----. (March 1997). AgendaJor Core Participants. Eugene, Oregon.
-----. (August 1997). AgendaJor Core Participants. Eugene, Oregon.
-----. (March 12, 1998). New Community Meeting II. Statement ojAgreements. Eugene,
Oregon.
----. (1998). Categories ojPeople Who Participate in the New Community Meeting II
Model. Eugene, Oregon.
-----. (1999). Evaluating the Success oJthe New Community Meeting II on Issues oj
Growth and Sustainable Development in Central Lane County, Oregon (1997-
1998). Eugene, Oregon.
-----. (September 2000). Final ReportJor the New Community Meeting II. Eugene,
Oregon.
Leichter, Howard M. (1999). The Poor and Managed Care in the Oregon Experience.
Journal oJHealth Politics, Policy and Law, 24 (5).
Lindblom, Charles. (1977). Politics and Markets. New York: Basic Books.
-----. (1990). Inquiry and Change: The Troubled Attempt to Understand and Shape
Society. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lowi, Theodore 1. (1964). American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political
Theory. World Politics, 16 (4),677-715.
-----. (1979). The End oJLiberalism: The Second Republic oJthe United States. Second
Ed. New York: Norton.
306
Macedo, Stephen. (1999). Deliberative Politics Essays on Democracy and Disagreement.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Majone, Giandomenico (1989). Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy
Process. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Manin, Bernard. (1987). On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation. Political Theory, 15
(3), 338-368.
Manley, John F. (1983). Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and II. The
American Political Science Review, 77 (2), 368-383.
Mansbridge, Jane. (1980). Beyond Adversary Democracy. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
-----. (1990). Beyond SelfInterest. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
-----. (1997). Activism Writ Small, Deliberation Writ Large. Paper presented to the
American Political Science Association, Washington.
Margerum, Richard. (2005). Statements Made During Dissertation Prospectus Proposal
Defense. University of Oregon. Spring.
Martin, Alyssa. (1995). Oregon's Health Care Plan: One State's Model. Journal of
Health & Social Policy, 6 (4), 25-35.
Mayes, Steve (1998). Schools Face Competition for Lottery Dollars in Vote to Support
Parks, Salmon. The Oregonian, All, October 14.
McLaughlin, Catherine. (1999). The Who, What, and How ofManaged Care. Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and Law, 24 (5).
Miles, Matthew B., and A. M. Huberman. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: an expanded
sourcebook. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Miller, G., Koekkoek, 1. (November 27, 1994). We all live in this community together.
The Register-Guard, B1.
Miller, Jeffrey and Liu, Joseph Tiang Yau. (1993). Oregon's Health Care Plan. The
World and I, (8), 102-111.
Morrow, Helen. (2003). The Imperative for Deliberative Justice in Health Care
Rationing. Prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association,
August, 28-31.
307
New Community Meeting II. (August 7, 1997). Meeting Minutes. Eugene, Oregon
New Community 1. (January 1994). Agenda and Training Materials Packet. Eugene,
Oregon.
Nino, C. S. (1996). The Constitution ofDeliberative Democracy. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Olson, Mancur. (1982). The Rise and Decline ofNations. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
The Oregon Health Care Proposal and the Americans with Disabilities Act. (1993).
Harvard Law Review, 106 (6), 1296-1313.
Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board. (2002). A Strategy for Achieving Healthy
Watersheds. Salem, OR: Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board.
Oregon. (2000). Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board Grant Administration Practices:
Summary. Salem, OR: Secretary of State, Audits Division.
Parenti, Michael. (1970). Power and Pluralism: A View from the Bottom. The Journal of
Politics, 32 (3), 501-530.
Pear, Robert. (1993). White House Expected to Back Oregon's Health-Care Rationing.
The New York Times, March 18th.
Petracca, Mark. (1992). The Politics ofInterests. Boulder, Westview Press.
Pincione, Guido and Teson, Fernando. (2006). Rational Choice, Democratic
Deliberation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pinkerson, Mary. (1992). The Oregon Health Plan: The Story ofan Experiment in
Governance. Dissertation, University ofSouthern California.
Planning and Development Department. (Prepared by City ofEugene Planning and
Development Department on February 1997). Final Report: Enterprise Zone
Advisory Committee
Planning and Development Department. (Presented to the City Council on December 5,
1994). Final Report: Council Committee on Economic Development. Eugene,
Oregon.
Prioritization ofHealth Services: A Report to the Governor and the Legislature. (1991).
Health Services Commission.
-----------------------
308
Robbins, Bruce. (1993). The Phantom Public Sphere. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Rogers, E. M. (1962). Diffusion of innovations. First ed. New York: Free Press. Fourth
Ed., 1995.
Rolph, Diane. (1996). A Comparative Study ofThree Watershed Partnerships in Oregon.
University of Oregon.
Rosenberg, Shawn W. (2007). Can the People Govern? Deliberation, Participation, and
Democracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rosenberg, Stacy. (2005). Watershed Restoration in Western Oregon: Landowners,
Watershed Groups, and Community Dynamics. University of Oregon.
Sabatier, Paul A. (2005). Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches to Watershed
Management. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sabel, Charles. (1994). Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions ofEconomic
Development. In Richard Smedberg and Neil Smelzer (Eds.), The Handbook of
Economic Sociology. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Sanders, L. M. (1997). Against Deliberation. Political Theory, 25 (3),347.
Schanz, Larry. (July 6, 1994). Councilman Explains Dissent from Rights Statement. The
Register-Guard, 11 A.
Schattsneider, E.E. (1960). The Semisovereign People. New York: Holt.
Schindler, R, K Aldred-Cheeck, and G.H. Stanley. (1999). Monitoring and Evaluating
Citizen Agency Interactions: A Framework Developedfor Adaptive Management.
General Technical Report PNW-GTR-452. U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station. Portland, Oregon.
Schon, Donald A. and Rein, Martin. (1984). Frame Reflection. New York: Basic Books.
Shapiro, Joseph P. (1992). To ration or not to ration. Us. News and World Report, 113
(6),24.
Sheplse, Kenneth. (1997). Analyzing Politics: Rationality. Behavior, and Institutions.
New York: W.W. Norton.
309
Shramm, C.l (1984). Can We Solve the Hospital Cost Problem in Our Democracy? New
England Journal ofMedicine, 311, 729-32.
Sirianni Carmen and Friedland, Lewis. (2001). Civic Innovation in America. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Skeels, Michael R. (1994). The Oregon Health Plan and Public Health. Journal ofHealth
and Social Policy, 6 (1),21-31.
Smith, Graham. (2003). Deliberative Democracy and the Environment. New York:
Routledge.
State of Oregon, Office of the Governor. (2000). The Oregon Approach to Environmental
Problems. Speech given by Governor Kitzhaber on January 2, 2000, OSU,
Corvallis, OR. http://www.governor.state.or.us/governor/speeches/s000106.html
State of Oregon, Salem. (1997). The Oregon Plan: Restoring an Oregon Legacy Through
Cooperative Efforts.
Stein, Arlene. (2001). The Stranger Next Door. Boston: Beacon Press Books.
Stone, Clarence. (1980). Systematic Power in Decision Making: A Restatement of
Stratification Theory. The American Political Science Review, 74 (4), 978-990.
Stone, Deborah. (1999). Managed Care and the Second Great Transformation. Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and Law, 42 (5).
-----. (2001). The Policy Paradox. New York: Norton.
University of Colorado, Boulder. (1996). The Watershed source book: Watershed-based
solutions to natural resource problems. Boulder, CO: University of Colorado,
Natural Resources Law Center.
Walker, 1 L. (1969). The diffusion of innovations among the American states. American
Political Science Review, 63 (3), 880-899.
-----. (1973). Comment: Problems in research on the diffusion of innovations. American
Political Science Review, 67 (4), 1186-1191.
Welsh, M. M. (2000). Discursive policy processes and the environment: Lessons from
case studies of public range management. Dissertation, University of Oregon.
Williams, Melissa. (2000). Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
310
Wondolleck, Julia M. and Steven L. Yaffee. (2000). Making Collaboration Work:
Lessonsfrom Innovation in Natural Resource Management. Washington D.C.:
Island Press.
Wright, Angela S. (2000). Citizen Knowledge and Opinion about Watershed
Management in the South Santiem Basin in Oregon. Oregon State University.
Wright, Angela and Schindler, Bruce. (2001). The Role ofInformation Sources in
Watershed Management. Fisheries, 26 (11), 16-23.
Wright, Jeff (March 13, 1998). Diverse Groups Find Surprising Consensus. The
Register-Guard.
Young, Iris. (1996). Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy. In
Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
-----. (1997). Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged
Thought. Constellations 3, 340-63.
-----. (2000). Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
